Nova Law Review 38, #1 by ,
Nova Law Review
Volume 38, Issue 1 2013 Article 1
Nova Law Review 38, #1
Nova Law Review∗
∗
Copyright c©2013 by the authors. Nova Law Review is produced by The Berkeley Electronic
Press (bepress). http://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr
NOVA LAW REVIEW 
VOLUME 38                FALL 2013                   ISSUE 1 
 
 
EXECUTIVE BOARD 
 
JOSEPH M. MORGESE 
Editor-in-Chief 
 
    LYDIA HARLEY  
          Executive Editor 
JORDAN M. GREENBERG  
 Lead Articles Editor 
 
STEPHANIA BERTONI 
Managing Technical Editor 
 
ARTICLES EDITORS 
 
MAEGAN BRIDWELL 
DANIEL DRAZEN 
MELANIE DUNKIEL 
STRATTON SMILEY 
JULIA STURGILL 
CAROLINE TABASH
 
KELLI LAGO 
 
ASSOCIATE EDITORS 
 
KIMBERLY WALD 
Assistant Technical Editor 
COLBY GROSSMAN 
 Goodwin Editor 
EVAN KOHN 
Assistant Lead Articles Editor 
   LINDA FRESNEDA 
Subscriptions Editor
          MICHELLE DELONG      MIKE LEONARD 
            Alumni Relations Editor                   Online Journal Editor 
            PATRICK ZALMAN    DANIEL LEWIN 
    Projects Editor                    Online Journal Editor 
CITRA REGISTE 
Membership & Diversity Editor 
 
FACULTY ADVISORS 
HEATHER BAXTER 
ELENA MARTY-NELSON 
1
: Nova Law Review 38, #1
Published by NSUWorks, 2013
SENIOR ASSOCIATES 
 
JILL ABERBACH 
MELISSA APONTE-MARTINI 
SARI CANAVAN 
TASHA DE MIGUEL 
ARIEL ENISMAN 
CHRISTINA LEHM 
BRITTNEY LITTLE 
JAY LONDON 
RYAN MCGLYNN 
ROBERT NEWMAN 
ELI POLLACK 
JON RICHMAN 
MELISSA ROJAS 
VANESSA SEBLANO 
MANNY SERRA-JOVENICH 
NATASHA SHAIKH 
CARI SHAPIRO 
HERB UZZI 
EMMI VAINO   
 
 
JUNIOR ASSOCIATES 
 
AARON BALL 
CHARLES ERIC BEARDEN 
TRICIA BRANKER 
GRACE BURGH 
ALYSSA CINA 
ALLISON CUCINOTTA 
ARIEL DERAY 
DAX DIETIKER 
MARISSA DUQUETTE 
JILL FELUREN 
FERNANDO FRANCO 
ELEN GANTNER 
NOVERA HAMID 
CALLIE HANNAN 
BRITTANY HENDERSON 
ASTRID HERVAS 
JACOB HERZEK 
JIBRAEL HINDI 
SHANNON KELLY 
CORY LAPIN 
KRISTA MARTI 
ELIZABETH MITCHELL 
WILLIAM MUELLER 
RICHARD NELSON 
VIRGINIA PAXTON 
ANDREW POLENBERG 
DANIELA POSADA 
KYLE ROBERTS 
DAVID SHAHEEN 
JACLYN SWITALSKI 
JAKE TOVER 
ANAILI TRIANA 
TINA TSIKIS 
JORDAN UTANSKI 
TOVA VERCHOW 
ANASTASIA WHITE 
AMANDA WINSTON 
 
 
2
Nova Law Review, Vol. 38, Iss. 1 [2013], Art. 1
http://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol38/iss1/1
NOVA SOUTHEASTERN UNIVERSITY 
SHEPARD BROAD LAW CENTER 
 
ADMINISTRATION 
 
Elena B. Langan, B.A., J.D., Interim Dean of the Law School, Associate Dean, Academic Affairs & 
Associate Professor of Law 
Carey Courson, Executive Assistant to the Interim Dean 
Lynda Harris, Executive Assistant to Associate Dean—Academic Affairs 
Catherine Arcabascio, B.A., J.D., Associate Dean, International Programs & Professor of Law 
David B. Cohen, B.A., Associate Director for International Programs 
Timothy Arcaro, B.S., J.D., Associate Dean for AAMPLE and Online Programs & Professor of Law 
Tracy Timberlake, AAMPLE Program Manager 
Jennifer McIntyre, B.S., M.S., Assistant Dean for Online Programs 
Jen Birchfield, Coordinator for Online Programs 
Linda F. Harrison, J.D., Associate Dean, Critical Skills Program & Associate Professor of Law 
Janet Mosseri, B.S., J.D., Associate Dean for Student Affairs 
Naomi Scheiner, Administrative Coordinator for Student Affairs 
Joshua Metz, B.S., B.A., CPA, Director of Administrative Operations 
Lynn Acosta, B.A., M.S., Assistant Dean for Student Services 
Veronica Kiszkiel, B.A., Assistant Director of Student Services 
Natalia Enfort, B.S., Graduation & Records Advisor for Student Services 
Marla Montesinos, Administrative Assistant for Student Services 
Olympia R. Duhart, B.A., J.D., Director of First-Year Lawyering Skills & Values Program & Professor of 
Law 
William D. Perez, Assistant Dean for Admissions 
Marsheila Bryant, Financial Aid Manager 
Joyce Warner, Financial Aid Assistant 
Nancy Sanguigni, B.S., M.B.A., Assistant Dean for Clinical Programs 
Tresha Barracks, Legal Assistant for Clinical Programs 
Indira Marquez, Legal Assistant for Clinical Programs 
Wendy Clasen, Administrative Assistant for Clinical Programs 
Jennifer Jarema, Director of Communications, Publications & Special Events 
Robert Levine, B.S., J.D., Assistant Dean, Career & Professional Development & Adjunct Professor of 
Law  
Cynthia Duval, Adjunct Professor, Associate Director of Career Services, Evening Division 
Denise Luczak, Associate Director of Career and Professional Development 
Catherine Zografos, Administrative Assistant to the Career & Professional Development Office 
Doug Kruse, Director of Alumni & Development 
Rebecca Allen, Director of Donor Relations & Stewardship 
Elena Rose Minicucci, B.A., J.D., Director of Alumni Relations & Adjunct Professor of Law 
Kathleen Perez, Assitant to the Director of Alumni & Development 
Meg Chandelle, B.S., M.B.A., J.D., Director of Advanced Lawyering Skills & Values & Adjunct 
Professor of Law 
Mary Butler, Coordinator of Advanced Lawyering Skills & Values  
Frank A. Orlando, B.S., J.D., Director of the Center for the Study of Youth Policy and Adjunct Professor 
Mary Paige Smith, B.A., M.L.S., Associate Director for Technical Services 
Rob Beharriell, B.A., J.D., Outreach & Reference Services Librarian 
Carolyn J. Brown, B.A., M.L.S., J.D., Outreach & Reference Services Librarian 
Heath Davis, B.S., M.L.S., Circulation Manager 
Danielle Giguere, B.A., Technical Services Assistant 
John Henderson, B.A., M.L.S., Technical Services Assistant 
Denise Luczak, B.A., J.D., Associate Director of Career and Professional Development 
Anneke Hercules, B.S., M.S., Associate Director of Admissions 
Miguel Hernandez, Assistant Director of Admissions 
3
: Nova Law Review 38, #1
Published by NSUWorks, 2013
Lakaye Carter, Admissions Coordinator 
Tanya Valdes, Admissions Coordinator 
Fran Tetunic, Director, Alternative Dispute Resolution Clinic & Professor of Law 
Geri Thaler, Administrative Assistant for Mediation Program 
Jason Rosenberg, B.A., M.B.A., Information Systems Administrator 
Mitchell L. Silverman, B.A., M.S., J.D., Reference and Patron Services Librarian 
Onekia Williams, A.S., B.F.A., Assistant Circulation Manager 
Eric Young, B.A., M.L.S., J.D., Assistant Dean for Law Library & Technology Center & Associate 
Professor of Law 
Avery P. Le, B.A., M.L.S., J.D., Emerging Technologies & Institutional Repository Librarian 
Craig Pharaoh, Assistant Circulation Manager 
Rebecca A. Rich, A.B., M.S., J.D., Senior Associate Director, Law Library and Technology Center 
Karen Rose, Assistant to the Assistant Dean of the Law Library & Technology Center 
Nicole Rodriguez, Building Operations Manager 
Bernadette Carnegie-Baugh, B.S., Administrative Director, Critical Skills Program 
Robert Jacobs, Secretary for Critical Skills Program 
Jessica Mcfarlane, Secretary for Critical Skills Program 
Jayme Cassidy, Adjunct Professor for the Veterans Clinic 
Chad Moulder, Clinic & Audiovisual Technology Coordinator 
David Alen, AV Coordinator 
Janet Corso, Faculty Coordinator 
Jesse Monteagudo, Legal Secretary 
Chantelle Spence, Faculty Assistant 
 
FACULTY 
 
Catherine Arcabascio, B.A., J.D., Associate Dean, International Programs & Professor of Law 
Timothy Arcaro, B.S., J.D., Associate Dean for AAMPLE and Online Programs & Professor of Law 
Heather Baxter, B.A., J.D., Assistant Professor of Law 
Brion Blackwelder, B.S., J.D., Director of Children & Families Clinic & Associate Professor of Law 
Randolph Braccialarghe, B.A., J.D., Professor of Law 
Barbara J. Britzke, B.A., M.A.T., J.D., LL.M., Critical Skills Instructor 
Ronald Benton Brown, B.S.M.E., J.D., LL.M., Professor of Law 
Johnny C. Burris, B.G.S., J.D., LL.M., Professor of Law 
Marilyn Cane, B.A., J.D., Professor of Law 
Timothy A. Canova, B.A., J.D., Professor of Law 
Kathy Cerminara, B.S., J.D., LL.M., J.S.D., Professor of Law 
Megan F. Chaney, B.A., J.D., Professor of Law 
Phyllis G. Coleman, B.S., M.Ed., J.D., Professor of Law 
Leslie Larkin Cooney, B.S., J.D., Professor of Law 
Jane Ellen Cross, B.A., J.D., Director of Caribbean Law Program & Associate Professor of Law 
Debra Moss Curtis, B.A., J.D., Professor of Law 
Michael J. Dale, B.A., J.D., Professor of Law 
Mark Dobson, A.B., J.D., LL.M., Professor of Law 
Douglas Lee Donoho, B.A., J.D., LL.M., Professor of Law 
Olympia R. Duhart, B.A., J.D., Director of First-Year Lawyering Skills & Values Program & Professor of 
Law 
Lynn A. Epstein, B.S., J.D., Professor of Law 
Michael Flynn, B.A., J.D., Professor of Law 
Amanda M. Foster, B.A., J.D., Assistant Professor of Law 
Pearl Goldman, B.C.L., M. Phil., LL.B., J.D., LL.M., Professor of Law 
Colleen Grady, B.S., M.S., J.D., Critical Skills Instructor 
Robert Gregg, B.A., J.D., Adjunct Professor, Critical Skills Instructor 
Joseph M. Grohman, B.A., M.A., J.D., Professor of Law 
Richard Grosso, B.S., J.D., Director, Environment & Land Use Law Clinic & Professor of Law 
Joseph Harbaugh, B.S., LL.B., LL.M, Dean Emeritus & Professor of Law 
Linda Harrison, B.A., J.D., Associate Dean, Critical Skills Program, & Associate Professor of Law 
4
Nova Law Review, Vol. 38, Iss. 1 [2013], Art. 1
http://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol38/iss1/1
Joseph Hnylka, B.A., J.D., Assistant Professor of Law 
Areto Imoukhuede, B.A., J.D., Assistant Professor of Law 
Robert M. Jarvis, B.A., J.D., LL.M., Professor of Law 
Judith Karp, B.A., M.L.S., J.D., Professor of Law 
Shahabudeen Khan, J.D., Critical Skills Instructor & Professor of Law 
Ishaq Kundawala, B.A., J.D., Assistant Professor of Law 
P. Camille Lamar, B.A., J.D., Assistant Professor of Law 
Elena Langan, B.A., J.D., Associate Dean, Academic Affairs & Professor of Law 
James Levy, B.A., J.D., Associate Professor of Law 
Kenneth L. Lewis Jr., M.S., J.D., B.Sc, Assistant Professor of Law 
Donna Litman, A.B., J.D., Professor of Law 
Elena Marty-Nelson, B.A., J.D., LL.M., Professor of Law 
Michael R. Masinter, B.A., J.D., Professor of Law 
Jani E. Maurer, B.A., J.D., Professor of Law 
Joel A. Mintz, B.A., J.D., LL.M., J.S.D., Professor of Law 
Heddy Muransky, B.A., M.Ed., J.D., Critical Skills Instructor 
Roma Perez, B.A., J.D., Associate Professor of Law 
Patricia Propheter, B.A., M.A., J.D., Critical Skills Instructor 
Rodney Rawls, B.S., J.D., LL.M., Critical Skills Instructor 
Gail Richmond, A.B., M.B.A., J.D., Professor of Law 
Michael L. Richmond, A.B., M.S.L.S., J.D., Professor of Law 
Eloisa C. Rodriguez-Dod, B.B.A., M.B.A., J.D., Professor of Law 
Bruce S. Rogow, B.B.A., J.D., Professor of Law 
Marc Rohr, B.A., J.D., Professor of Law 
Raul Ruiz, B.A., J.D., Critical Skills Instructor 
John Sanchez, B.A., J.D., LL.M., Professor of Law 
Florence Bih Shu-Acquaye, LL.B., LL.M., J.S.M., J.S.D., Professor of Law 
Charlene Smith, B.A., M.A., J.D., LL.M., Professor of Law 
Michele Struffolino, B.A., M.Ed., J.D., Assistant Professor of Law 
Fran L. Tetunic, B.A., J.D., Director, Alternative Dispute Resolution Clinic & Professor of Law 
Kathryn Webber, B.A., J.D., Assistant Professor of Law 
James D. Wilets, B.A., M.A., J.D., Professor of Law 
Tania Williams, B.A., J.D., LL.M., Skills Instructor 
Steven Wisotsky, B.A., J.D., LL.M., Professor of Law 
Eric Young, B.A., M.L.S., J.D., Assistant Dean for Law Library & Technology Center & Associate 
Professor of Law
5
: Nova Law Review 38, #1
Published by NSUWorks, 2013
ADJUNCT FACULTY 
 
Antoinette Appel, B.A., M.A., Ph.D., J.D., Adjunct Professor of Law 
Karina S. Arzumanova, B.A., M.S., J.D., Adjunct Professor of Law 
Scott Atherton, B.S., J.D., Adjunct Professor of Law, M.S.Emp.L. Program 
Ross Baer, B.A., J.D., Adjunct Professor of Law 
Denise L. Baker, B.A., J.D., Adjunct Professor of Law 
Steven Ballinger, B.A., J.D., Adjunct Professor of Law, M.S.H.L. Program 
Roshawn Banks, B.S., J.D., Adjunct Professor of Law 
Courtney Jared Bannan, Adjunct Professor of Law 
Mark K. Bromley, B.S., J.D., Adjunct Professor of Law 
Dale A. Bruschi, B.S., J.D., Adjunct Professor of Law 
Robert Campbell, B.A., J.D., M.P.H., Ph.D., Adjunct Professor of Law, M.S.H.L. Program 
Lydia B. Cannizzo, B.H.S., J.D., Adjunct Professor of Law, M.S.E.D.L. Program and M.S.Emp.L. 
Program 
Jayme Cassidy, B.S., J.D., Adjunct Professor of Law 
George Cavros, B.A., J.D., Adjunct Professor of Law 
Meg Chandelle, B.S., M.B.A., J.D., Director of Advanced Lawyering Skills & Values & Adjunct 
Professor of Law 
Michele Chang, B.A., M.H.A., J.D., Adjunct Professor of Law, M.S.H.L. Program 
Tracey L. Cohen, J.D., B.A., Adjunct Professor of Law 
Steven M. Collard, B.A., M.Ed., Adjunct Professor of Law 
Jude Cooper, Adjunct Professor of Law 
Michael Costantino, B.S., J.D., Adjunct Professor of Law 
Arthur T. Daus III, B.A., J.D., Adjunct Professor of Law 
Morton Diamond, M.D., Adjunct Professor of Law 
Hon. Robert Diaz, A.A., B.A., J.D., Adjunct Professor of Law 
Ken S. Direktor, Adjunct Professor of Law 
Susan Dubow, Adjunct Professor of Law 
Cynthia Duval, B.A., J.D., Adjunct Professor of Law, Associate Director of Career Services, Evening 
Division  
Rebecca Feinberg, Adjunct Professor of Law, M.S.H.L. Program 
Luis Font, Adjunct Professor of Law 
Hon. Rex Ford, B.S., J.D., Adjunct Professor of Law 
John A. Frusciante, B.A., M.S., J.D., Adjunct Professor of Law 
Myrna Galligano-Kozlowski, B.A., J.D., Adjunct Professor of Law 
Andrew Garofalo, B.S., J.D., Adjunct Professor of Law 
Jason A. Glusman, Adjunct Professor of Law 
Adam Scott Goldberg, B.S., J.D., LL.M., Adjunct Professor of Law 
Evan J. Goldman, Adjunct Professor of Law 
Anthony Gonzales, Adjunct Professor of Law 
Carlos F. Gonzalez, Adjunct Professor of Law 
Shanika Graves, B.A., J.D., Adjunct Professor of Law 
Arthur Green, Adjunct Professor of Law, M.S.E.D.L. Program 
Robert C. Grosz, Ed.D., M.S., B.A., Adjunct Professor of Law 
Jami Gursky, B.A., J.D., Adjunct Professor of Law 
Tonja Haddad-Coleman, J.D., Adjunct Professor of Law 
Ross Hartog, B.S., J.D., Adjunct Professor of Law 
Robert Hartsell, J.D., Adjunct Professor of Law 
A. Margaret Hesford, B.A., J.D., Adjunct Professor of Law 
Barbara Heyer, Adjunct Professor of Law 
Peter Homer, B.A., J.D., M.B.A., Adjunct Professor of Law 
Alfred Horowitz, B.A., J.D., LL.M., Adjunct Professor of Law 
Julie E. Hough, J.D., Adjunct Professor of Law 
Jacqueline F. Howe, Esq., Adjunct Professor of Law 
Cynthia G. Imperato, B.S., M.S., J.D., Adjunct Professor of Law 
6
Nova Law Review, Vol. 38, Iss. 1 [2013], Art. 1
http://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol38/iss1/1
G. Yasmin Jacob, B.A., J.D., Adjunct Professor of Law, M.S.Emp.L. Program  
Nick Jovanovich, Adjunct Professor of Law 
Norman Kaplan, Adjunct Professor of Law 
Neil Karadbil, Adjunct Professor of Law 
Jason Katz, B.S., J.D., Adjunct Professor of Law 
Daniel Kaufman, B.S., J.D., Adjunct Professor of Law  
Sue Ellen Kenny, Adjunct Professor of Law 
Kamran Khurshid, B.A., J.D., Adjunct Professor 
Ken Kugler, Adjunct Professor of Law 
Ira Kurzban, Adjunct Professor of Law 
Warren Kwavnick, Adjunct Professor of Law 
Allan M. Lerner, B.A., J.D., Adjunct Professor of Law 
Robert C. Levine, B.S., J.D., Assistant Dean, Career & Professional Development & Adjunct Professor of 
Law 
James Lewis, Adjunct Professor of Law 
Rochelle Marcus, B.S., M.Ed., J.D., Adjunct Professor of Law 
Lisa A. McNelis, B.A., J.D., Adjunct Professor of Law 
Chance Meyer, B.S., J.D., Adjunct Professor of Law 
Catherine M. Michael, B.A., J.D., Adjunct Professor of Law, M.S.E.D.L. Program 
Elena R. Minicucci, B.A., J.D., Director of Alumni Relations & Adjunct Professor of Law 
Alberto Moris, Assistant Professor of Law 
Gerald M. Morris, B.A., J.D., LL.M, Adjunct Professor of Law, M.S.H.L. Program 
Charles B. Morton, Jr., B.A., J.D., Adjunct Professor of Law 
Hon. Spencer J. Multack, B.A., J.D. Adjunct Professor of Law 
John Napolitano, Adjunct Professor of Law 
Robert N. Nicholson, B.A., J.D., Adjunct Professor of Law 
William Nortman, Adjunct Professor of Law 
Laura Pincus, B.A., M.A., J.D., Adjunct Professor of Law, M.S.E.D.L. Program 
Christopher Pole, B.S., J.D., Adjunct Professor of Law 
Ari Abraham Porth, B.A., J.D., Adjunct Professor of Law 
Vanessa L. Prieto, Esq., Adjunct Professor of Law 
Rachel Ricci, Adjunct Professor of Law 
Becka Rich, B.A., M.S., J.D., Senior Associate Director, Law Library & Technology Center 
Hasan H. Rizvi, B.S., J.D., Adjunct Professor of Law 
Michael J. Rocque, A.A., B.A., J.D., Adjunct Professor of Law 
Jose A. Rodriguez-Dod, B.S., J.D., Adjunct Professor of Law 
Morgan Rood, B.S., J.D., M.B.A., Adjunct Professor of Law 
Alison Rosenberg, B.A., M.S., J.D., Head of Outreach Services 
Thomas E. Runyan,Esq., B.S., J.D., Adjunct Professor of Law 
Philip G. Schlissel, B.A., J.D., Adjunct Professor of Law 
Maria Schneider, B.A., J.D., Adjunct Professor of Law 
Robert H. Schwartz, Adjunct Professor of Law 
Stacy Schwartz, B.S., J.D., Adjunct Professor of Law 
Matthew Seamon, Pharm.D., J.D., Adjunct Professor of Law 
Neal B. Shniderman, B.A., J.D., Adjunct Professor of Law 
Jodi Siegel, B.A., J.D., Adjunct Professor of Law, M.S.E.D.L. Program 
Mitchell Silverman, Reference and Patron Services Librarian 
Samuel Smargon, Adjunct Professor of Law 
Scott Smiley, BSEE, J.D., Adjunct Professor of Law 
Mindy F. Solomon, B.S., J.D., Adjunct Professor of Law 
Richard Stone, Adjunct Professor of Law 
Maxine K. Streeter, B.A., J.D., Adjunct Professor of Law 
Meah Tell, Esq., B.A., M.B.A., J.D., LL.M., Adjunct Professor of Law 
Debbie Thaler, B.A., J.D., Adjunct Professor of Law, M.S.H.L. Program 
Damian Thomas, J.D., Adjunct Professor of Law 
Ellen S. Tilles, B.A., M.S.W., Ed.S., J.D., Adjunct Professor of Law 
7
: Nova Law Review 38, #1
Published by NSUWorks, 2013
Emilie M. Tracy, Esq., Adjunct Professor of Law 
Dawn Traverso, B.A., J.D., Adjunct Professor of Law 
Rhonda Wallach, Adjunct Professor of Law 
Lee Weintraub, B.S., B.A., J.D., Adjunct Professor of Law 
Camille L. Worsnop, B.S., J.D., LL.M., Adjunct Professor of Law 
 
 
8
Nova Law Review, Vol. 38, Iss. 1 [2013], Art. 1
http://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol38/iss1/1
NOVA LAW REVIEW 
NON-DISCRIMINATION STATEMENT 
It is the policy of Nova Law Review to support equality of opportunity.  No 
person shall be denied membership in Nova Law Review or participation in any of its 
activities on the basis of race, color, religion, national or ethnic origin, sex, sexual 
orientation, age, or disability. 
PERMISSION 
Nova Law Review hereby grants permission to nonprofit organizations to 
reproduce and distribute the contents of its journal, in whole or in part, for 
educational purposes, including distribution to students, provided that the copies are 
distributed at or below cost and identify the author, Nova Law Review, the volume, 
the number of the first page of the article, the year of publication, and proper notice 
is affixed to each copy—unless, a separate copyright notice of an author appears on 
the article.  All other rights reserved.  All other inquiries for permission, including 
articles with a separate copyright notice of an author, should be sent to the attention 
of the Editor-in-Chief. 
MANUSCRIPTS 
Nova Law Review invites submissions of unsolicited manuscripts.  Articles 
submitted to Nova Law Review should conform to the guidelines set forth in The 
Bluebook:  A Uniform System of Citation (19th ed. 2010).  Articles may be submitted 
via mail, or e-mail and must be available on Microsoft Word.  E-mail submissions 
may be sent to the Editor-in-Chief, accessible at http://nsulaw.nova.edu/ 
students/orgs/lawreview/ or the e-mail address listed below.  All articles not chosen 
for publication are discarded after consideration.  Nova Law Review does not assume 
responsibility for the return of any materials. 
SUBSCRIPTIONS 
The Nova Law Review is published three times per year by students of the 
Shepard Broad Law Center.  The current annual subscription rate is $35.00.  Single 
issues are available for $12.00.  Canadian subscribers should add $5.00 for postage 
fees.  Foreign subscribers should add $20.00 for postage fees.  Subscriptions are 
automatically renewed unless notification to the contrary is received by Nova Law 
Review. 
Please notify Nova Law Review of any changes of address at least 30 days 
prior to issue release for the change to take effect.  The postal service will not 
forward your copies unless extra postage is provided by the subscriber.  Duplicate 
copies will not be sent free of charge.  Subscribers should report non-receipt of 
copies within 6 months of the expected mailing date.  Please address any 
correspondence to: 
 
 Nova Law Review 
 Shepard Broad Law Center 
 3305 College Avenue 
 Fort Lauderdale, Florida 33314 
 Phone:  (954) 262-6196 
 Fax:  (954) 262-3845 
 E-mail:  lawreview@nsu.law.nova.edu 
9
: Nova Law Review 38, #1
Published by NSUWorks, 2013
 IDENTITY:  LESBIAN LAWYERS IN SOUTH FLORIDA 
AN ORAL HISTORY 
CHARLENE L. SMITH, EILEEN SMITH-CAVROS, ANA ALVAREZ* 
 
I. INTRODUCTION ................................................................................... 1 
II. COMING OUT STORIES ....................................................................... 5 
A. Are Lesbian and Gay Male Issues Different? ....................... 6 
B. Queer Theory/Feminist Jurisprudence:  Relationship to 
Identity .................................................................................. 7 
III. HOW DID INTERVIEWEES SELF-IDENTIFY? ...................................... 10 
A. Law School Experience ....................................................... 13 
B. LGBTI Client’s and Court Experience................................ 19 
IV. FLORIDA LAW AS IT RELATES TO THE LGBTI COMMUNITY ........... 21 
A. Right to Marry .................................................................... 22 
B. What the Future May Hold? ............................................... 26 
1. Transfer of Property ............................................... 27 
2. Visitation Rights and End of Life Decisions ......... 28 
3. Living Facilities ..................................................... 30 
C. Adoption .............................................................................. 32 
D. Child Custody ..................................................................... 34 
E. Employment Discrimination ............................................... 37 
V. WHAT THE LESBIAN LAWYERS OBSERVED ABOUT THE LEGAL 
SYSTEM ............................................................................................ 37 
VI. CONCLUSION:  SOME MUSINGS ON IDENTITY AND LAW ................. 40 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Individual identity is a key concept in legal classifications.  
However, the concept of identity has an identity crisis of sorts.  Some 
theorists embrace identity—feminist theorists—and other groups eschew it—
queer theorists.  Identity inhabits realms beyond the theoretical—its 
spectrum continues all the way to the individual.  Identity can be construed 
as biological, personal, public, legal, political, historical, and fluid among 
many other sometimes complementary, but often conflicting classifications.  
Therefore, identities are more complex than mere singular categories.  
Kimberle Crenshaw was the first to specifically discuss the ideas of 
intersectionality and identity in a discussion of violence against women, 
noting, “experiences of women of color are frequently the product of 
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intersecting patterns of racism and sexism, and how these experiences tend 
not to be represented within the discourses of either feminism or 
antiracism.”1  Adding to Crenshaw’s observations about intersectionality, 
Patricia Hill Collins noted that: 
Gender, sexuality, race, and class hierarchies all require a 
favorable political climate.  While U.S. nation-state policies 
regarding marriage and family reflect dominant moral codes, they 
also regulate property relations.  Assumptions about marriage and, 
by implication, desired family forms remain supported by 
governmental policy, corporate policies, and the legal system.  For 
example, denying slaves legal marriages, forbidding interracial 
marriages, using marital status to determine taxation policies and 
social welfare state entitlements, and refusing legal marriage to 
sexually stigmatized individuals all reflect nation-state interest in 
regulating an allegedly natural institution.
2
 
The study of intersectionality has continued to pose questions not 
only on how sex and race might interact, but also on how the following 
intersect:  Social class, ethnicity, religion, age, sexual orientation, and 
multiple other ascribed or assigned statuses, characteristics, roles, and groups 
into which society and individuals are assigned or assign themselves.  A 
                                                          
* Charlene L. Smith, Professor, Nova Southeastern University, Shepard Broad Law 
Center.  In addition to her teaching obligations, she is Executive Director of the Inter-
American Center for Human Rights, a non-profit organization housed at the Shepard Broad 
Law Center. 
Eileen Smith-Cavros, Associate Professor, Nova Southeastern University, Farquhar 
College of Arts and Sciences.  She teaches sociology and anthropology classes while also 
performing field research in social and environmental justice issues in the United States, 
Mexico, and Ghana. 
Ana C. Alvarez received her J.D. from Nova Southeastern University, Shepard 
Broad Law Center, in May 2013.  Ana received a Bachelor’s of Science from the University 
of Central Florida, with a major in Political Science and a minor in Legal Studies.  Ana would 
like to thank Professor Smith for allowing her the opportunity to take part in the writing of this 
article.  Additionally, Ana would like to thank her family for their never-ending motivation 
and support, which made her involvement in this article possible. 
The authors want to thank Eric Young, Assistant Dean, Law Library and 
Technology Center, Nova Southeastern University, Shepard Broad Law Center, for initiating 
the oral history project.  The web link is:  http://nsulaw.nova.edu/library/kimballarchive/. 
1. Kimberle Crenshaw, Mapping the Margins:  Intersectionality, Identity 
Politics, and Violence Against Women of Color, 43 STAN. L. REV. 1241, 1243–44 (1990–
1991) (footnote omitted). 
2. Patricia Hill Collins, Gender, Black Feminism, and Black Political 
Economy, 568 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 41, 49 (2000), available at http://
www.jstor.org/stable/1049471. 
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female lawyer might have an experience different from a lesbian lawyer, or 
different from a gay male lawyer, or different from an African-American 
lesbian lawyer; a woman who is perceived as a lesbian lawyer might self-
describe differently if asked her own identity.
3
  As a result, we chose to take 
an oral history approach to this project with the belief that although all 
interviewees shared the characteristics of being lesbians who were also 
lawyers, each woman’s unique circumstances shaped who she was, how she 
saw herself, and how she interacted with the law.
4
  Thus, each woman 
defined herself in terms of identity.
5
  This project also considered how the 
legal system, the workings within it, and the concept of justice itself might 
                                                          
3. See Interview with Lilas Ayandeh, Attorney at Law, The Law Office of 
Lilas Ayandeh, P.A., in Fort Lauderdale, Fla., 3 (June 27, 2012) (on file with Nova 
Southeastern University, Shepard Broad Law Center Library); Interview with Jennifer 
Travieso, Attorney at Law, Ins. Law Advocates, in Fort Lauderdale, Fla., 1 (June 28, 2012) 
(on file with Nova Southeastern University, Shepard Broad Law Center Library). 
4. See Interview with Lilas Ayandeh, supra note 3, at 3; Interview with 
Robin L. Bodiford, Attorney at Law, Law Offices of Robin L. Bodiford, P.A., in Fort 
Lauderdale, Fla., 1–2 (July 17, 2012) [hereinafter Interview with Robin L. Bodiford (July 17, 
2012)] (on file with Nova Southeastern University, Shepard Broad Law Center Library); 
Interview with Robin L. Bodiford, Attorney at Law, Law Offices of Robin L. Bodiford, P.A., 
in Fort Lauderdale, Fla., 1 (Aug. 3, 2012) [hereinafter Interview with Robin L. Bodiford (Aug. 
3, 2012)] (on file with Nova Southeastern University, Shepard Broad Law Center Library); 
Interview with Seril L. Grossfeld, Attorney at Law, Seril L. Grossfeld Attorney at Law, P.A., 
in Fort Lauderdale, Fla., 1–2 (June 29, 2012) (on file with Nova Southeastern University, 
Shepard Broad Law Center Library); Interview with Linda F. Harrison, Assoc. Dean, Critical 
Skills Program & Assoc. Professor of Law, Nova Se. Univ., Shepard Broad Law Ctr., & 
Phyllis D. Kotey, Dir. of Cmty. Externship Programs & Clinical Assoc. Professor of Law, Fla. 
Int’l Univ. Coll. of Law, in Fort Lauderdale, Fla., 1 (Aug. 1, 2012) (on file with Nova 
Southeastern University, Shepard Broad Law Center Library); Interview with Lea P. Krauss, 
Attorney at Law, Lea P. Krauss Esquire, P.A., in Fort Lauderdale, Fla., 1 (July 17, 2012) (on 
file with Nova Southeastern University, Shepard Broad Law Center Library); Interview with 
Michelle M. Parker, Attorney at Law, Parker Law Firm, in Fort Lauderdale, Fla., 1 (June 30, 
2012) (on file with Nova Southeastern University, Shepard Broad Law Center Library); 
Interview with Monica I. Salis, Attorney at Law, Monica I. Salis, P.A., in Fort Lauderdale, 
Fla., 1 (July 9, 2012) (on file with Nova Southeastern University, Shepard Broad Law Center 
Library); Interview with Jennifer Travieso, supra note 3, at 1.  In 2012, the authors 
interviewed nine lesbian lawyers who practice in South Florida.  These nine responded to an 
announcement about the oral history project on the Gay & Lesbian Legal Network (“GLLN”), 
which was sent to all members.  Each of the lesbian lawyers granted an interview with the 
authors, which was videotaped, and is currently available on the Shepard Broad Law Center’s 
Library and Technology website at:  http://nsulaw.nova.edu/library/.  Videos were transcribed 
and those transcriptions are currently part of the Harris L. Kimball Memorial Digital Archive 
of Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Transgender, and Queer Florida Legal Oral History.  The web link 
is:  http://nsulaw.nova.edu/library/kimballarchive/.  Each one of the participants granted the 
interviewers permission to use information from the interview.  This article is a product of 
those interviews. 
5. E.g., Interview with Lea P. Krauss, supra note 4, at 1. 
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interact with the lesbian status shared by all interviewees and the 
understanding that being a lesbian and being a lawyer might mean very 
different things to each woman.
6
  We wanted to examine differences between 
the women’s narratives as well as similarities that arose.7 
It is important to note that the group of lesbian lawyers we 
interviewed was accomplished through a snowball
8
 sample of women who 
were practicing law, teaching law, or had practiced law in South Florida.
9
  
We acknowledge clearly that this was not a random sample and that South 
Florida—especially Broward County—is a unique place within the United 
States given its diverse population and international qualities.
10
  In 
addition—as noted in a National Public Radio (“NPR”) report on the 2010 
Census—Florida recorded the second largest number of same-sex couples in 
the United States, in spite of having a “constitutional amendment[] restricting 
marriage to a man and a woman.”11  With regard to the project, it does not 
completely include a full spectrum of minority lawyers—for example, no 
Hispanic-American lesbian lawyers or Asian-American lesbian lawyers were 
included in the study.
12
  This was not by design, but because none were 
reached through the snowball sample––an obvious limitation we were unable 
to address.
13
 
In relation to the lesbian lawyers, Newman
 
notes that belonging to 
“advantaged . . . sexuality-based groups can serve as cultural capital . . . as 
                                                          
6. E.g., Interview with Jennifer Travieso, supra note 3, at 17. 
7. See infra Part II–III. 
8. Survey Sampling Methods, STATPAC, http://www.statpac.com/surveys/
sampling.htm (last visited Nov. 11, 2013) (providing explanation of snowball sampling). 
9. Interview with Linda F. Harrison & Phyllis D. Kotey, supra note 4, at 1; 
Interview with Jennifer Travieso, supra note 3, at 1. 
10. See Broward is South Florida’s Most Racially Diverse, S. FLA. BUS. J. 
(June 28, 2011, 2:52 PM), http://www.bizjournals.com/southflorida/news/2011/06/28/
broward-south-florida-racially-diverse.html.  “Detailed racial breakdowns from 2010 [United 
States] Census Bureau data indicates that [thirty-seven] percent of Broward County residents 
are of a minority racial group.”  Id.  Further, “[t]he Williams Institute of Census has said that 
South Florida is one of the top spots for LGBT population [g]rowth.”  Patricia Davis, LGBT 
Population Increases 60% in Broward County Florida, FLA. EST. PLAN. L. BLOG (Aug. 23, 
2011, 3:09 PM), http://www.floridaestateplanninglawyerblog.com/2011/08/the-gay-south-
will-rise-again.html. 
11. Corey Dade, Data on Same-Sex Couples Reveal Changing Attitudes, NPR 
(Sept. 30, 2011, 2:51 PM), http://www.npr.org/2011/09/30/140950989/data-on-same-couples-
reveal-changing-attitudes; see also FLA. CONST. art. I, § 27. 
12. But see Interview with Lilas Ayandeh, supra note 3, at 19; Interview with 
Linda F. Harrison & Phyllis D. Kotey, supra note 4, at 1. 
13. See Survey Sampling Methods, supra note 8.  However, the study did 
include Jewish, Persian, Catholic, Protestant, African-American and Caucasian participants.  
See infra Part III. 
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illustrated by the historical preference for white, male, heterosexual 
employees over women, people of color, and homosexual or transgendered 
individuals.”14  If cultural capital “can determine a person’s social 
opportunities,” it follows then that in a society that is heterosexist, an identity 
other than heterosexual might be viewed as a liability in terms of cultural 
capital.
15
  If so, can it also have an effect on what we might call legal capital 
or opportunities within the legal system—from perspectives of career or 
client, of success or of justice?
16
 
II. COMING OUT STORIES 
Calhoun notes that the identities of lesbians (and gays) are usually 
considered from standpoints of sexuality.
17
  Her argument, however, is that 
lesbian identity is “best described as an identity that breaks heterosexual 
law.”18  While the authors of this paper do not ascribe to that as the single 
best description, there is within Calhoun’s claim an inherent and important 
truth.
19
  The identities of lesbian lawyers, their clients, and the greater lesbian 
community are closely intertwined with the law and legal decisions that 
affect them, directly or indirectly, or shape the way that society views 
lesbians and the way lesbians view society and the law.
20
  Thus, how lesbian 
lawyers see their own identities and those of their clients connects to how 
they identify the nature of law and justice as well as how they interact with 
the legal system.
21
 
Some things have indeed changed in the twenty-first century for 
lesbian lawyers in terms of identity; other things have not.
22
  One area that 
remains challenging is the declaration and/or negotiation of identity.
23
  Some 
of the interviewees did not come out as lesbians until after graduating from 
law school or later.
24
  Several delayed coming out for family concerns.
25
  
                                                          
14. DAVID M. NEWMAN, IDENTITIES AND INEQUALITIES: EXPLORING THE 
INTERSECTIONS OF RACE, CLASS, GENDER, AND SEXUALITY 27 (2005). 
15. Id. 
16. See id. 
17. Cheshire Calhoun, Commentary, Denaturalizing and Desexualizing 
Lesbian and Gay Identity, 79 VA. L. REV. 1859, 1859 (1993). 
18. Id. at 1860. 
19. See id. 
20. E.g., Interview with Jennifer Travieso, supra note 3, at 8–11. 
21. See, e.g., id. 
22. Sexual Orientation and Homosexuality, AM. PSYCHOL. ASS’N, http://
www.apa.org/helpcenter/sexual-orientation.aspx (last visited Nov. 11, 2013). 
23. Id. 
24. E.g., Interview with Lilas Ayandeh, supra note 3, at 1.  But see Interview 
with Linda F. Harrison & Phyllis D. Kotey, supra note 4, at 5–6. 
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Some lesbians married men and lived contrasting public and private lives.
26
  
Some had children, while others were never interested in children.
27
  Most 
interviewees minimized their coming out stories as they retold them to us 
initially.  However, as they further described events and family relationships 
in relation to coming out, most had some degree of trauma associated with 
coming out.
28
  This ranged from angst over deciding if, when, and how to 
come out, to strains on relations with some family members, some of which 
were or are not completely resolved by coming out.
29
  This declaration of 
identity and its consequences in a heterosexist and homophobic society can 
be an ongoing source of personal stress and difficulty that heterosexual 
lawyers never face.
30
 
A. Are Lesbian and Gay Male Issues Different? 
A few of the interviewees discussed their coming out as especially 
difficult because they were lesbian and not gay men.
31
  For example, one 
noted that, in spite of holding progressive political beliefs, her father was 
accepting of her gay brother, but not of her being a lesbian.
32
  However, 
another interviewee felt that gay men actually had more challenges than 
lesbians, commenting:  “I do think that many gay men find much more harsh 
discrimination and are treated differently than lesbian women.”33  
Additionally, an interviewee noted that gay men she worked with on 
committees did not want to hear about feminism;
34
 however, another 
interviewee remarked that when men found out she was a lesbian, they 
treated her as one of the guys.
35
  A few interviewees noted that being a 
woman presented many challenges in itself; even before the challenges that 
                                                                                                                                         
25. E.g., Interview with Lilas Ayandeh, supra note 3, at 1. 
26. Interview with Robin L. Bodiford, (July 17, 2012), supra note 4, at 8; 
Interview with Linda F. Harrison & Phyllis D. Kotey, supra note 4, at 2–3; Interview with 
Monica I. Salis, supra note 4, at 2–3. 
27. Compare Interview with Linda F. Harrison & Phyllis D. Kotey, supra 
note 4, at 1–3, with Interview with Seril L. Grossfeld, supra note 4, at 10. 
28. See Interview with Lilas Ayandeh, supra note 3, at 18–19; Interview with 
Seril L. Grossfeld, supra note 4, at 10. 
29. E.g., Interview with Lilas Ayandeh, supra note 3, at 19. 
30. E.g., Interview with Jennifer Travieso, supra note 3, at 10–13. 
31. See, e.g., Interview with Robin L. Bodiford (Aug. 3, 2012), supra note 4, 
at 2. 
32. Id. 
33. Interview with Lea P. Krauss, supra note 4, at 2. 
34. Interview with Robin L. Bodiford (Aug. 3, 2012), supra note 4, at 3. 
35. Interview with Lilas Ayandeh, supra note 3, at 9. 
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lesbianism might present.
36
  In general, however, there was a sense among 
most participants of shared issues between lesbians and gay men.
37
  Further, 
several of the interviewees represented multiple gay male clients, and a few 
described their legal victories for gay male clients as their proudest career 
moments.
38
 
B. Queer Theory/Feminist Jurisprudence:  Relationship to Identity 
One of the questions we wanted to consider was if the lesbian 
lawyers were influenced by any theoretical perspective that focused on either 
being a lesbian, a woman, or combinations of various approaches.  For 
example, in the 1980s, Adrienne Rich observed that the framework of 
feminist jurisprudence was one where lesbians were perceived as either 
“abhorrent, or simply rendered invisible.”39  Rich was interested in why 
heterosexual feminists “crushed, invalidated, forced into hiding and 
disguise[d]” women who loved other women, and why feminist scholarship 
totally neglected the lesbian existence.
40
  Rich’s conclusion was that the 
“lesbian existence is potentially liberating for all women.”41  Further, Rich 
observed that there was a difference “between lesbian existence and the 
lesbian continuum.”42  Her observation was that lesbians generally led or 
lead double lives in order to fit into the heterosexual normative, where 
women are second-class citizens. 
43
 
Fourteen years later, Elvia R. Arriola noted that she perceived “the 
law as a powerful instrument for cultural transformation.”44  Arriola was 
“call[ing] for [a] new perspective[] in discrimination analysis.”45  She notes, 
                                                          
36. Id. at 11; Interview with Linda F. Harrison & Phyllis D. Kotey, supra note 
4, at 18; Interview with Lea P. Krauss, supra note 4, at 2, 4. 
37. See Interview with Lilas Ayandeh, supra note 3, at 18–19; Interview with 
Seril L. Grossfeld, supra note 4, at 9–10; Interview with Linda F. Harrison & Phyllis D. 
Kotey, supra note 4, at 3. 
38. Interview with Seril L. Grossfeld, supra note 4, at 10; Interview with Lea 
P. Krauss, supra note 4, at 13; Interview with Monica I. Salis, supra note 4, at 6–7. 
39. Adrienne Rich, Compulsory Heterosexuality and Lesbian Existence, 5 
SIGNS: J. WOMEN CULTURE & SOC’Y 631, 632 & n.2 (1980) (commenting on Alice Rossi’s 
paper, Children and Work in the Lives of Women, delivered at the University of Arizona, and 
Doris Lessing’s book, The Golden Notebook). 
40. Id. 
41. Id. at 659. 
42. Id. 
43. Id. 
44. Elvia R. Arriola, Gendered Inequality:  Lesbians, Gays, and Feminist 
Legal Theory, 9 BERKELEY WOMEN’S L.J. 103, 105 (1994). 
45. Id. 
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as did Rich more than a decade before, that the feminist and other legal 
scholars failed to develop “adequate models of analysis in support of gay and 
lesbian victims of discrimination.”46  Also, part of her article is openly 
critical of lesbian legal theory because it too “perpetuates the problematic 
idea that lesbian invisibility should be remedied by simply carving out 
theories around singular traits by which a person might self-identify.”47  In 
her view, if lesbian legal theory embraces categorization into a single trait, it 
flounders because it fails to “capture a person’s full identity . . . to advance a 
meaningful principle of equality.”48  The legal theory that follows the idea of 
a single trait results in group-based equality.
49
  Arriola concludes that the 
courts instead should be looking at the total person, which might include 
“gender, sexuality, race, class, age, and ethnicity.  Each trait is important to 
one’s moral worth, yet none provides justification for the denial of equal 
rights under the law.”50 
Traditionally, the law has been hostile toward lesbians.
51
  Under anti-
sodomy laws, claiming the identity itself of lesbian—and acting on that 
identity—was deemed illegal.52  Even after lesbianism itself was no longer 
considered against the law, lesbians received unsatisfactory protection under 
the law from the perspectives of feminist and lesbian scholars.
53
  Professor 
Nancy Polikoff noted in 1986, in relation to child custody disputes involving 
lesbian mothers, “[t]he courtroom is no place in which to affirm our pride in 
our lesbian sexuality, or to advocate alternative child-rearing designed to 
produce strong, independent women.”54 
Several decades later, how do lesbian lawyers view related issues?  
This will raise questions about how and if contemporary lesbian identities 
influence the law, and if and how law may influence lesbian identities.  For 
example, do the interviewed lesbian lawyers believe the law treats lesbians 
and gays in a just manner?  Why do they believe what they do, and does it 
affect their interpretation of law, their practice of it, their relationships with 
juries and opposing counsel, their political beliefs, and their day-to-day 
lives?  However, examining the interviewees only in relation to the law is not 
                                                          
46. Id.; see also Rich, supra note 39, at 632–33. 
47. Arriola, supra note 44, at 107. 
48. Id. 
49. See id at 106. 
50. Id. at 143. 
51. See FLA. STAT. §§ 798.02, 800.02 (2013). 
52. See id. 
53. See Nancy Polikoff, Lesbian Mothers, Lesbian Families:  Legal 
Obstacles, Legal Challenges, 14 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 907, 907 (1986). 
54. Id. 
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enough.
55
  Related identity issues like generational, heritage, and family 
issues—when women came out, the decade in which they became lawyers 
and practiced law, and how their own families reacted—as well as other 
identities claimed by the interviewees like racial or ethnic identities, to cite 
just a few examples, are also likely to interact with their self and professional 
identities, and perhaps impact at least some of their choices.
56
 
The theories would seem significant to lesbian lawyers.
57
  However, 
when the interviewees were asked about feminist jurisprudence, many 
responded that they knew very little about it.
58
  Regardless of not connecting 
feminist jurisprudence with being a feminist, most considered themselves to 
be feminists.
59
  For instance, Monica Salis believes that “if you stand up for 
women’s rights, [you are also] . . . standing up for lesbian rights.”60  Many of 
those we interviewed said the legal system gave them a chance to change the 
way in which people were treated.
61
  Monica said it was her observation that 
if you encountered a bigoted father with a daughter, then you argued:  Would 
you want your daughter treated that way?
62
  She considered it her job to 
make sure that the courts were fair.
63
  Since there is “bias everywhere . . . [in] 
[e]very case, [her] job is to make a perfect record.”64 
While the lesbian lawyers may not have had a jurisprudential theory 
that they identified with, they reported stories of judges who would 
                                                          
55. See Interview with Linda F. Harrison & Phyllis D. Kotey, supra note 4, at 
20; Interview with Lea P. Krauss, supra note 4, at 4–5; Interview with Monica I. Salis, supra 
note 4, at 20–21. 
56. Interview with Lilas Ayandeh, supra note 3, at 19; Interview with Linda 
F. Harrison & Phyllis D. Kotey, supra note 4, at 4–5; Interview with Lea P. Krauss, supra 
note 4, at 6–7. 
57. See Interview with Michelle M. Parker, supra note 4, at 1; Interview with 
Monica I. Salis, supra note 4, at 4. 
58. E.g., Interview with Lilas Ayandeh, supra note 3, at 3.  For instance, Lilas 
Ayandeh said that she would not do anything to promote feminism, but she was “pro-women, 
doing things and would . . . vote for Hilary Clinton.”  Id.  Michelle Parker viewed feminism as 
fighting discrimination.  Interview with Michelle M. Parker, supra note 4, at 1.  She wants to 
be treated the same as men.  Id.  Jennifer Travieso said she was probably more of a feminist 
while in college, but did not have time when in law school.  Interview with Jennifer Travieso, 
supra note 3, at 1. 
59. Interview with Linda F. Harrison & Phyllis D. Kotey, supra note 4, at 17–
18; Interview with Michelle M. Parker, supra note 4, at 1; Interview with Monica I. Salis, 
supra note 4, at 1; Interview with Jennifer Travieso, supra note 3, at 1. 
60. Interview with Monica I. Salis, supra note 4, at 1. 
61. E.g., id. 
62. Id. 
63. Id. at 9. 
64. Id. (“call[ing] judges on their bad calls [and] proffer[ing] into the record” 
all that is needed to clarify the record). 
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constantly refer to the male lawyers as counsel, while the women lawyers 
would be referred to as miss.
65
  In fact, Lilas Ayandeh said that her female 
suitemate lawyer-friend got into an argument with a judge who kept calling 
her miss, and she said, “stop calling me miss, [I am] a lawyer too.”66  And the 
judge responded that he did not know what she was talking about.
67
  Lilas 
observed that maybe the judge was pompous, or he just did not know what 
her suitemate was talking about because the law is so geared toward men.
68
  
Thus, while the principles of feminist jurisprudence may not have been 
known specifically, those interviewed certainly had first-hand experiences 
with the law and the effects of the law being sexist.
69
  Seril Grossfeld, for 
example, mentioned a case involving a divorce proceeding in which the 
judge said that “he [did not] think it was right . . . to throw a man out of his 
house.”70 
There were those who described themselves as activists, such as Lea 
Krauss.
71
  However, when asked if she considered herself a lesbian 
separatist, she said she did not do things to the extreme.
72
  Lea equated being 
a lesbian separatist activist with making judgments that might interfere with 
her desire to be accepting.
73
  Lea also said how a lesbian was treated was 
related to the way she looked.
74
  If a lesbian blended into society, then she 
would be treated the same as heterosexual women.
75
 
III. HOW DID INTERVIEWEES SELF-IDENTIFY? 
Nearly all of our interviewees used the word lesbian as one of the 
first words with which they identified themselves.
76
  Robin Bodiford 
explained her choice of lesbian as a primary identifying word.
77
  She stated: 
                                                          
65. Interview with Lilas Ayandeh, supra note 3, at 11. 
66. Id. (emphasis added). 
67. Id. 
68. Id. 
69. See, e.g., Interview with Seril L. Grossfeld, supra note 4, at 7–8. 
70. Id. (emphasis added). 
71. Interview with Lea P. Krauss, supra note 4, at 2.  Lea is the current 
president of GLLN, the Gay and Lesbian Lawyers Network, which is active in Broward 
County.  Id. at 9. 
72. Id. at 2. 
73. Id.  She also observed that women were “still struggling to get equal pay.”  
Id. 
74. Interview with Lea P. Krauss, supra note 4, at 2. 
75. Id. 
76. Interview with Robin L. Bodiford (July 17, 2012), supra note 4, at 1; 
Interview with Linda F. Harrison & Phyllis D. Kotey, supra note 4, at 1; Interview with 
Monica I. Salis, supra note 4, at 1; Interview with Jennifer Travieso, supra note 3, at 1. 
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I [am] a lesbian. . . . Because basically once you decide that you 
[are] a lesbian, it pretty much defines your life.  You wake up 
every day and you [are] a lesbian and you have to deal with it and . 
. . [i]t does [not] go away. . . . You never get to forget about it 
unless you may be, you know, absorbed in a book or a movie or . . 
. something like that, but other than that, . . . it never goes away.
78
 
Most interviewees also mentioned several other identifying words 
together; from woman to mother to daughter to attorney or lawyer––used by 
most interviewees—to black, rather than a single identity.79  This is 
exemplified by Linda Harrison, who described herself as “[f]emale first, 
African American second, lesbian third, and mother on top of all those.”80  
Lea Krauss said, “I would say I identify as a gay woman, as an attorney, as a 
friend, a cousin.  I [am] pretty family and friend oriented.”81 
Several expressed discomfort at the general idea of categorizing 
identities.
82
  Michelle Parker, for example, commented, “I tell other people to 
not put themselves [in] a category to limit themselves.  I do limit [my]self, I 
consider myself a lesbian but I know that [is] kind of hypocritical . . . that I 
tell other people to not limit themselves or to categorize themselves but then 
I do [it] myself . . . .”83  Only one interviewee volunteered the term feminist 
when we asked if the interviewees considered themselves feminists.
84
  
Interestingly, most were somewhat hesitant to fully qualify themselves as 
feminists for various reasons.
85
  A few equated feminism with activism, and 
were not activists, therefore reluctant to call themselves feminists.
86
  For 
example, Jennifer Travieso explained, “I [am] a lesbian.  I would qualify 
myself as a feminist. . . . I think in college I was definitely a feminist.  I think 
now I [am] maybe not as strong or as active in—under the title of feminist as 
                                                                                                                                         
77. Interview with Robin L. Bodiford (July 17, 2012), supra note 4, at 1. 
78. Id. 
79. Interview with Linda F. Harrison & Phyllis D. Kotey, supra note 4, at 1; 
Interview with Lea P. Krauss, supra note 4, at 1; Interview with Monica I. Salis, supra note 4, 
at 1. 
80. Interview with Linda F. Harrison & Phyllis D. Kotey, supra note 4, at 1. 
81. Interview with Lea P. Krauss, supra note 4, at 1. 
82. E.g., Interview with Linda F. Harrison & Phyllis D. Kotey, supra note 4, 
at 1. 
83. Interview with Michelle M. Parker, supra note 4, at 1. 
84. Id. 
85. E.g., Interview with Linda F. Harrison & Phyllis D. Kotey, supra note 4, 
at 17–18. 
86. E.g., Interview with Jennifer Travieso, supra note 3, at 1. 
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I used to be.”87  Several others clarified areas where they felt like they 
differed from some feminist thinking.
88
  Phyllis Kotey noted: 
The only reason I [am] bothered by [the feminist label] is I [am] 
bothered by the phrase and all the baggage that it brings with it.  
But for me, even with all of the baggage that it brings to bear, I 
still must say that I believe that in issues with gender, issues of 
race, that we have to be advocates and make sure that people are 
treated fairly.  And that [is] what I see being, you know, a feminist 
[is] all about.  It [is] not about whether I wear makeup or not, or 
whether I shave my legs or not, no more than being black is all 
about whether I raise my black power fist. 
But I certainly think that it [is] important that I am always 
sensitive to issues of gender and I always try to be.  And when I—
people tell me, oh, it does [not] matter.  I [am] like, well, if it did 
[not] matter, then we would have more women in place—in 
positions of power.
89
 
Most of our interviewees were white and did not mention race or 
ethnicity in terms of their identities.
90
  Two of our interviewees were 
African-American, one was Persian-American/Iranian-American, and three 
were Jewish.
91
  These interviewees all discussed ways in which race or 
ethnicity impacted their identities and/or legal careers.
92
  Both African 
American interviewees mentioned the critical importance of class within the 
legal system and one discussed being the recipient of racial bias in the 
courtroom in the 1990s.
93
  Linda Harrison explained that when she was a 
prosecutor, “[t]he judge wanted someone else appointed to try the case” 
because he was just concerned about keeping his record intact of never 
                                                          
87. Id. 
88. E.g., Interview with Linda F. Harrison & Phyllis D. Kotey, supra note 4, 
at 17–18. 
89. Id. 
90. See, e.g., Interview with Robin L. Bodiford (July 17, 2012), supra note 4, 
at 1. 
91. Interview with Lilas Ayandeh, supra note 3, at 1; Interview with Seril L. 
Grossfeld, supra note 4, at 5; Interview with Linda F. Harrison & Phyllis D. Kotey, supra note 
4, at 1; Interview with Lea P. Krauss, supra note 4, at 14; Interview with Monica I. Salis, 
supra note 4, at 13. 
92. Interview with Lilas Ayandeh, supra note 3, at 1–2; Interview with Seril 
L. Grossfeld, supra note 4, at 5; Interview with Linda F. Harrison & Phyllis D. Kotey, supra 
note 4, at 4–5; Interview with Lea P. Krauss, supra note 4, at 14; Interview with Monica I. 
Salis, supra note 4, at 13–14. 
93. Interview with Linda F. Harrison & Phyllis D. Kotey, supra note 4, at 24–
26. 
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having a black person prosecute a case in his court.
94
  Seril Grossfeld 
described looking for a first job after law school: 
[T]he first job was difficult because I was a Jewish woman from 
New York in Northern Florida looking for a job.  So there was 
[not] much opportunity and I usually got appointments for 
interviews . . . they could [not] tell from my name, and when I 
walked in, they said, “Oh, we just filled the job.”
95
 
Persian-American interviewee Lilas Ayandeh discussed the challenges of 
revealing and maintaining her identity within her ethnic community and 
family: 
[T]he [Persian] culture is so strong and rich . . . and even in Iran 
you hear the president say we do [not] have gay people.  I mean 
that [is] ridiculous, what [do] you mean you do [not] have gay 
people, of course you do; but it [is] not something that [is] 
accepted . . . there is [sic] jokes about gay people from back in the 
day, so it [is] something that [is] just engrained in the culture that 
it [is] not real and the people that are there look at that as lower 
than dirt kind of thing.  So yes it was definitely hard to come out to 
them [family]—they are accepting now.
96
 
A. Law School Experience 
The law school experience for a lesbian can be traumatic and/or 
enlightening.
97
  She can be tolerated but ignored, or validated as someone 
bringing insight into the law.
98
  Sometimes, all of these approaches are her 
experience.
99
  To illustrate the traumatic, it has not been uncommon for 
lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, and intersex (“LGBTI”) bulletin boards 
to be vandalized.
100
 
                                                          
94. Id. at 25. 
95. Interview with Seril L. Grossfeld, supra note 4, at 5. 
96. Interview with Lilas Ayandeh, supra note 3, at 19–20. 
97. See Scott N. Ihrig, Sexual Orientation in Law School:  Experiences of 
Gay, Lesbian, and Bisexual Law Students, 14 LAW & INEQ. 555, 566 (1996). 
98. Id. 
99. See id. 
100. Id. at 568.  The University of Michigan Gay, Lesbian, and Bisexual group 
was forced to put Plexiglas over its bulletin board.  Id. at 568 n.73.  In 1988, Lynn Miller, a 
contributing editor to the Student Lawyer, noted that when she asked a lesbian who was Chair 
of the Lesbian, Gay, and Bisexual Caucus about being out, her response was that “students do 
[not] want to be isolated—or harassed.”  Lynn Miller, The Legal Closet, 16 STUDENT LAW., 
Feb. 1988, at 12, 14.  Further, the lesbian leader noted that at the University of Oregon Law 
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Recently, the atmosphere in most law schools is one of toleration.
101
  
However, even by 1994, any classroom discussion that focused on LGBTI 
issues was frequently confined to the legal arguments, according to Scott 
Ihrig, who studied the issue as a student at the University of Minnesota.
102
 
Rarely were the facts of such cases discussed.
103
  The impact was to 
silence the voice of the LGBTI community.
104
  For instance, Ihrig observed 
that any time sexual orientation was the legal question of the constitutional 
law case being discussed in class, if he volunteered observations, he was told 
by his professor to “‘divorce your personal politics from your constitutional 
law.’”105 
For lesbians, the problem is compounded.
106
  Lesbian sexuality is 
almost totally absent in any discussion, based on court cases.
107
  Ruthann 
Robson also noted that in her experience as a law professor—even if such 
discussion took place—it was not uncommon for the lesbian students to 
censor their comments and never make them personal.
108
  Of course, there 
are exceptions.
109
  For instance, Monica Salis, who went to the University of 
Miami Law School in the late 1970s, said she took classes related to 
discrimination and she always tried to turn the focus to gay rights.
110
  Monica 
also observed that she was perceived to be very outspoken.
111
  For a variety 
of reasons, many of those interviewed were not out while in law school.
112
  
As has been noted, many of the interviewed lesbian attorneys waited until 
                                                                                                                                         
School, some “‘students were getting hate mail.’”  Id.  The Dean did respond by sending a 
message to the entire student body that such mail was unacceptable.  Id. 
101. Ihrig, supra note 97, at 566. 
102. See id. at 555, 557–58. 
103. Id. at 572.  Monica Salis noted that in no class that she took at the 
University of Miami Law School in the late 1970s, was there any discussion of sexual 
orientation, not even when Bowers v. Hardwick was assigned.  Interview with Monica I. Salis, 
supra note 4, at 4. 
104. Ihrig, supra note 97, at 566. 
105. Id. at 558. 
106. See RUTHANN ROBSON, SAPPHO GOES TO LAW SCHOOL 221 (1998). 
107. Id. 
108. Id.  It was noted by a law student in the Student Lawyer (1988), “‘[t]here 
are times in class when I want to bring up gay-related issues, but I can’t raise my hand, 
because I know [that] everyone in the class will immediately wheel around in their chairs to 
see who said that.’”  Miller, supra note 100, at 14. 
109. See Interview with Monica I. Salis, supra note 4, at 4. 
110. Id. at 2, 4. 
111. Id. at 4.  Monica admits that even her high school transcript said that she 
had forced the closure of the school due to demonstrations, which she orchestrated.  Id. 
112. See Interview with Lilas Ayandeh, supra note 3, at 1; Interview with Seril 
L. Grossfeld, supra note 4, at 3; Interview with Lea P. Krauss, supra note 4, at 8. 
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after graduating from law school to make their identity known.
113
  Further, 
their recollections were that sexual orientation was not discussed in the law 
classes.
114
  Even in those law classes where the expectation that a discussion 
might take place—such as Constitutional Law, Family Law, or Wills and 
Trusts—they did not remember any mention of sexual orientation issues.115  
Lea Krauss validates what the studies have shown.
116
  Lea graduated in 1999 
and she does not recall any classes where sexual orientation was the focus of 
the legal discussion.
117
 
There were exceptions to being silent.
118
  Michelle Parker, who 
graduated in 2011, recalls that sexual orientation issues were talked about 
openly in some of her law classes.
119
  Perhaps this might be related to the fact 
that the law school had many openly gay and lesbian law professors and even 
a dean.
120
  Michelle observed that the professors knew she was a lesbian, and 
in her classes she felt that the professors explained things in more detail that 
were related to sexual orientation issues.
121
  On the other hand, Seril 
Grossfeld—who attended law school in the 1970s—says that there were no 
open LGBTI law professors.
122
  In fact, Seril noted that there were very few 
                                                          
113. See Interview with Lilas Ayandeh, supra note 3, at 1, 4; Interview with 
Seril L. Grossfeld, supra note 4, at 3–4; Interview with Lea P. Krauss, supra note 4, at 4, 6, 8. 
114. Interview with Robin L. Bodiford (July 17, 2012), supra note 4, at 11; 
Interview with Seril L. Grossfeld, supra note 4, at 5; Interview with Linda F. Harrison & 
Phyllis D. Kotey, supra note 4, at 7; Interview with Lea P. Krauss, supra note 4, at 8; 
Interview with Monica I. Salis, supra note 4, at 4. 
115. Interview with Robin L. Bodiford (July 17, 2012), supra note 4, at 11; 
Interview with Seril L. Grossfeld, supra note 4, at 5; Interview with Linda F. Harrison & 
Phyllis D. Kotey, supra note 4, at 7; Interview with Lea P. Krauss, supra note 4, at 8; 
Interview with Monica I. Salis, supra note 4, at 4. 
116. See Interview with Lea P. Krauss, supra note 4, at 8. 
117. Id.  Lea says that she took Constitutional Law her last year in law school 
and they talked about Bowers v. Hardwick.  Id. 
118. See Interview with Michelle M. Parker, supra note 4, at 7. 
119. Id. 
120. Interview with Lilas Ayandeh, supra note 3, at 10; Interview with 
Michelle M. Parker, supra note 4, at 7.  Michelle attended the Shepard Broad Law Center, 
Nova Southeastern University.  Interview with Michelle M. Parker, supra note 4, at 7. 
121. Id.  Michelle recalls that in a Civil Procedure class where the professor 
knew she was a lesbian, that professor “spen[t] ten extra minutes on it just for [her] benefit.”  
Id.  Lilas Ayandeh was not out while in law school and she does not remember any discussion 
at the same law school—Shepard Broad Law Center, Nova Southeastern University—where 
there was any discussion that related to sexual orientation.  Interview with Lilas Ayandeh, 
supra note 3, at 1, 7.  Further, Lilas did not know that there were several out professors at the 
law school and was surprised when told who they were.  Id. at 9–10. 
122. See Interview with Seril L. Grossfeld, supra note 4, at 2, 4. 
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women law professors.
123
  In some instances, there were openly gay 
professors at the law school but their presence seemed subdued.
124
  For 
instance, Jennifer Travieso remembers that she took a course in sexual 
identity with about six or seven other students.
125
  It was a paper course and 
she thought that what she learned was very interesting.
126
 
For the few who acknowledged their sexual orientation while in their 
teens or twenties, it was common to become activists in their undergraduate 
years.
127
  Identity recognition prompted being active in law school too.
128
  
There were exceptions even to this general observation.
129
  Monica Salis 
went to New York University for her undergraduate education and was 
involved with women’s organizations on campus where half the members 
were lesbians.
130
  But, when she got to University of Miami Law School in 
1979, there were no identifiable lesbians.
131
 
In contrast, Jennifer Travieso joined an underground LGBTI club at 
a Catholic university law school.
132
  She decided to run the club in a much 
more active way.
133
  She approached the Assistant Dean for funding, 
something all groups at the law school did.
134
  The Assistant Dean flat out 
denied the request and Jennifer was explicitly told that the group would not 
be welcome.
135
  Jennifer sought help from her favorite professor and he 
                                                          
123. Id. at 5.  Monica Salis said there were no out professors at the University 
of Miami Law School in the late 1970s.  Interview with Monica I. Salis, supra note 4, at 3. 
124. See Interview with Jennifer Travieso, supra note 3, at 7. 
125. Id. at 6. 
126. Id. at 6–7. 
127. See, e.g., id. at 1. 
128. See, e.g., id. at 3.  Many of those interviewed are very active in the LGBTI 
community currently.  See Interview with Monica I. Salis, supra note 4, at 14–15; Interview 
with Jennifer Travieso, supra note 3, at 14.  For instance, Lea Krauss is President of GLLN, 
which is a very active group.  Interview with Lea P. Krauss, supra note 4, at 9.  She is also 
very active in The Pride Center as a board member.  Id.  One of the reasons they asked Lea to 
be on the board was to have a “younger perspective and a female perspective.”  Id. at 10.  She 
is largely responsible for assembling a women’s resource center that addresses issues with 
regard to health, networking, and also provides a social center where women feel safe.  Id.  
Until she got this established, The Pride Center was largely a boys’ club.  Id. 
129. See, e.g., Interview with Monica I. Salis, supra note 4, at 3. 
130. Id. 
131. Id. at 2–3.  “[All her] friends in law school were gay men.”  Id. at 3.  
“They were easy to identify and it was very comfortable. . . . We studied for the Bar, shared a 
hotel room up in Tampa, and took the Bar together.”  Id. 
132. Interview with Jennifer Travieso, supra note 3, at 3. 
133. Id. at 3–5. 
134. Id. at 3. 
135. Id. at 3–4. 
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suggested contacting the American Civil Liberties Union (“ACLU”).136  
With the backing of the ACLU, the LGBTI club was born.
137
  By the end of 
the year, the group won an award for being the most active at the law 
school.
138
  Interestingly, the faculty sponsor of the group was not the out 
professor at the school, but rather her favorite law professor, the one who had 
suggested she consult the ACLU.
139
 
Jennifer’s experiences were somewhat mirrored by Michelle Parker, 
who became the President of Lambda United, the law school LGBTI club at 
Shepard Broad Law Center, Nova Southeastern University, and made it into 
one of the most active groups at the law school.
140
  She took on the task 
because, in her words, “equal right[s] [are] so important to me . . . [and] 
raising awareness is . . . important.”141  In fact, Michelle said that so much of 
her time in law school was taken up by the group, that her grades suffered.
142
  
Fortunately, at her law school, the group had existed for some time and they 
were given funds without hesitation.
143
  Under Michelle’s leadership, 
Lambda sponsored fundraisers with the money going to organizations such 
as the Broward House that helps people with HIV/AIDS.
144
  They also joined 
other student groups to present a Gay Adoption Symposium.
145
  Michelle 
also observed that “[she] would [have] died without the faculty 
[involvement].”146 
                                                          
136. Id. at 4. 
137. Interview with Jennifer Travieso, supra note 3, at 4. 
138. Id. at 4–5.  Some of the students at the law school were not in favor of the 
club, so Jennifer and her group decided to “poke fun at ourselves” and offered a free breakfast 
consisting of Fruit Loops.  Id. at 5.  Jennifer also indicated that she really felt empowered by 
being the founder of the law school group.  Id. at 11.  Fighting for people’s rights was an 
amazing experience for her.  Id. 
139. Interview with Jennifer Travieso, supra note 3, at 7. 
140. Compare id. at 4–5, with Interview with Michelle M. Parker, supra note 4, 
at 1, 6.  When nobody wants to lead, the law school club becomes almost underground.  See 
Interview with Michelle M. Parker, supra note 4, at 6. 
141. Id. 
142. Id.  According to Michelle, “[she] was making the same grades as [her] 
first year [friends who] all graduated with honors, except for [her].”  Id. 
143. See id. 
144. Interview with Michelle M. Parker, supra note 4, at 6.  They also had 
Rock Out Loud with a band and hamburgers.  Id.  Lambda gave half of what it made to Fight 
Out Loud, which helps people who “have been victims of discrimination based on their sexual 
orientation and sexual identity.”  Id. 
145. Past Events: Symposium on Gay Adoption in Florida, IACHR NEWSL. 
(Inter-Am. Ctr. for Human Rights, Fort Lauderdale, Fla.), Mar. 2011, at 7, available at http://
nsulaw.nova.edu/students/orgs/iachr/newsletters/index.cfm. 
146. Interview with Michelle M. Parker, supra note 4, at 7. 
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As far as helping the lesbian lawyers secure legal positions after 
graduating, the various law schools did not seem to be aware of any potential 
problems associated with getting jobs and being a lesbian.
147
  Whether those 
interviewed were out to their future employers related to several factors.
148
  
For those who graduated in the 1980s and waited until after law school to 
come out, sexual orientation was not of concern.
149
  In contrast, those who 
had been active and out in law school, interviewed as out lesbians.
150
  
Michelle Parker, for instance, observed that she 
would rather [the firm] know that I am gay before I . . . step foot in 
your office because if you [are] going to have a problem with it I 
would rather you know now and I do [not] want to be terminated 
in two months because you found out that I was gay.
151
 
Fortunately for Michelle, her firm is fine with gay folks.
152
  Jennifer noted 
that “now some firms are marketing directly to the gay community.”153  The 
gay attorney can identify with the gay community and it is actually 
positive.
154
  In South Florida, there may even be an advantage to being 
identified as a lesbian according to Lea Krauss, the current president of the 
Gay and Lesbian Lawyers Network (“GLLN”).155  It is a method by which to 
                                                          
147. See id. at 7–8.  In 1988, an article in Student Lawyer noted that “‘[g]ay 
students feel they have to remain closeted to get a job and establish a reputation . . . .’”  Miller, 
supra note 100, at 14.  Activists are caught between a rock and a hard place.  “If they include 
membership in any gay organizations on their resumes, [it is] an automatic warning.  If they 
leave them off . . . [the students] ‘look like . . . boring pe[ople] with no leadership skills.’”  Id. 
148. See Miller, supra note 100, at 17. 
149. See id. 
150. See, e.g., Interview with Michelle M. Parker, supra note 4, at 8.  There 
were those in-between years where those who were out were very afraid to be when they 
started their job searches.  See Miller, supra note 100, at 14.  They believed they would not 
get the position, and if they did, and it became known they were lesbians, they would be fired.  
See id. at 15.  Their experience at the time was that they did not fit in.  Id.  They could not take 
their partners to any social function.  Id.  They had to be very careful about what they talked 
about that was personal.  Id.  Then, the result was that the lesbian/gay attorney was perceived 
to be removed and cold.  Miller, supra note 100, at 15.  Law professors at that time counseled 
gay students to do research about the firms to see which ones contributed to gay causes.  Id.  
That way, they were more likely to fit in.  Id. 
151. Interview with Michelle M. Parker, supra note 4, at 8.  Further, Michelle 
said she wanted to be free to take her girlfriend to the Christmas party.  Id.  And she wanted to 
know if the firm was anti-gay before working for them.  Id. 
152. Id.  The firm’s secretary is a lesbian and her uncle, who is gay, is the 
person in charge of all the firm’s scheduling.  Id. 
153. Interview with Jennifer Travieso, supra note 3, at 11. 
154. Id. 
155. Interview with Lea P. Krauss, supra note 4, at 3, 9. 
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get business and, further, the LGBTI community “feel[s] comfortable dealing 
with a lesbian [attorney].”156  “[P]rofessionally, you can use that to your 
advantage.”157 
For lawyers, education is never finished.
158
  In fact, Continuing 
Legal Education (“CLE”) is a requirement.159  With the influence of such 
groups as the GLLN,
160
 the Florida Bar presented a CLE program geared to 
LGBTI issues.
161
  The presentation covered such issues as death of partners 
and how the remaining partners might not have any rights.
162
  As Jennifer 
noted, “[i]f you do [not] have the proper documents in place and . . . [the] 
partner’s family does [not] agree with you, they come in . . . [and] take the 
body.”163  Jennifer expressed her dismay, “it [is] completely legal for them to 
do that.  It [is] heart wrenching.”164 
B. LGBTI Client’s and Court Experience 
Various judicial councils and bar associations have been concerned 
about fairness in courts for the LGBTI community.
165
  For instance, the 
Arizona report found that “[t]hirteen percent (13%) of judges and attorneys 
have observed negative treatment by judges in open court toward those 
perceived to be gay or lesbian.”166  Further, if sexual orientation was part of 
the legal issue, “[thirty-nine] percent believed their sexual orientation was 
used to devalue their credibility.”167 
                                                          
156. Id. at 3. 
157. Id. 
158. See Continuing Legal Education Requirement, FLA. B., https://
www.floridabar.org/DIVCOM/PI/BIPS2001.nsf/1119bd38ae090a748525676f0053b606/8182
932fc055e6f78525669e004f74f2!OpenDocument (last updated May 26, 2005). 
159. Id. 
160. See Interview with Lea P. Krauss, supra note 4, at 12; Interview with 
Jennifer Travieso, supra note 3, at 9.  Lea P. Krauss is currently the president of the GLLN.  
Interview with Lea P. Krauss, supra note 4, at 9. 
161. See Interview with Jennifer Travieso, supra note 3, at 9–10. 
162. Id. 
163. Id. at 10. 
164. Id. 
165. See GAY & LESBIAN TASK FORCE, STATE BAR OF ARIZ., REPORT TO THE 
BOARD OF GOVERNORS 18 (1999); SEXUAL ORIENTATION FAIRNESS SUBCOMM., JUDICIAL 
COUNCIL OF CAL., SEXUAL ORIENTATION FAIRNESS IN THE CALIFORNIA COURTS 1 (2001), 
available at http://www.courts.ca.gov/documents/report.pdf. 
166. GAY & LESBIAN TASK FORCE, STATE BAR OF ARIZ., supra note 165, at 20. 
167. Todd Brower, Obstacle Courts:  Results of Two Studies on Sexual 
Orientation Fairness in the California Courts, 11 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 39, 45 
(2003) [hereinafter Brower, Obstacle Courts]. 
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It has been observed that once the client’s sexual orientation 
becomes part of the legal proceeding, the entire proceeding is overshadowed 
by the trait.
168
  When juror polls are taken, jurors are more likely to say that 
“they cannot be fair . . . [to] gay litigants,” compared to any other group.169  
Given this knowledge, it would appear that some lawyers use this animosity 
to plant negative seeds in prospective jurors’ minds.170  For instance, when 
an attorney asks whether the prospective juror would “‘accept unbiased 
testimony from [a] gay witness[],’” the implication is that the gay witness is 
unreliable.
171
  Further, if the LGBTI lawyer represents activists in the LGBTI 
community, a conflict may arise.
172
  This fact may be important because, as 
Professor Nancy D. Polikoff noted, if the activist client wanted, for example, 
to shout out in a courtroom, she as the lawyer was conflicted between 
identifying with her client’s need to be heard, and her desire to abide by her 
respect of the judicial system.
173
  With one exception, none of those 
interviewed represented gay activists.
174
  Only a few of those interviewed 
actually had clients who even identified as LGBTI.
175
  Lilas Ayandeh, being 
the accidental exception by representing a client who had a civil rights claim, 
said that she advertised in Girl Magazine, which is well known in the South 
Florida lesbian community.
176
  From that advertisement, Lilas was 
approached by a client who wanted to be represented by her because she 
wanted a lesbian lawyer.
177
  Lilas sought out civil rights attorneys for their 
                                                          
168. Todd Brower, Of Courts and Closets:  A Doctrinal and Empirical 
Analysis of Lesbian and Gay Identity in the Courts, 38 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 565, 609–10 
(2001). 
169. Id. at 611.  The jurors are more likely to be less fair to gay or lesbians than 
“African-Americans, Asians, Hispanics, or Whites.”  Id. 
170. Brower, Obstacle Courts, supra note 167, at 58. 
171. Id. 
172. See Nancy D. Polikoff, Am I My Client?:  The Role Confusion of a 
Lawyer Activist, 31 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 443, 450 (1996). 
173. Id. at 449–50. 
174. Compare Interview with Seril L. Grossfeld, supra note 4, at 16, with 
Interview with Lilas Ayandeh, supra note 3, at 4–5, Interview with Robin L. Bodiford (Aug. 
3, 2012), supra note 4, at 2, Interview with Linda F. Harrison & Phyllis D. Kotey, supra note 
4, at 12–13, Interview with Lea P. Krauss, supra note 4, at 17, Interview with Michelle M. 
Parker, supra note 4, at 8, Interview with Monica I. Salis, supra note 4, at 6, and Interview 
with Jennifer Travieso, supra note 3, at 7. 
175. See Interview with Lilas Ayandeh, supra note 3, at 4; Interview with Seril 
L. Grossfeld, supra note 4, at 10; Interview with Linda F. Harrison & Phyllis D. Kotey, supra 
note 4, at 12–13; Interview with Michelle M. Parker, supra note 4, at 8; Interview with 
Monica I. Salis, supra note 4, at 6; Interview with Jennifer Travieso, supra note 3, at 7. 
176. Interview with Lilas Ayandeh, supra note 3, at 4. 
177. Id. 
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advice as to whether the case had merit.
178
  The case ended as other civil 
rights attorneys said it would.
179
  The client lost due to the weakness of the 
facts in her case.
180
 
Generally, the court system in Broward County was seen as fair 
toward the LGBTI community.
181
  While Michelle M. Parker has many 
LGBTI clients, the issues are usually not gay related.
182
  The reason that her 
firm has so many gay clients is due to the manner in which they advertise on 
the GLLN website.
183
  GLLN is a very active legal network.
184
  Thus, many 
in the community decide on which lawyer they will retain based on finding 
them on the network.
185
  Michelle noted that they handle Title VII cases, but 
based on gender, not sexual orientation.
186
  Thus, Michelle noted that while 
their clients had been fired because they were lesbian, the focus of the case 
was sex discrimination because the client did not fit the female stereotype.
187
 
IV. FLORIDA LAW AS IT RELATES TO THE LGBTI COMMUNITY 
Florida’s LGBTI population is one of the highest in the United 
States, and the figure is continually rising.
188
  In the past decade, the number 
of same-sex households alone has greatly increased in Florida.
189
  One would 
infer from such statistics that the LGBTI community is attracted to Florida 
                                                          
178. Id. at 5. 
179. Id. 
180. See id.  Some part of the loss was due to the fact that the client had been 
“pulled over for a DUI [and in doing so] almost hit th[e] Deputy on the side of the road.”  
Interview with Lilas Ayandeh, supra note 3, at 5.  However, the client was convinced that the 
whole episode was due to her sexual orientation.  Id. at 6.  The client arrived at this conclusion 
because when she was stopped, the deputy asked if she was gay.  Id.  He probably arrived at 
this conclusion because she had short hair and her partner, who was also in the car, was very 
feminine.  Id. 
181. Id. at 6; see also Interview with Lea P. Krauss, supra note 4, at 17. 
182. See Interview with Michelle M. Parker, supra note 4, at 8. 
183. See id. 
184. See Interview with Lea P. Krauss, supra note 4, at 9. 
185. See id. at 13; Interview with Michelle M. Parker, supra note 4, at 8. 
186. Interview with Michelle M. Parker, supra note 4, at 8; see also Oncale v. 
Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 79–80 (1998). 
187. Interview with Michelle M. Parker, supra note 4, at 8; see also Price 
Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 251 (1989) (discussing sex stereotyping). 
188. GARY J. GATES, SAME-SEX COUPLES AND THE GAY, LESBIAN, BISEXUAL, 
POPULATION:  NEW ESTIMATES FROM THE AMERICAN COMMUNITY SURVEY 6 tbl.3, app. 1 
(2006), available at http://williamsinstitute.law.ucla.edu/wp-content/uploads/Gates-Same-
Sex-Couples-GLB-Pop-ACS-Oct-2006.pdf. 
189. Jeff Kunerth, More Gays are Now Families, ORLANDO SENTINEL, Aug. 18, 
2011, at A1. 
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due to its favoring laws and liberal constituency; however, that is not the 
case.
190
  Florida’s laws towards members of the LGBTI community have 
been described as hostile and even draconian.
191
  Historically, the treatment 
towards the LGBTI persons in Florida exemplifies an overall societal 
animosity.
192
  There have been “‘witch hunts’ for lesbian and gay teachers, 
political attacks through voter initiatives, [and] overtly discriminatory 
laws.”193 
Florida’s legislation and judiciary make a clear distinction between 
the LGBTI individual and the heterosexual individual.
194
  In Florida, the 
LGBTI individual’s rights and protections are limited in comparison to those 
of a heterosexual individual.
195
  Although the LGBTI community, at a local 
level, might enjoy some added protections that the State of Florida fails to 
provide,
196
 “the scope of [such] protections is limited and . . . do[es] not 
geographically encompass a large percentage of Florida’s LGBT[I] 
population.”197  Florida’s LGBTI community faces much discrimination in 
various aspects of the law due to their sexual orientation. 
A. Right to Marry 
On September 21, 1996, Congress effectuated the Defense of 
Marriage Act (“DOMA”), which grants states the right to decline recognition 
of same-sex marriages sanctioned in another state.
198
  DOMA was motivated 
                                                          
190. Matthew T. Moore, Long-Term Plans for LGBT Floridians:  Special 
Concerns and Suggestions to Avoid Legal and Family Interference, 34 NOVA L. REV. 255, 256 
(2009); see also GATES, supra note 188, at 6 tbl.3, app. 1; Kunerth, supra note 189. 
191. See Moore, supra note 190, at 256. 
192. See id. 
193. William E. Adams, Jr., A Look at Lesbian and Gay Rights in Florida 
Today:  Confronting the Lingering Effects of Legal Animus, 24 NOVA L. REV. 751, 751 
(2000). 
194. See id. at 754. 
195. CARLTON FIELDS & EQUAL. FLA. INST., A LEGAL HANDBOOK FOR LGBT 
FLORIDIANS AND THEIR FAMILIES 7–10 (3d ed. 2012), available at http://
www.CarltonFields.com/Files/Uploads/Documents/OtherPubs/Equality_Florida_Handbook_3
Ed_06_2012.pdf. 
196. See Kunerth, supra note 189.  For example, “Orlando and Orange County 
both offer domestic-partnership benefits to same-sex couples—something they [did not] do 
[ten] years ago.”  Id. 
197. Moore, supra note 190, at 259. 
198. Defense of Marriage Act of 1996 § 2(a), 28 U.S.C. § 1738C (2012); see 
also Nanci Schanerman, Note, Comity:  Another Nail in the Coffin of Institutional 
Homophobia, 42 U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REV. 145, 150–51 (2010). 
No State, territory, or possession of the United States, or Indian tribe, 
shall be required to give effect to any public act, record, or judicial proceeding of 
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by the likely prospect that same-sex marriages would soon be recognized in 
Hawaii.
199
  “[T]he federal government was worried that [Hawaii] was 
dangerously close to granting same-sex marriages, and the implications of 
the Full Faith and Credit Clause would mandate recognition of marriages 
performed in Hawaii in every state around the country.”200  By enacting 
DOMA, the federal government’s purpose was to leave the decision of 
recognizing same-sex marriage up to each state, rather than having it 
mandated upon all states on the basis of federal principles.
201
 
The Florida Legislature took prompt action with regard to the 
Federal DOMA and, by June 1997, the DOMA law was accepted and 
codified into the Florida Statutes.
202
  In the process of enacting the Florida 
DOMA, many supporters of such law made their hostility toward the LGBTI 
community known.
203
  Take, for example, the words of Senator Grant, an 
advocate for Florida’s DOMA, “‘God created Adam and Eve, not Adam and 
Steve,’” or how he expressed that it was “‘[g]reat that [the Act] [took] effect 
on June 4, right smack dab in the middle of Gay Pride Week.’”204 
Although Florida’s DOMA makes clear that same-sex marriages are 
not recognized within the state, the issue did not stop there.
205
  In 2003, when 
the Supreme Court of Massachusetts overturned its state law banning same-
sex marriage,
206
 Florida’s opponents to same-sex marriage were quick to 
realize that Florida’s DOMA was also at risk of being overturned.207  For that 
                                                                                                                                         
any other State, territory, possession, or tribe respecting a relationship between 
persons of the same sex that is treated as a marriage under the laws of such other 
State, territory, possession, or tribe, or a right or claim arising from such 
relationship. 
Defense of Marriage Act of 1996 § 2(a). 
199. See Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44, 59–60, 67 (Haw.), reconsideration 
granted in part, 875 P.2d 225 (Haw. 1993), and appeal after remand sub nom. Baehr v. Miike, 
910 P.2d 112 (Haw. 1996), remanded, 1996 WL 694235 (Haw. Cir. Ct. Dec. 3, 1996), aff’d, 
950 P.2d 1234 (Haw. 1997); Schanerman, supra note 198, at 150. 
200. Schanerman, supra note 198, at 150. 
201. Id. at 150–51. 
202. FLA. STAT. § 741.212 (2013); Michael J. Kanotz, Comment, For Better or 
for Worse:  A Critical Analysis of Florida’s Defense of Marriage Act, 25 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 
439, 445 (1998). 
203. Kanotz, supra note 202, at 446. 
204. Id. at 445–46 (second alteration in original). 
205. Id. 
206. Goodridge v. Dep’t of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 948 (Mass. 2003); 
Lynn D. Wardle, Non-Recognition of Same-Sex Marriage Judgments Under DOMA and the 
Constitution, 38 CREIGHTON L. REV. 365, 375 (2004–2005). 
207. See Vote Yes on Amendment 2, CHRISTIAN FAM. COALITION, http://
cfcoalition.com/full_article.php?article_no=94 (last visited Nov. 10, 2013).  The coalitions 
advertised various reasons why an amendment to the Florida Constitution was necessary.  Id. 
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very reason the process to amend Florida’s Constitution began.208  In 2005, 
“[a] coalition of groups joined . . . and agreed on the language [for] the 
Florida Marriage Protection Amendment . . . .”209  The proposed language 
stated, “‘marriage is the legal union of only one man and one woman as 
husband and wife, no other legal union that is treated as marriage or the 
substantial equivalent thereof shall be valid or recognized.’”210  The 
Supreme Court of Florida approved the language of the Amendment by a 
unanimous vote.
211
  By 2008, the decision to determine whether the proposed 
Amendment was to become part of the Florida Constitution was left in the 
hands of Florida’s constituents.212 
There were ugly campaign tactics favoring the passage of the 
Amendment; one campaign advertisement particularly encouraged voters to 
vote in favor of the Amendment by threatening that activist judges could 
ignore the will of the people and legalize same-sex marriage if the 
Amendment was not passed.
213
  Furthermore, advertisements emphasized 
hostile societal views against the LGBTI community by stating that the 
Amendment would “protect[] . . . children from being taught [by] public 
schools that same-sex marriage is the same as natural marriage,” and it 
would “give[] children the best chance for both a mom and a dad.”214  The 
results were surprising to the LGBTI community since opinion polls “never 
showed the [Amendment] getting any more than [fifty-nine] percent 
                                                          
208. See id. 
209. Florida Voters Approve Marriage Protection Amendment, 
PROLIFEBLOGS.COM (Nov. 4, 2008, 9:44 PM), http://www.prolifeblogs.com/articles/archives/
2008/11/florida_voters.php.  “Amendment 2 defines marriage as the union of one man and 
one woman and will prohibit polygamy, group marriage, and same-sex marriage from being 
recognized in Florida.”  Id. 
210. Anthony Niedwiecki, Florida’s Amendment 2:  What Does “Substantial 
Equivalent” to Marriage Mean?, BILERICO PROJECT (Oct. 20, 2008, 3:00 PM), http://
www.bilerico.com/2008/10/floridas_amendment_2_what_does_substanti.php. 
211. Advisory Op. to the Att’y Gen. re Fla. Marriage Prot. Amendment, 926 
So. 2d 1229, 1241 (2006); Florida Voters Approve Marriage Protection Amendment, supra 
note 209. 
212. See FLORIDA FAMILY POLICY COUNCIL ET AL., CONSTITUTIONAL 
AMENDMENT PETITION FORM: FLORIDA MARRIAGE PROTECTION AMENDMENT 1 (n.d.), 
available at http://election.dos.state.fl.us/initiatives/fulltext/pdf/41550-1.pdf. 
213. FLA. FAMILY POLICY COUNCIL, YES ON 2:  FACT SHEET 1 (2008), available 
at http://ccpcfl.org/Voter-Guides/2008/2008MarriageAmend2.pdf. 
Massachusetts . . . activist judges ha[d] re-written marriage laws and ignored the 
will of the people by legalizing same-sex marriages.  There is a national movement 
to do this all over the country, which is why [twenty-seven] states have passed state 
constitutional amendment [sic] to protect marriage. . . . Amendment 2 protects the 
definition of marriage from activist judges. 
Id. (emphasis added). 
214. Id. 
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support.”215  Yet the Amendment passed by a supermajority; 
“[a]pproximately 4.6 million voters supported [the] Amendment, . . . while 
about 2.8 million opposed it.”216  Passage of this Amendment “demonstrates 
that neither legislative nor societal hostility in Florida is likely to end 
soon.”217 
For now, an LGBTI individual in a long-term, non-marital 
relationship will continue to be viewed as an individual under the laws of 
Florida.
218
  Since the LGBTI community is denied of the right to marry, they 
are also denied the “legal status and certain benefits derived therein.”219 
Marriage bestows upon couples a litany of legal rights and 
benefits, including but not limited to:  [F]iling joint state and 
federal income tax returns, social security survivor benefits, 
immigration benefits, bereavement leave, immunity from 
testifying against your spouse in court, wrongful death and loss of 
consortium relief, sick leave to care for a partner, assumption of a 
spouse’s pension, automatic inheritance rights, child custody, 
burial determination, hospital visitation rights, divorce protections, 
and domestic violence protection.
220
 
Acknowledging that change is necessary, the Supreme Court of the 
United States found section three of DOMA unconstitutional.
221
  Even so, 
LGBTI individuals must undertake “costly and time consuming litigation 
under Florida law” to make sure that his or her loved one does not become a 
legal stranger upon the occurrence of an unexpected event.
222
 
                                                          
215. Florida Marriage Amendment Wins 62% Support, FLA. BAPTIST WITNESS 
(Nov. 13, 2008), http://gofbw.com/News.asp?ID=9579. 
216. Id.; Florida Voters Approve Marriage Protection Amendment, supra note 
209. 
217. Moore, supra note 190, at 256. 
218. Id. at 257. 
219. Melissa A. Provost, Comment, Disregarding the Constitution in the Name 
of Defending Marriage:  The Unconstitutionality of the Defense of Marriage Act, 8 SETON 
HALL CONST. L.J. 157, 159 (1997). 
220. Id. 
221. United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2695 (2013) (reasoning that, 
“[t]he federal statute is invalid, for no legitimate purpose overcomes the purpose and effect to 
disparage and injure those whom the State, by its marriage laws, sought to protect in 
personhood and dignity”).. 
222. Moore, supra note 190, at 280; see also William Gibson, Lesbian Case in 
Miami Highlighted Denial of Hospital Visitation Rights, SUNSENTINEL (Apr. 16, 2010, 11:18 
AM), http://weblogs.sun-sentinel.com/news/politics/dcblog/2010/04/lesbian_case_in_miami_
highligh.html. 
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B. What the Future May Hold? 
Even when the LGBTI individual takes legal measures to protect his 
or her partner and provide him or her with rights to prevent them from 
becoming legal strangers upon the occurrence of an unexpected event, there 
still remains the frightening possibility that such legal documents will be 
ignored because the gay and lesbian “‘relationship is so thoroughly invisible 
and disrespected.’”223  Take for example the 2008 case of Clay Greene and 
Harold Scull, partners of twenty years, whose legal measures to “name[] 
each other [as] beneficiaries of their respective estates and agents for medical 
decisions” were completely ignored.224  “By the time [Scull] died, county 
officials had [already] sold all of the couple’s possessions, confiscated their 
cats, and assumed control over their finances.”225  Scull died without seeing 
his partner Greene, since Greene was confined to a nursing home and 
prohibited from visiting him.
226
 
Although the legal measures taken by an LGBTI individual might be 
ignored or contested,
227
 such measures are still the best option an LGBTI 
individual has to provide rights and protect his or her life partner.  In Florida, 
the LGBTI individual must plan ahead in the event sickness or death 
strikes.
228
  This is especially true since “Florida [is] hostile to same-sex 
relationships and consider[s] same-sex partners to be legal strangers.”229 
                                                          
223. Gerry Shih, Suit Charges Elderly Gay Partners Were Forced Apart, N.Y. 
TIMES (Apr. 20, 2010, 2:09 AM), http://bayarea.blogs.nytimes.com/2010/04/20/suit-charges-
elderly-gay-couple-was-forced-apart/?scp=1&sq=elderly%20gay%20partners&st=cse. 
224. NCLR Launches Campaign on Behalf of Clay & Harold, DAILY KOS (Apr. 
19, 2010, 5:43 PM), http://www.dailykos.com/story/2010/04/19/858870/-NCLR-Launches-
Campaign-on-Behalf-of-Clay-Harold. 
225. Nancy J. Knauer, Gay and Lesbian Elders:  Estate Planning and End-of-
Life Decision Making, 12 FLA. COASTAL L. REV. 163, 164–65 (2010). 
226. Id. at 164; NCLR Launches Campaign on Behalf of Clay & Harold, supra 
note 224. 
227. See CARLTON FIELDS & EQUAL. FLA. INST., supra note 195, at 14; 
MOVEMENT ADVANCEMENT PROJECT ET AL., LGBT OLDER ADULTS: FACING LEGAL BARRIERS 
TO TAKING CARE OF LOVED ONES (2010), available at, http://www.lgbtagingcenter.org/
resources/pdfs/LGBTOlderAdultsandTakingCareofLovedOnes.pdf. 
228. See CARLTON FIELDS & EQUAL. FLA. INST., supra note 195, at 14. 
229. Knauer, supra note 225, at 188. 
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1. Transfer of Property 
In Florida, a LGBTI individual must utilize legal tools and 
documents to make sure that his or her life partner has access to him or her 
and to his or her property upon death or incapacity.
230
 
[T]here are a wide variety of legal documents available and 
recognized under Florida law that can be used to facilitate the 
orderly transfer of various types of property upon death, in the 
event of incapacity, or to otherwise avoid the default disposition of 
those assets upon death under existing law.
231
 
So in Florida, if a LGBTI individual wishes for his or her life partner 
to be granted any of his or her property upon death, he or she must have valid 
legal documents specifying such wishes because failure to do so can leave 
the surviving life partner empty handed.
232
 
Although some states have facilitated matters for their LGBTI 
community in this regard by granting legal recognition and protection to the 
same-sex relationship, Florida is not one of those states.
233
  Florida’s 
legislature has failed various times to pass laws that would “recognize the 
long-term relationships of same-sex couples”; until such occurrence, 
Florida’s same-sex partners will continue to be “forced . . . to fit themselves 
into existing legal categories.”234 
Same-sex partners can “fit themselves into existing legal 
categories”235 through estate planning.236  “[E]state-planning documents 
enable[] same-sex partners to give each other some measure of legal standing 
and protection.”237  For example, through a valid will, same-sex partners can 
devise their property to their partners—devisees—rather than allowing 
                                                          
230. See CARLTON FIELDS & EQUAL. FLA. INST., supra note 195, at 14. 
231. Id. 
232. Id. at 14–15. 
233. See Aimee Bouchard & Kim Zadworny, Growing Old Together:  Estate 
Planning Concerns for the Aging Same-Sex Couple, 30 W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 713, 749 (2008).  
“The Hawaii [L]egislature passed the Hawaii Reciprocal Beneficiaries Act, which granted 
some of the legal rights of marriage to couples who registered as reciprocal beneficiaries.”  
Id. at 717.  “When Vermont extended the status of a civil union to same-sex couples, it 
granted them all the same legal rights as provided by marriage within the state . . . .”  Id.  “The 
California Domestic Partner Rights and Responsibilities Act states that same-sex domestic 
partners will be treated like heterosexual married partners in the event of the death of one 
spouse.”  Id. at 720. 
234. Adams, supra note 193, at 761 & n.74, 762. 
235. Id. at 762. 
236. Knauer, supra note 225, at 167. 
237. Id. 
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Florida’s intestacy laws to govern the distribution of their property.238  If the 
probate method is not preferred, the LGBTI individual has other options, 
such as “trusts, joint ownership, and transfer on death designations.”239  
Unlike heterosexual couples, if same-sex partners fail to take legal action to 
provide their long-term partners with rights, their partners will be legal 
strangers in the eyes of Florida law.
240
 
2. Visitation Rights and End of Life Decisions 
Some of the most unconscionable are laws that stand in the way of 
LGBT[I] people taking care of those they love, in life and in death. 
. . . LGBT[I] people could be excluded from medical decision-
making for a partner. . . . [U]pon the death of a partner, LGBT[I] 
people are often denied making end-of-life decisions about last 
rites, funerals, and disposition of remains.
241
 
Unlike heterosexual couples, same-sex couples have to provide the 
hospitals with legal documents “before being allowed to take part in [their] 
partner’s care” or to even be allowed to see their partner.242  This is why 
LGBTI individuals are advised to have legal documents that verify their 
relationship and grant their partners the right to make medical and end-of-life 
decisions.
243
 
A recent Florida case that gained much national attention, Langbehn 
v. Public Health Trust of Miami-Dade County,
244
 exemplifies the difficulties 
same-sex partners face in obtaining access to their hospitalized partner and in 
being permitted to make medical decisions on behalf of their partner.
245
  
Janice Langbehn was not allowed access to Lisa Pond, her partner of 
eighteen years, during the critical hours of Pond’s hospitalization when she 
                                                          
238. Id. at 189–90, 192. 
In the vast majority of states where the decedent is not survived by a spouse, the 
rules of intestate succession distribute the decedent’s property to the closest 
relatives in the following priority:  Children, parents, siblings, nieces and nephews, 
grandparents. . . . If a decedent is not survived by any relatives within the 
prescribed degrees of relationship, all property will escheat to the state. 
Id. at 190–91 n.141 (emphasis added). 
239. Id. at 189–90. 
240. See Knauer, supra note 225, at 188. 
241. MOVEMENT ADVANCEMENT PROJECT ET AL., supra note 227. 
242. Tara Parker-Pope, How Hospitals Treat Same-Sex Couples, N.Y. TIMES 
(May 12, 2009, 12:00 PM), http://well.blogs.nytimes.com/2009/05/12/how-hospitals-treat-
same-sex-couples/. 
243. Id. 
244. 661 F. Supp. 2d 1326 (S.D. Fla. 2009). 
245. Id. at 1331–33. 
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remained semi-conscious.
246
  Although Janice had a power of attorney, 
which authorized her to make medical decisions on behalf of her partner in 
the case of incapacity, no one in the hospital “acknowledged the legal effect 
of the document.”247  Instead, Janice was informed by a social worker that 
because Florida was an anti-gay state, she was not going to be allowed to see 
Pond or know about her medical condition.
248
  It was not until Pond’s sister 
arrived at the hospital that Janice was allowed access to Pond, but at that 
point, Pond was already unconscious and died soon thereafter.
249
 
Although Janice unsuccessfully sued the hospital and hospital staff 
for the emotional distress she was forced to endure,
250
 her case was not 
overlooked by the President of the United States.
251
  President Barack Obama 
noted, 
[LGBTI] Americans are “uniquely affected” by relatives-only 
policies at hospitals . . . [and] “are often barred from the bedsides 
of the partners with whom they may have spent decades of their 
lives—unable to be there for the person they love, and unable to 
act as a legal surrogate if their partner is incapacitated.”
252
 
Therefore, in 2010, President Obama issued a memorandum requiring 
hospitals that accept Medicare or Medicaid funds to adopt policies that 
would provide visitation rights to same-sex couples.
253
  Further, the 
memorandum directed hospitals to respect “all patients’ advance directives, 
such as durable powers of attorney and health care proxies.”254 
Since hospitals must abide by the President’s executive order to 
continue obtaining funding from the government, it is not surprising that 
Florida hospitals have changed their policies to include same-sex partners as 
                                                          
246. Id. 
247. Id. at 1332. 
248. Id.; see also Susan Donaldson James, Lesbians Sue When Partners Die 
Alone, ABC NEWS (May 20, 2009), http://abcnews.go.com/Health/story?id=7633058. 
249. Erin Shaughnessy Zuiker, The Rights of Patients to Visitors of Their 
Choice:  CMS Expands the Meaning of “Immediate Family” and Through Regulation 
Requires Hospitals to Do the Same, HOSPS. & HEALTH SYS. RX, May 2011, at 16, 16. 
250. Langbehn v. Pub. Health Trust of Miami-Dade Cnty., 661 F. Supp. 2d 
1326, 1347 (S.D. Fla. 2009). 
251. Obama Orders Hospital Visitation Rights for Gays, Lesbians, CNN 
POLITICS (Apr. 16, 2010, 2:34 AM), http://www.cnn.com/2010/POLITICS/04/15/
hospital.gay.visitation/index.html. 
252. Id. 
253. Id. 
254. President Barack Obama, Presidential Memorandum–Hospital Visitation 
(Apr. 15, 2010), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/presidential-
memorandum-hospital-visitation. 
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part of their “family member” definitions and have adopted a non-
discrimination policy that encompasses sexual orientation, gender identity, 
and gender expression.
255
  Although such policy changes are occurring 
throughout Florida hospitals, they are not a result of any state action.
256
 
President Obama’s memorandum did not cover end-of-life decisions 
that arise when dealing with funeral decisions and disposition of remains.
257
  
However, this issue also causes problems for the same-sex partners, 
specifically when “[f]amilies [are] unfamiliar with or intolerant of a same-
sex relationship [and they] may make after-death arrangements contrary to a 
couple’s wishes.”258  In Florida, “any person may carry out written 
instructions of the decedent relating to the decedent’s body and funeral and 
burial arrangements.”259  Therefore, it is advised that same-sex partners 
provide directives on how they wish their remains to be disposed.
260
  If such 
measures are not taken, the same-sex partner will have no say in such 
decision regarding the area of burial and cemetery arrangements, since the 
state law has traditionally vested decision-making authority in the next of 
kin.
261
 
3. Living Facilities 
About eighty percent of senior care is provided by family, but since 
LGBTI elders typically do not have the traditional family support system, 
many end up relying on nursing homes or other institutions for long-term 
care.
262
  The thought of going to a nursing home or a living facility raises 
many fears for the LGBTI elders.
263
  Unfortunately, their fears are validly 
                                                          
255. Id.; see also, e.g., JACKSON HEALTH SYS., VISITATION POLICY 1–2 (2010), 
http://www.jacksonhealth.org/library/policies/jhs-visitation-policy.pdf. 
256. See President Barack Obama, supra note 254; see also, e.g., JACKSON 
HEALTH SYS., supra note 255. 
257. See President Barack Obama, supra note 254. 
258. Bouchard & Zadworny, supra note 233, at 748. 
259. FLA. STAT. § 732.804 (2013). 
260. Bouchard & Zadworny, supra note 233, at 748. 
261. Jennifer E. Horan, Note, “When Sleep at Last Has Come”:  Controlling 
the Disposition of Dead Bodies for Same-Sex Couples, 2 J. GENDER RACE & JUST. 423, 428 
(1999) (discussing the difficulty encountered by surviving same-sex partners). 
262. LGBT MOVEMENT ADVANCEMENT PROJECT & SERVS. & ADVOCACY FOR 
GAY, LESBIAN, BISEXUAL, & TRANSGENDER ELDERS, IMPROVING THE LIVES OF LGBT OLDER 
ADULTS ii, 33–34 (2010), available at 
http://www.sageusa.org/resources/publications.cfm?ID=21. 
263. Dean H. Freeman, Gay Seniors Fear Nursing Home Abuse in Broward if 
“Outed”, FLA. NURSING HOME LAW. BLOG (Aug. 18, 2012), http://
www.floridanursinghomelawyerblog.com/2012/08/gay_seniors_fear_nursing_home_1.html. 
39
: Nova Law Review 38, #1
Published by NSUWorks, 2013
2013] LESBIAN LAWYERS IN SOUTH FLORIDA 31 
rooted, especially when elders “face a heightened risk of abuse . . . regardless 
of other identity factors.”264  Being part of a minority group makes the 
LGBTI elders more susceptible to being subjected to emotional and physical 
hostility and to being the first target of abuse in living facilities.
265
  For such 
reasons, many LGBTI elders who end up in long-term care institutions feel 
forced to closet their sexual orientation.
266
 
Although the Nursing Home Reform Act (“NHRA”) was designed to 
protect LGBTI elders from discrimination, abuse, and neglect in federally 
certified nursing homes,
267
 this does not mean that such conduct does not 
continue to occur.
268
  Regardless of the federal protections, the LGBTI elders 
are correct in believing that in such institutions “‘[t]hey can[not] be 
guaranteed an environment . . . where they will be treated equally.’”269  A 
national survey indicated that forty-three percent of 770 LGBTI elders living 
in a nursing home “reported some type of mistreatment by staff or fellow 
patients” and “about [twenty] percent of LGBT[I] patients were abruptly 
discharged from their facility—a far higher rate than their straight 
counterparts.”270  Also, since the NHRA protections do not cover living 
facilities or nursing homes that are not federally funded, it is up to the states 
                                                          
264. Jaime E. Hovey, Note, Nursing Wounds:  Why LGBT Elders Need 
Protection from Discrimination and Abuse Based on Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity, 
17 ELDER L.J. 95, 96 (2009). 
265. Id. 
266. Diane C. Lade, Nursing Home as Closet—‘Gen Silent’ Film on Gay 
Seniors Exposes Prejudice, Fear, SUN-SENTINEL, Aug. 7, 2012, at 1A (“More than three-
fourths of the LGBT[I] survey respondents said gay seniors would hide their sexual 
orientation if they ended up in institutional care.”); see also Daniel Redman, They Stood Up 
for Us:  Advocating for LGBT Elders in Long-Term Care, 21 TEMP. POL. & CIV. RTS. L. REV. 
443, 452–53 (2012). 
Vera and Zayda were together for fifty-eight years.  When Vera’s 
Alzheimer’s became too much for Zayda to deal with, they went into an assisted 
living facility.  Despite the fact that they had been partners for nearly six decades, 
they were afraid to be out in this facility, and they presented themselves as sisters 
instead.  Once Vera passed away, Zayda did not feel like she could speak about 
their relationship.  She did not put up any pictures or any indications of the fact that 
she had lived this life with this person whom she loved, and with whom she had 
built a family. 
Redman, supra note 266, at 453. 
267. NAT’L SENIOR CITIZENS LAW CTR. ET AL., LGBT OLDER ADULTS IN LONG-
TERM CARE FACILITIES: STORIES FROM THE FIELD 21 (2011), available at http://
www.lgbtagingcenter.org/resources/pdfs/NSCLC_LGBT_report.pdf. 
268. Rob Barry et al., Neglected to Death, Part 1:  Once Pride of Florida; Now 
Scenes of Neglect, MIAMI HERALD (Apr. 30, 2011), http://www.miamiherald.com/2011/04/30/
2194842/once-pride-of-florida-now-scenes.html. 
269. Lade, supra note 266. 
270. Freeman, supra note 263. 
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to set those protections.
271
  Sadly, Florida has not been at the forefront in 
enforcing laws protecting the elders in long-term care facilities, let alone 
creating laws that would protect the LGBTI elders in long-term care 
facilities.
272
  Instead, “[r]eports have criticized [Florida] nursing homes and 
assisted living facilities for not meeting the specialized health and welfare 
needs of elderly homosexuals.”273  Until proactive measures are taken by 
Florida to hold the long-term care institutions accountable for unfair 
treatment towards the LGBTI elders, the LGBTI elders feel forced to hide 
their identity in order to diminish the likelihood of abuse, discrimination, and 
neglect.
274
 
C. Adoption 
Until recently, Florida had a total ban on homosexual adoption.
275
  
“In 1977, Florida became the first state to enact a [blanket exclusion] on 
adoption[] by gay[s] or lesbian[s] . . . .”276  The statute plainly stated “[n]o 
person eligible to adopt under this statute may adopt if that person is a 
homosexual.”277  The legislation clearly singled out the LGBTI community 
from adopting on the basis that the group was dangerous to children.
278
  
Even though there was a “lack of empirical studies or legislative fact-finding 
regarding the harms of adoption by gay or lesbian adults, the legislature[’s]” 
hostility was enough to enact the ban on all homosexual adoptions.
279
  As 
                                                          
271. NAT’L SENIOR CITIZENS LAW CTR. ET AL., supra note 267, at 21–25. 
272. NAT’L GAY & LESBIAN TASK FORCE, STATE NONDISCRIMINATION LAWS IN 
THE U.S. (2013), available at http://www.thetaskforce.org/downloads/reports/issue_maps/
non_discrimination_6_13_color.pdf; Report Reveals Elder Abuse in Florida Assisted Living 
Facilities, HUFFINGTON POST (May 8, 2011, 10:22 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/
05/08/report-reveals-elder-abuse_n_858892.html.  The article points out “Florida’s state 
regulators’ failure to monitor and enforce the laws protecting some of society’s most 
vulnerable residents.”  Report Reveals Elder Abuse in Florida Assisted Living Facilities, 
supra note 272. 
273. 15 JEROME IRA SOLKOFF & SCOTT M. SOLKOFF, FLORIDA ELDER LAW § 
24.5 (2012–2013). 
274. Freeman, supra note 263; Lade, supra note 266. 
275. See Fla. Dep’t of Children & Families v. Adoption of X.X.G. & N.R.G., 
45 So. 3d 79, 81, 91–92 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 2010). 
276. Tiffani G. Lee, Note, Cox v. Department of Health and Rehabilitative 
Services:  A Challenge to Florida’s Homosexual Adoption Ban, 51 U. MIAMI L. REV. 151, 151 
(1996). 
277. FLA. STAT. § 63.042(3) (1977) (current version at FLA. STAT. § 63.042 
(2013)) (emphasis added). 
278. Lee, supra note 276, at 154; FLA. STAT. § 63.042 (1977) (current version 
at FLA. STAT. § 63.042 (2013)). 
279. Lee, supra note 276, at 155. 
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one senator pointed out, the statute “had nothing to do with adoption and 
everything to do with discrimination against homosexuals.”280 
In Florida, the right to adopt has been incessantly fought for by the 
LGBTI community for thirty-six years.
281
  In many cases like Lofton v. 
Kearney,
282
 homosexual foster parents challenged the constitutionality of 
Florida’s adoption ban.283  The courts constantly upheld the adoption ban, 
mainly on the reasoning that the best interest of the child was a legitimate 
basis for the ban.
284
  However, it has been clear to many that “the best 
interest of the child standard, that was offered as the legitimate purpose 
behind the per se denial of homosexual adoption, [was] merely a guise for 
discrimination.”285 
After previous failed legal challenges to the adoption ban, a Third 
District Court of Appeal decision has changed the playing field in the favor 
of the LGBTI community.
286
  In 2010, the Third District Court of Appeal 
deemed the law banning homosexuals from adopting unconstitutional.
287
  
The court held that “the best interests of children are not preserved by 
prohibiting homosexual adoption,” and “the [law] violated . . . equal 
protection rights of the children [and their prospective parents].”288  For now, 
the prohibited adoption by gays and lesbians is no longer in effect.
289
  But the 
                                                          
280. Id.  Oddly enough, members of the LGBTI community could become 
foster parents, but could not adopt those foster children until the legal challenge was initiated 
by a gay foster father.  See In re Adoption of Doe, 2008 WL 5006172, at *1 (Fla. 11th Cir. Ct. 
Nov. 25, 2008), aff’d sub nom. Fla. Dep’t of Children & Families v. Adoption of X.X.G. & 
N.R.G., 45 So. 3d 79 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 2010).  The Florida Circuit Court of the Eleventh 
Judicial Circuit found the prohibition against adoption unconstitutional.  Id. at *29. 
281. See FLA. STAT. § 63.042(3) (1977) (current version at FLA. STAT. § 63.042 
(2013)); Lofton v. Kearny, 157 F. Supp. 2d 1372, 1374–76 (S.D. Fla. 2001); Cox v. Fla. Dep’t 
of Health & Rehabilitative Servs., 656 So. 2d 902, 902–03 (Fla. 1995) (per curiam). 
282. 157 F. Supp. 2d 1372 (S.D. Fla. 2001). 
283. Id. at 1374. 
284. See, e.g., id. at 1383–84. 
285. Carolyn S. Grigsby, Note, Lofton v. Kearney:  Discrimination Declared 
Constitutional in Florida, 21 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 199, 224 (2002); see also Timothy 
P.F. Crowley, Case Note, Lofton v. Kearney:  The United States District Court for the 
Southern District of Florida Holds Florida’s Statutory Ban on Gay Adoption Is Not Offensive 
to the Constitution, 11 TUL. J.L. & SEXUALITY 253, 263 (2002). 
286. See Fla. Dep’t of Children & Families v. Adoption of X.X.G. & N.R.G., 
45 So. 3d 79, 81, 91–92 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 2010); Susan Spencer-Wendel, Gay Adoption 
Ban Overturned; an Appeals Court Rejects Nation’s Last Prohibition; State Stops Enforcing 
It, PALM BEACH POST, Sept. 23, 2010, at A.1. 
287. Adoption of X.X.G. & N.R.G., 45 So. 3d at 92; Spencer-Wendel, supra 
note 286. 
288. Adoption of X.X.G. & N.R.G., 45 So. 3d at 87, 91. 
289. Spencer-Wendel, supra note 286. 
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fight is far from over; a backlash against gay and lesbian adoption continues 
to ensue.
290
  There remains the lingering possibility of another Florida 
appellate court ruling differently on the matter, which would take it to the 
Supreme Court of Florida to make the final ruling.
291
 
D. Child Custody 
In Florida, a LGBTI parent might face child custody and visitation 
issues in two main factual contexts:  1) “[A] person who enters into a 
heterosexual marriage and has children, [but] later divorce[s] after 
discovering that he or she is gay, lesbian, bisexual, or transgender,” or 2) “[a] 
same-sex couple[] . . . rais[es] a child or children together [and later] 
separate[s].”292  In the first scenario, the legal issues for the LGBTI parent 
arise due to his or her sexual orientation and/or gender identity.
293
  While in 
the second scenario, the legal issues for the LGBTI parents typically arise 
because only one of the LGBTI parents is the legal parent of the child.
294
  
Under Florida law, there is a lot more guidance on how to deal with child 
custody or visitation issues if the LGBTI parent had the child from a prior 
heterosexual relationship.
295
 
In a custody decision, it is the court that decides which parent is 
better fit to retain custody over his or her child.
296
  A “family court judge 
applying a ‘best interest of the child’ test, has broad discretion in defining 
which family members or forms are deviant and which are normal and 
healthy.”297  In Florida, the problem for the LGBTI parent lies in the broad 
discretion that the judges have.
298
  Many court decisions show that judges 
decide child custody matters based on the social stigma of homosexuality, 
rather than what is truly in the best interest of the child.
299
  Take, for 
                                                          
290. See id. 
291. Id. 
292. NAT’L CTR. FOR LESBIAN RIGHTS, CHILD CUSTODY AND VISITATION ISSUES 
FOR LESBIAN, GAY, BISEXUAL, AND TRANSGENDER PARENTS IN FLORIDA 1 (2009), available at 
www.nclrights.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/07/2007_10_02_FLCustodyPub.pdf. 
293. See Maradie v. Maradie, 680 So. 2d 538, 540 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 
1996) (per curiam). 
294. NAT’L CTR. FOR LESBIAN RIGHTS, supra note 292, at 1–2. 
295. See FLA. STAT. § 61.13(2)(c) (2013). 
296. Id.; see also Barbara Bennett Woodhouse & Kelly Reese, Reflections on 
Loving and Children’s Rights, 20 U. FLA. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 11, 19 (2009). 
297. Woodhouse & Reese, supra note 296, at 19 (emphasis added). 
298. See Packard v. Packard, 697 So. 2d 1292, 1293 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 
1997) (per curiam); Maradie, 680 So. 2d at 543. 
299. Packard, 697 So. 2d at 1293; Maradie, 680 So. 2d at 540. 
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example, Maradie v. Maradie,
300
 where the trial court below removed child 
custody rights from a lesbian-mother on the basis that the “‘homosexual 
environment is not a traditional home environment and can adversely affect a 
child,’”301 or Packard v. Packard,302 where the trial court below reasoned 
that due to the mother’s sexual orientation, the father would “provide a more 
traditional family environment for the children.”303  Even though the Florida 
appellate courts have clarified that sexual orientation of an LGBTI parent 
should only be considered in determining custody matters if it has a direct 
bearing on the “‘welfare of the child,’” these types of rulings exemplify how 
social stereotypes disfavor the LGBTI parent in Florida.
304
 
Unlike LGBTI parents from prior heterosexual relationships, 
“[s]ame-sex parents in Florida . . . face unique legal issues” because, 
typically, “both partners in a same-sex couple cannot establish a legally 
recognized parental relationship to the couple’s child.”305  Since same-sex 
couples in Florida cannot gain parental rights on the basis of marriage, there 
are very few avenues available for a LGBTI non-legal parent to form legal 
ties with his or her child.
306
  A recent avenue that has become available to 
Florida’s LGBTI non-legal parents is second-parent adoption.307  “Second-
parent adoption in Florida is when an unmarried parent adopts her partner’s 
biological or adoptive child.  This adoption generally gives the second parent 
full legal parental rights, legal and custodial.”308  This adoption option only 
recently became available to Florida’s LGBTI community as a result of 
Florida’s lift on the ban of homosexual adoption.309  Although the second-
parent adoption option might be available, it remains a new and unsettled law 
in Florida.
310
 
If a LGBTI non-legal parent is unable to establish legal ties to the 
child, Florida case law precedent does not favor his or her fight in obtaining 
                                                          
300. 680 So. 2d 538 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1996) (per curiam). 
301. Id. at 540. 
302. 697 So. 2d 1292 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1997) (per curiam). 
303. Id. at 1293. 
304. See id. (quoting Maradie, 680 So. 2d at 542); see also Jacoby v. Jacoby, 
763 So. 2d 410, 413 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2000). 
305. NAT’L CTR. FOR LESBIAN RIGHTS, supra note 292, at 7 (emphasis added). 
306. See supra Part IV.A. 
307. Second Parent Adoption, GIDEON I. ALPER ATT’Y & COUNS. LAW, http://
www.galperlaw.com/gay-law/second-parent-adoption/ (last visited Nov. 10, 2013). 
308. Id. 
309. See supra Part IV.C; Second Parent Adoption, supra note 307. 
310. The Law Firm of Adam B. Cordover, P.A., A Story of Second Parent 
Adoption, ABC FAM. L. BLOG (Apr. 28, 2012), http://abcfamilyblog.wordpress.com/2012/04/
28/an-interesting-story-of-second-parent-adoption/. 
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child custody or visitation rights.
311
  “Florida’s appellate courts have 
consistently held that parental rights cannot be extended or established based 
upon the emotional or psychological bond that develops over time when one 
treats a child as his or her own, even with the legal parents’ knowledge and 
consent.”312  The Florida judiciary is continually unwilling to apply the legal 
theories that could grant the LGBTI non-legal parent custodial rights to the 
child.
313
  More often than not, Florida courts treat the LGBTI non-legal 
parent as a legal stranger to the child.
314
  In Wakeman v. Dixon,
315
 the court 
rejected the former domestic partner’s claim of parental rights as a de facto 
or psychological parent as there is “no right to claim court-ordered visitation 
as a psychological parent, and the court lacks the inherent authority to award 
it.”316  Florida’s Judiciary justifies its reluctance to extend theories of de 
facto parent or psychological parent with the argument that those “‘rights 
are, with regard to a non-parent, statutory, and the court has no inherent 
authority to award’” them.317  Not surprisingly, the Florida Legislature has 
taken no action in granting the court such authority.
318
  Quite obviously, the 
inaction of Florida’s Judiciary and Legislature in this matter stems from legal 
animus towards the LGBTI community.
319
 
                                                          
311. See T.M.H. v. D.M.T., 79 So. 3d 787, 807 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 2011) 
(Lawson, J., dissenting) (citing Wakeman v. Dixon, 921 So. 2d 669, 673 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. 
App. 2006) (per curiam)), aff’d in part, disapproved in part, No. SC12-261, 2013 WL 
5942278 (Fla. Nov. 7, 2013); Lamariatata v. Lucas, 823 So. 2d 316, 319 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. 
App. 2002); Kazmierazak v. Query, 736 So. 2d 106, 110 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1999); Music 
v. Rachford, 654 So. 2d 1234, 1235 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1995) (per curiam) (citing Meeks 
v. Garner, 598 So. 2d 261, 262 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1992)); Taylor v. Kennedy, 649 So. 2d 
270, 271–72 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1994). 
312. T.M.H., 79 So. 3d at 807 (Lawson, J., dissenting). 
313. See NAT’L CTR. FOR LESBIAN RIGHTS, supra note 292, at 10–12. 
314. See id.  This is a growing issue especially when “[a]n increasing number 
of same-sex couples are choosing to have children. . . . Reproductive options for same-sex 
couples who desire to parent include adoption, foster care, embryo adoption, surrogacy, donor 
sperm insemination (“DI”), donor oocyte with gestational carrier (“GC”), and shared 
maternity.”  Deborah Smith, What are the Reproductive Options When a Same-Sex Couple 
Wants a Family?, SEXUALITY, REPROD. & MENOPAUSE, Aug. 2011, at 30, 30–31. 
315. 921 So. 2d 669 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 2006) (per curiam). 
316. Id. at 672–73 (citing Swain v. Swain, 567 So. 2d 1058, 1058 (Fla. 5th 
Dist. Ct. App. 1990)). 
317. Music v. Rachford, 654 So. 2d 1234, 1235 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1995) 
(per curiam) (quoting Meeks v. Garner, 598 So. 2d 261, 262 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1992)); 
see also Wakeman, 921 So. 2d at 673 (quoting Music, 654 So. at 1235). 
318. See Wakeman, 921 So. 2d at 672. 
319. See Memorandum from Williams Inst. On Florida—Sexual Orientation 
and Gender Identity Law and Documentation of Discrimination 8 (Sept. 2009), available at 
williamsinstitute.law.ucla.edu/wp-content/uploads/Florida.pdf. 
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E. Employment Discrimination 
“[T]he Florida Civil Rights Act does not cover employment 
discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation or gender identity.”320  It has 
been clearly documented that, in Florida, LGBTI individuals experience 
employment discrimination at a high rate.
321
  Yet, the Florida Legislature has 
failed to take action to prevent such injustices from continuing.
322
  To this 
day, Florida does not have a “statute prohibiting employment discrimination 
based on sexual orientation or gender identity.”323  In 2008, the Florida 
Legislature made attempts to add sexual orientation and gender identity as 
impermissible grounds for discrimination, but since animus towards the 
LGBTI community is prevalent within the legislature, no protection has 
passed.
324
  Take, for example, Florida House Representative D. Alan Hays, 
who believes that LGBTI individuals “‘need psychological treatment.’”325  
Until such animosity towards LGBTI individuals is extinguished, it is 
unlikely that LGBTI individuals will have a legal remedy in matters of 
employment discrimination.
326
  Until then, cases like that of Steven 
Stanton—who was employed for seventeen years as a city manager but fired 
once he announced plans of getting a gender change—will continue to 
occur.
327
 
V. WHAT THE LESBIAN LAWYERS OBSERVED ABOUT THE LEGAL 
SYSTEM 
Lesbian lawyers have multiple challenges relating to the legal 
system.
328
  The first is that the law itself was written by males and to 
advantage males.
329
  Women were a later addition.
330
  Deborah L. Rhode 
gives due credit to contemporary changes in regard to sex and the law, noting 
                                                          
320. Id. at 1. 
321. See id. at 1–8, 17–30. 
322. Id. at 9–11. 
323. Id. at 1. 
324. Memorandum from Williams Inst., supra note 319, at 9–10. 
325. Id. at 10. 
326. See id.; Willie Howard, Stanton Starts Work as City Manager, 
SUNSENTINEL (May 5, 2009), http://articles.sun-sentinel.com/2009-05-05/news/
0905010127_1_city-manager-steve-stanton-gender-identity. 
327. See Howard, supra note 326. 
328. Deborah L. Rhode, Gender and the Profession:  The No-Problem 
Problem, 30 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1001, 1004 (2002). 
329. See CYNTHIA FUCHS EPSTEIN, WOMEN IN LAW 3–4 (1983 ed. 1983). 
330. See id. at 219 tbl.12.1.  Less than 5% of the lawyers were women in the 
1960s and fewer than 2% were law professors.  Id. at 4 tbl.I.1, 219–20 tbl.12.1. 
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that “[t]oday, the legal landscape has been transformed.”331  But she contends 
that even with more women in law and the abiding belief that “the woman 
problem has been solved,”332 inequities remain a serious problem from 
salaries to mentoring to promotions.
333
  Rhode believes that these and other 
areas remain—and often continue—to present obstacles and challenges to 
lesbian lawyers and their clients.
334
 
All of our interviewees described a changing legal system and a 
changing world for lesbian lawyers, although they described different 
degrees of systemic change.
335
  Most felt the law was more or less equal in 
its treatment of lesbian and gay clients and lawyers
336
 and seemed to feel that 
“for the most part, [they thought] judges just care about the law.  They [are] 
not—they [are] not [sic] going to necessarily care about is he gay or 
straight.”337  Jennifer Travieso expressed mixed feelings—shared by 
several—that if a jury knows, it may, but it would probably not affect a judge 
because they mostly just use the law.
338
  On the other hand, Robin Bodiford 
stated flatly that there is “[n]o such thing as someone not bringing biases to 
[the] bench.”339  And Michelle Parker, when asked to describe her angriest 
moment—as all interviewees were—answered, “[m]y angriest moment is that 
there is bias everywhere.  You [are] not always going to get a fair deal, like 
life is [not] fair . . . .”340  Monica Salis affirms, “[m]y job is to make the court 
be fair. . . . There [is] bias everywhere.  Every case.  Every case.”341  
Interestingly, even most of those who described the legal system as primarily 
fair, later went on to describe incidents of unfairness within the system or in 
                                                          
331. Rhode, supra note 328, at 1001. 
332. Id. 
333. Id. at 1001–04. 
334. See id. at 1003–06. 
335. Interview with Robin L. Bodiford (Aug. 3, 2012), supra note 4, at 5; 
Interview with Seril L. Grossfeld, supra note 4, at 18; Interview with Linda F. Harrison & 
Phyllis D. Kotey, supra note 4, at 22; Interview with Lea P. Krauss, supra note 4, at 5; 
Interview with Jennifer Travieso, supra note 3, at 17; see Interview with Lilas Ayandeh, supra 
note 3, at 18; Interview with Michelle M. Parker, supra note 4, at 11–12; Interview with 
Monica I. Salis, supra note 4, at 19–20. 
336. See Interview with Robin L. Bodiford (Aug. 3, 2012), supra note 4, at 4–
5; Interview with Seril L. Grossfeld, supra note 4, at 18; Interview with Monica I. Salis, supra 
note 4, at 19. 
337. Interview with Jennifer Travieso, supra note 3, at 8. 
338. Id.; see also Interview with Lea P. Krauss, supra note 4, at 17; Interview 
with Michelle M. Parker, supra note 4, at 9; Interview with Monica I. Salis, supra note 4, at 9. 
339. Interview with Robin L. Bodiford (Aug. 3, 2012), supra note 4, at 5. 
340. Interview with Michelle M. Parker, supra note 4, at 12. 
341. Interview with Monica I. Salis, supra note 4, at 9. 
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individuals within the system;
342
 for example, how heterosexual women 
lawyers found more success,
343
 how men still outnumber women in many 
courtrooms,
344
 how juries might deal unfairly with LGBTI individuals, how 
opposing lawyers might use a person’s sexual orientation as an issue,345 how 
some judges demonstrated biased language or behavior, and the difference in 
perspectives between urban courts compared to courts in North Florida.
346
 
The interviewees agreed that same-sex marriages deserved equal 
legal footing—no matter whether they saw marriage itself as a positive 
institution or not.
347
  Yet same-sex marriage remains unavailable in most 
states and has found inconsistent support in the courts at best.
348
 
In addition, our research experience in the snowball sample done for 
this project contradicts the idea that we have achieved equality, in terms of 
sexual orientation, within the legal profession.
349
  Monica Salis, one of our 
interviewees who works with the local GLLN, also commented: 
A lot of gay attorneys are not out.  They [are] out socially.  
They [are] out in organizations.  We have, I [would] say, a good 
[thirty] percent of GLLN members that [will not] put their name 
on a list, do [not] want their name anywhere, and then there [are] a 
whole bunch of people that [will not] join . . . at all or come to our 
events, and they [are] known in the community as gay, not any 
question.
350
 
In a truly equal legal world, lesbians in the legal profession would not need 
to self-censor interviews or organizational memberships.
351
  Indeed, some of 
the comments in our interviews suggest that this is still necessary, especially 
for beginning lawyers at larger firms.
352
  One experienced attorney 
interviewee, when asked for advice for young lawyers, said, “bear in mind 
that most of the people in the world are heterosexual and . . . you have to 
                                                          
342. See, e.g., id. at 9. 
343. See Interview with Michelle M. Parker, supra note 4, at 1. 
344. See Interview with Seril L. Grossfeld, supra note 4, at 18. 
345. Interview with Michelle M. Parker, supra note 4, at 9. 
346. Interview with Monica I. Salis, supra note 4, at 9–10, 17–18. 
347. Interview with Lilas Ayandeh, supra note 3, at 8; Interview with Seril L. 
Grossfeld, supra note 4, at 17; Interview with Linda F. Harrison & Phyllis D. Kotey, supra 
note 4, at 16–17; Interview with Lea P. Krauss, supra note 4, at 6; Interview with Michelle M. 
Parker, supra note 4, at 10; Interview with Jennifer Travieso, supra note 3, at 12–13. 
348. See supra Part IV.A. 
349. See supra Part III. 
350. Interview with Monica I. Salis, supra note 4, at 11. 
351. See id. 
352. See, e.g., Interview with Seril L. Grossfeld, supra note 4, at 22–23. 
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deal with them” and that “there [are] still a lot of conservative firms.  If that[] 
[is] where you want to have [the] job, you have to abide by their rules.”353  
She finished by noting that a young lawyer “[cannot] be radical if you want 
to work for a [big] firm. . . . Once you[] [are] inside . . . you might be able to 
shake things up . . . .”354 
Although some interviewees stressed the fairness of the law to gays 
and lesbians,
355
 some also wanted to see a lesbian on the Supreme Court of 
the United States.
356
  One said, “it would be [nice] to have someone on [our] 
team up there.”357 
All our interviewees spent years practicing, teaching, or studying law 
in South Florida.
358
  However, while many interviewees emphasized the 
concept of fairness for all within the legal system,
359
 only one interviewee 
mentioned the many years in which gays and lesbians were treated unfairly 
in terms of law and forbidden to legally adopt in Florida––though they were 
considered fit foster parents.
360
 
VI. CONCLUSION:  SOME MUSINGS ON IDENTITY AND LAW 
It may seem at first that the issue of identity is a personal one, best 
examined through sociology or psychology, and irrelevant to law.  However, 
in reality, for LGBTI and all those whose sexuality does not fit into 
mainstream categories—identity, society, and law are strongly intertwined.361  
Why is identity important in law?  Courts of law, like people, have the power 
to define, restrict, or even liberate an identity.
362
  The Court has done each of 
these in its history.
363
  For instance, in Romer v. Evans,
364
 one side singled 
people out, based on their identity, for a lack of protection under the law.
365
  
                                                          
353. Id. at 22. 
354. Id. at 23. 
355. E.g., Interview with Monica I. Salis, supra note 4, at 7. 
356. E.g., Interview with Lilas Ayandeh, supra note 3, at 12–13. 
357. Id. at 13. 
358. See supra Part I. 
359. E.g., Interview with Monica I. Salis, supra note 4, at 7. 
360. Interview with Linda F. Harrison & Phyllis D. Kotey, supra note 4, at 3–
4; see also Lofton v. Kearny, 157 F. Supp. 2d 1372, 1375 (S.D. Fla. 2001). 
361. See, e.g., Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 627–30 (1996). 
362. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003); Romer, 517 U.S. at 627–
29. 
363. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 578; Romer, 517 U.S. at 627–29; Bowers v. 
Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 188–90 (1986). 
364. 517 U.S. 620 (1996). 
365. Id. at 624. 
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They said that Coloradans could not enact local laws to protect a group
366—
homosexuals—and three dissenting members of the Court evidently saw that 
as acceptable.
367
  Another example is Bowers v. Hardwick,
368
 which upheld 
sodomy laws that declared homosexual sex a crime—the Court essentially 
criminalized people’s identities.369  Of course, this decision was later 
overturned in Lawrence v. Texas,
370
 but consider the devastating effects of 
the original ruling on identity from societal and personal standpoints.
371
  The 
effects linger today—as people and groups continue to attempt to use the 
courts to restrict homosexual identity.
372
 
Thus, finding out how lesbian lawyers identify and what their 
triumphs and challenges have been in the legal field provide an important 
historical perspective, and inform us about contemporary evolutions in the 
field.  Our interviewees were a wonderfully diverse group of women that 
shared some qualities in common, such as lesbianism and a legal degree, but 
differed in race, ethnicity, class, political beliefs, family, generation, and 
disclosure of identity—by method, time, and impact of coming out.373  They 
did share one other quality—a passion for justice in the legal system.374  
Perhaps that passion manifests itself in their choices related to the practice of 
law.
375
  None were corporate lawyers, for example.
376
  It may be that 
corporate lawyers are less likely to be involved in the GLLN for various 
reasons and were, therefore, not reached by this snowball sample.  Most—
but not all—saw the legal system as generally fair to LGBTI, even while 
surrounded by examples—particularly in Florida—of when it is not.377  This 
                                                          
366. Id. at 624, 635–36. 
367. Id. at 636 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
368. 478 U.S. 186 (1986). 
369. Id. at 187–89. 
370. 539 U.S. 558 (2003). 
371. See id. at 578; Adams, supra note 193, at 751–52; Ihrig, supra note 97, at 
558; supra Part II. 
372. Langbehn v. Pub. Health Trust of Miami-Dade Cnty., 661 F. Supp. 2d 
1326, 1332 (S.D. Fla. 2009); Packard v. Packard, 697 So. 2d 1292, 1293 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. 
App. 1997) (per curiam); Maradie v. Maradie, 680 So. 2d 538, 540–41 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 
1996) (per curiam). 
373. See supra Parts I–III. 
374. Interview with Linda F. Harrison & Phyllis D. Kotey, supra note 4, at 8; 
see also Interview with Michelle M. Parker, supra note 4, at 6. 
375. See supra Parts I–II. 
376. See Interview with Lilas Ayandeh, supra note 3, at 4; Interview with Seril 
L. Grossfeld, supra note 4, at 1; Interview with Linda F. Harrison & Phyllis D. Kotey, supra 
note 4, at 8; Interview with Lea P. Krauss, supra note 4, at 11; Interview with Michelle M. 
Parker, supra note 4, at 11; Interview with Monica I. Salis, supra note 4, at 1; Interview with 
Jennifer Travieso, supra note 3, at 1. 
377. See supra Part V. 
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may speak to optimism, it may speak to the increasing changes and ongoing 
evolution of the legal system, or it may be influenced by the loyalty; all seem 
to relate to principles of law and to the legal system in the United States.  
Lesbian lawyers are faced with contradictions within the system.
378
  They 
have been taught respect for the rule of law in law school, yet the same 
system and associated set of laws still discriminate against them at an 
identity-based level.
379
  They remain both insiders and outsiders to the 
system.
380
  This is another quality they share and one that puts them in a very 
different place from lawyers who are not lesbians.
381
 
                                                          
378. See Memorandum from Williams Inst., supra note 319, at 2–8; supra Part 
IV. 
379. See Memorandum from Williams Inst., supra note 319, at 2–8; supra Part 
IV. 
380. See Memorandum from Williams Inst., supra note 319, at 2–8; supra 
Parts IV–V. 
381. See Memorandum from Williams Inst., supra note 319, at 2–8; supra 
Parts IV–V. 
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  ABSTRACT  
Hollywood East!  The honorific title bestowed upon a bewitching 
state known for her sandy beaches, warm winter days, and mosquito-filled 
Everglades.  Florida and the Film Industry:  A tale of an alluring titan and a 
powerful behemoth behaving like two lovers enmeshed in an affair, complete 
with wooing, courting, and rebuffs.  A relationship that has lasted over a 
century and continues to blossom amidst healthy competition, tax incentives, 
innovative legislation, and cooperation.  Florida’s commitment to a thriving 
film industry—through its legislature, government administrative agencies, 
and incentives—has allowed its economy to grow and its citizenry to 
flourish, while showcasing Florida to the world. 
                                                 
* Mary Pergola Parent, JD, is a lecturer on Law and Film:  Images of Justice, as an 
Adjunct Assistant Professional Specialist in the Department of Film, Television, and Theatre, 
College of Arts & Letters, at the University of Notre Dame. 
** Kevin Hugh Govern, JD, LL.M, is an Associate Professor of Law at Ave Maria 
School of Law, an Instructor of Law and Public Policy at California University of 
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the Center for Ethics and the Rule of Law, University of Pennsylvania Law School. 
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This article chronicles the development of the Florida film and 
entertainment industry, from its inception to the present day, as a product of 
environment, opportunity, economics, law, and policy.
1
  The film and 
entertainment industry is one of the most significant contributors to Florida’s 
local, regional, and global image, through depiction of its people, cities, 
industry, and nature.  As an ever-growing contributor to the state’s economy 
through job creation, service industry revenues, and tax collections, Florida’s 
relationship with the film and entertainment industry has gone from an ad 
hoc approach to a carefully strategized, multi-year effort, fueled by the 
Florida Film and Entertainment Industry Financial Incentive Program, to 
encourage the use of the state as a location for all facets of digital, film, and 
television production.
2
 
This article will address in Part I the earliest history of film in 
Florida from the late nineteenth century birth and flourishing through the 
1917 transfer to California and revitalization during World War II.
3
  Part II 
considers the state’s economic, political, and legal enticements for the film 
industry to grow in the state and to match the public relations campaign to 
draw tourism to the Sunshine State.
4
  Part III outlines the essence of 1950s 
blockbuster hits that gave impetus to rules and laws to solidify the state’s 
relationship with the film industry.
5
  As commented upon in Part IV, 
Florida’s compelling call to the industry reached New York City and beyond, 
bringing rare talent that would further expand the industry’s reach and hold 
in Florida.
6
  Worthy of Part V’s particular focus, mesmerizing Miami 
reached international recognition as a thriving hub for both television and 
film from the 1950s onward, and industry contractual practices there set the 
standard for the entire film and television industry thenceforth.
7
  Part VI 
summarizes the background, legislative authority, and practical efforts of the 
Governor’s Office of Film and Entertainment, followed by the tax incentives 
under state and federal law which caused the film and television industry 
efforts in Florida to expand exponentially in the twenty-first century onward 
in Part VII; specifically with some of the most notable progeny of this effort 
and their value to state, regional, and the national economies showcased in 
                                                 
1. See infra Part I–X. 
2. See The Fla. Office of Film & Entm’t, Florida Film & Entertainment 
Industry Financial Incentive Program, FILMINFLORIDA.COM, http://www.filminflorida.com/ifi/
incentives.asp (last visited Jan. 18, 2014) [hereinafter The Fla. Office of Film & Entm’t, 
Florida Film & Entertainment Industry Financial Incentive Program]. 
3. See infra Part I. 
4. See infra Part II. 
5. See infra Part III. 
6. See infra Part IV. 
7. See infra Part V. 
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Part VIII.
8
  Part IX highlights how past is prologue for Florida film and 
television, why current state and federal initiatives will prevent major 
production efforts from becoming runaway boons to other states and 
countries, and the demonstrable economic benefits those laws and policies 
have already produced for Florida in particular, and the United States in 
general.
9
  In conclusion, Part X predicts how faithfulness and fidelity to the 
film and television industry will continue to reap benefits in a multi-billion 
dollar relationship continuing into its second century, with over 120 films 
and television shows to its credit and counting.
10
 
I. FLORIDA AND THE FILM INDUSTRY:  THE LOVERS MEET 
The story begins “in 1898, [when] the Spanish-American War 
newsreels [entitled] U.S. Cavalry Supplies Unloading at Tampa Florida” 
captured and permanently recorded a glimpse of Florida’s story.11  Film fever 
took hold in Miami and Jacksonville at the turn of the century.
12
  “The years 
1907 to 1909 marked the first attempt by the [film] industry to mass-produce 
narratives,”13 and “Klutho, Edison and Biograph were [the giants] . . . among 
more than thirty silent film [studios] based in Jacksonville, [the so-called] 
‘Winter Film Capital of the World,’ . . . [welcoming] The Keystone Kops, 
Oliver Hardy, and Lionel Barrymore.”14  “The [nation’s] first permanent 
filming studio, Kalem Studios, [was] opened in . . . 1908” in Jacksonville, 
and the port city became a major innovator in the African-American film 
industry as well.
15
  Aside from these innovations, Jacksonville would be 
                                                 
8. See infra Parts VI, VII, VIII. 
9. See infra Part IX. 
10. See infra Part X. 
11. JAMES PONTI, HOLLYWOOD EAST: FLORIDA’S FABULOUS FLICKS 2 
(Kathleen M. Kiely & Dixie Kasper eds., 1992). 
12. See id. at 2–3, 6. 
13. THE AMERICAN FILM INDUSTRY 22 (Tino Balio ed., rev. ed. 1985). 
14. PONTI, supra note 11, at 3; see also BLAIR MILLER, ALMOST HOLLYWOOD: 
THE FORGOTTEN STORY OF JACKSONVILLE, FLORIDA 1, 3, 41 (2013). 
15. Jacksonville’s Place in Film History, OFFICIAL WEBSITE CITY 
JACKSONVILLE, FL, http://www.coj.net/departments/office-of-economic-development/film-
and-television/film-history-in-jacksonville.aspx (last visited Jan. 18, 2014).  Jacksonville’s 
official online history notes that: 
In 1916, producer Richard Norman came to Jacksonville and opened a movie 
studio.  Norman, a white man, began his career in the 1910s making movies for 
white audiences.  Soon afterwards, he began making movies for African-American 
audiences, opened his Jacksonville studio and joined the ranks of others, including 
Oscar Micheaux and the Lincoln Motion Picture Company, in being a pioneer in 
producing movies not only geared towards African-Americans, but that showed 
them in a positive light and employed them in the production side of the film 
industry.  Norman Studios continued to make African-American films, also known 
as race movies, throughout the 1920s. 
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responsible for one of the world’s largest movie studios of the twentieth and 
twenty-first centuries; Joseph Engel’s 1915 Metro Pictures later merged with 
another company to become Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer (“MGM”).16  Florida’s 
relationship with Hollywood was moving quickly, but with competing 
priorities and no established rules, a clash was inevitable.
17
  As the industry 
grew, these silent film companies began to lock horns with the conservative 
Florida folks.
18
  Irate residents were sick and tired of the way the movie 
people manhandled their town; in one instance, a script called for a shot of a 
red fire engine roaring down Main Street, so the production crew simply 
called in a fake fire and rolled cameras as the fire truck screamed to the 
rescue, and in another instance, pastors and their congregations lodged 
protests that bank robberies were being filmed on Sundays.
19
  Safety became 
a major issue.
20
  During the 1916 filming of The Clarion, a riot broke out, 
requiring forty police officers to clear out more than 1300 extras.
21
  During 
that same year, while filming of The Dead Alive, the actors, following 
instructions from the director, sped down the main thoroughfare of 
Jacksonville and “plunged [their movie car] into the St. Johns River.”22  
Apparently, the director had confided in the crew—but did not tell the 
actors—that he had saved this scene for last, just “in case the actors [did not] 
survive the crash.”23 
This type of crass “behavior made the film industry the [major topic 
of the] Jacksonville[] mayoral election of 1917.”24  The conservatives ousted 
the pro-movie industry “incumbent Mayor ‘Jet’ Bowden.”25  This rang the 
death knell for the filmmakers in Florida.
26
  Without the backing and support 
of the government, private businesses, and the local community, the movie 
industry packed up and headed west.
27
  California offered a friendlier 
environment, mountains, beaches, plentiful talent, and a skilled labor force.
28
  
                                                                                                                   
Id. 
16. Id. 
17. See PONTI, supra note 11, at 3. 
18. Id. 
19. Id. 
20. Id. 
21. MILLER, supra note 14, at 120; PONTI, supra note 11, at 3.  For fascinating 
contemporary background on the production of this movie, see Manufacturers’ Advance 
Notes, MOVING PICTURE WORLD, Jan. 1, 1916, at 1153, 1310, available at http://
ia700707.us.archive.org/21/items/movingpicturewor27newy/movingpicturewor27newy.pdf. 
22. MILLER, supra note 14, at 120; PONTI, supra note 11, at 3. 
23. PONTI, supra note 11, at 3. 
24. Id. at 3–4. 
25. Id. at 4. 
26. Id. 
27. Id. at 3–4. 
28. PONTI, supra note 11, at 4. 
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The film industry settled in to Los Angeles and the cameras stopped rolling 
in Florida—temporarily.29 
Florida’s reputation was tarnished and her relationship with 
Hollywood was strained.
30
  It would have been irreparable if not for a bit of 
ironic serendipity—“the outbreak of World War II.”31  The Cavalry arrived 
as “the military brought cameras back to Florida in the early [19]40s.”32  
“Hollywood brought the war . . . to [hometown] theatres across [the 
country].”33  The nation’s morale needed a boost and Uncle Sam asked the 
studios to help.
34
  The Federal Government “opened military bases to [the] 
movie stars and [film] crews [and asked them to join] the cause.”35 
Florida was brimming with military installations and the humid, 
palm-tree-lined coast made it the perfect setting to imitate the tropics of the 
Pacific Islands.
36
  Florida cranked out box office smashes like A Guy Named 
Joe, 30 Seconds Over Tokyo, and Twelve O’clock High.37  These films were 
extremely “successful, as [both] entertainment and . . . propaganda.”38  Most 
importantly, this series of events and opportunities reignited the spark 
between Florida and the film industry.
39
 
II. FLORIDA FLAUNTS AND FLIRTS 
The State of Florida published Florida, A Guide to the Southernmost 
State (“The Guide”) in 193940 in order to lure major industries to the 
Sunshine State.
41
  Capitalizing on this new vitality brought on by the 
                                                 
29. Id.  Actually, the cameras did not stop rolling completely.  See The 
Yearling—Trivia, IMDB, http://www.imdb.com/title/tt0039111/trivia (last visited Jan. 18, 
2014).  MGM tried shooting “[m]ost of the ‘atmosphere’ and outdoors animal scenes [for The 
Yearling] . . . by a second-unit crew sent to Florida in 1941, when the project was first begun.  
The film was shut down soon after the footage was shot, but . . . it was restarted again in 1946, 
[using] the 1941 footage.”  Id.  “During the final days of filming, actor Gregory Peck was 
alternating between the Florida set of this movie and a Texas set, where he was 
simultaneously filming Duel in the Sun.”  Id. 
30. PONTI, supra note 11, at 4. 
31. Id. 
32. Id. at 5. 
33. Id. 
34. Id. 
35. PONTI, supra note 11, at 5. 
36. Id. 
37. Id. 
38. Id. 
39. See id. 
40. FED. WRITERS’ PROJECT, WORK PROJECTS ADMIN., FLORIDA: A GUIDE TO 
THE SOUTHERNMOST STATE iv (1939). 
41. See John J. Tigert, Foreword to FED. WRITERS’ PROJECT, WORK PROJECTS 
ADMIN., FLORIDA: A GUIDE TO THE SOUTHERNMOST STATE v, v (1939). 
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rekindled flame of the film industry, the government and administrative 
agencies of Florida made a conscious decision to keep the flame alive.
42
  The 
Guide, a dense tome describing absolutely everything about Florida,
43
 was 
bound in rich green leather and imprinted with a toothy Florida gator right on 
the cover.
44
  This unabashed exposé of all that is Florida, complete with 
flowery language and detailed economic data, legitimized a state that had 
previously been known as primeval territory.
45
 
In the Industry and Commerce section, the state’s economic 
development is stated in terms of bank resources, which stood at 
$500,000,000 in 1927.
46
  Business life in the state is illustrated by the volume 
of retail sales, which stood at $504,523,000 in 1929.
47
  “Building contracts 
awarded during 1936” increased by 35% over 1935, reaching $72,587,000.48 
Florida boasted “[f]ifteen [f]ederal highways, [a] [s]tate highway 
patrol, [and a] [s]tate gasoline tax [of seven cents].”49  Passenger steamship 
lines ran from Miami to Jamaica, the Waterman Line ran from Tampa to 
Puerto Rico, and the Mobile Oceanic Line embarked from Tampa to 
Europe.
50
  Extensive rail travel stretched the length of the peninsula.
51
  But, 
one word of caution—some lines had “less than 100 miles of track each.”52  
At that time, the Atlantic Coast Line and the Florida East Coast Railway 
were built to “penetrate the Everglades, meeting at Lake Harbor, south of 
Lake Okeechobee.”53 
                                                 
42. See PONTI, supra note 11, at 5, 7. 
43. See FED. WRITERS’ PROJECT OF THE WORK PROJECTS ADMIN. FOR THE 
STATE OF FLA., supra note 40, passim. 
44. Id.  This was an important moment for Florida.  This was the original Film 
Florida Production Guide—even though the authors, at the time, did not know it.  See id. at iv; 
FILM FLORIDA PRODUCTION GUIDE (2003).  The spiral bound, color rich guide in 2003, for 
example, reports in great detail every aspect of transportation, labor––including union and 
non-union workers––permitting, and tax incentives, as “advantages of relocating or expanding 
to Florida.”  FILM FLORIDA PRODUCTION GUIDE, supra note 44.  The Guide from 1939 and the 
Film Florida Production Guide in the twenty-first century—although worlds apart in 
presentation—embody the same theme.  Compare FED. WRITERS’ PROJECT OF THE WORK 
PROJECTS ADMIN. FOR THE STATE OF FLA., supra note 40, at ix, with FILM FLORIDA 
PRODUCTION GUIDE, supra note 44. 
45. See FED. WRITERS’ PROJECT OF THE WORK PROJECTS ADMIN. FOR THE 
STATE OF FLA., supra note 40, at 9, 93, 472. 
46. Id. at 93. 
47. Id. 
48. Id. 
49. Id. at xvii. 
50. FED. WRITERS’ PROJECT OF THE WORK PROJECTS ADMIN. FOR THE STATE OF 
FLA., supra note 40, at xvii. 
51. See id. 
52. Id. 
53. Id. 
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Labor in Florida included “seven locals [of] the International Cigar 
Makers’ Union.”54  The workforce also included Florida longshoremen and 
dockworkers, citrus workers, factory workers, canners, packers, and 
boatmen.
55
  By the end of 1937, the American Federation of Labor (“AFL”) 
had an estimated membership of “65,000 craft unionists in 400 locals 
affiliated with the State Federation of Labor.”56 
A [s]tate child-labor law, enacted in 1913 and amended in 
1915, established minimum wages and maximum hours for the 
employment of children . . . . A State workmen’s compensation 
law [was] enacted in 1935 [and] provide[d], with exceptions, for 
medical care, compensation, and other assistance to workers 
receiving injuries while gainfully employed . . . . A Florida 
industrial commission [was] created in 1935 [for the purpose of] 
exercis[ing] general authority over industrial employment.
57
 
Despite union presence in Florida, state laws giving “preference to 
the right to work over union membership” allowed Florida to attract 
production away from California’s closed shop environment.58 
Beautiful sepia photos in the Guide enticed readers to join in the 
nightlife of Hollywood Beach, walk the links of the St. Petersburg Golf 
Course, or visit the Old Slave Market in St. Augustine.
59
  An entire chapter is 
dedicated to giving detailed touring directions.
60
  “Tour 5” illustrates the 
route from Miami to Naples as a 113-mile trip on US 94.
61
  The tour 
promises a “[h]ard-surfaced roadbed throughout” with “[l]imited 
accommodations [and] camp sites.”62  This section of the Tamiami Trail was 
constructed by the State Road Department and opened on April 25, 1928 at a 
cost of $13 million.
63
 
While traveling Florida in the late 1930s, visitors were encouraged to 
photograph the wildlife, respectfully visit the Seminole Villages, and use 
caution along the highways, as “[t]he ’Glades [were] thickly overgrown,” the 
                                                 
54. Id. at 95. 
55. See FED. WRITERS’ PROJECT OF THE WORK PROJECTS ADMIN. FOR THE 
STATE OF FLA., supra note 40, at 98. 
56. Id. 
57. Id. 
58. NICK HERD, CHASING THE RUNAWAYS 21 (2004). 
59. FED. WRITERS’ PROJECT OF THE WORK PROJECTS ADMIN. FOR THE STATE OF 
FLA., supra note 40, at 162–63 (photos. reprint), 224–25 (photos. reprint). 
60. See id. at 297–538. 
61. Id. at 406. 
62. Id. at 297, 406. 
63. Id. at 406. 
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“mangled corpses of snakes” laid on the road, and alligators and buzzards 
were everywhere.
64
 
Florida’s wiles have tempted and then transformed out-of-staters for 
decades.
65
  The 1939 Guide describes the transformation this way:  “The 
person noted for taciturnity in his home community often becomes 
loquacious, determined that those about him shall know that he is a man of 
substance.”66  A spell, whether brief or extended, in the Florida sunshine was 
believed to bring out the best in everyone and everything.
67
 
Over eighty years ago—just as today—Florida understood the 
importance of bringing people, industry, and money to Florida:  “Regardless 
of individual circumstances and preference, one desire seems to be common 
to all—the desire to improve Florida.”68 
III. FLORIDA CHARMS A CAPTIVATING CAST OF CHARACTERS 
The unspoilt scenery of Florida beckoned to the film industry often 
in the early 1940s, with exotic potential film locations close to cities with 
transportation and production-supporting infrastructure.
69
  Two films 
depicting the Second Seminole War of 1835–1842 came out in short order, 
with all-star casts.
70
  The first such film, Distant Drums in 1951, featured 
Gary Cooper and Mari Aldon in which “American soldiers and their rescued 
companions . . . face[d] the dangerous Everglades and hostile Indians in 
order to reach safety [in Florida].”71  The journey into the Everglades was 
only simulated though, as the actual location of the fort in the film was the 
historic Castillo de San Marcos in historic St. Augustine, Florida, near the 
sprawling metropolis of Jacksonville, Florida.
72
  Shortly thereafter came 
Seminole, the 1953 American western film directed by Budd Boetticher and 
starring Rock Hudson as “[nineteenth]-century army officer Lance 
Caldwell,” born and raised in Florida, and returning from his West Point 
                                                 
64. FED. WRITERS’ PROJECT OF THE WORK PROJECTS ADMIN. FOR THE STATE OF 
FLA., supra note 40, at 407. 
65. See id. at 8. 
66. Id. 
67. See id. at 8–9. 
68. Id. at 9. 
69. See PONTI, supra note 11, at 5. 
70. See Distant Drums, IMDB, http://www.imdb.com/title/tt0043469/ (last 
visited Jan. 18, 2014); Seminole, IMDB, http://www.imdb.com/title/tt0046294/ (last visited 
Jan. 18, 2014). 
71. Distant Drums, supra note 70. 
72. See id. 
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education to be “assigned to Fort King in the Everglades.”73  Along with 
Hudson, notables of the time including Barbara Hale, Anthony Quinn, and 
Lee Marvin, and the rest of the cast, actually did endure the steamy, humid 
surroundings of the Everglades National Park for much of the film’s 
shooting.
74
 
In 1954, Ricou Browning emerged from an eminently hospitable 
Wakulla Springs in a $12,000 half-man, half-fish monster suit.
75
  The 
Creature from the Black Lagoon emerged from the murky depths and “saved 
Universal [Studios] from impending bankruptcy.”76  “Browning, a swimming 
champion, was able to hold his breath for up to four minutes . . . [and] is 
credited with creating the . . . torso-twisting creature swimming technique.”77  
Creature from the Black Lagoon grossed $3 million
78
 and helped resuscitate 
Florida’s film industry through audiences drawn to its 3-D horror film 
appeal, if not for the dramatic acting or scenery.
79
 
                                                 
73. Seminole (1953), TURNER CLASSIC MOVIES, http://www.tcm.com/tcmdb/
title/89538/seminole/ (last visited Jan. 18, 2014). 
74. See Seminole, supra note 70.  At least forty-four other movies, television 
shows, and documentaries to date have similarly featured and have been filmed in the 1.4 
million acre UNESCO World Heritage Site at the southern tip of Florida, “the largest 
designated sub-tropical wilderness reserve on the North American continent.”  Everglades 
National Park, UNESCO, http://whc.unesco.org/en/list/76 (last visited Jan. 18, 2014); see also 
Clambake, Distant Drums, Gentle Ben, Gone Fishin’, Only Fools and Horses. . . ., Stardom, 
The Amazing Race, The Mean Season—Filming Locations, IMDB, http://www.imdb.com/ 
(search “filmname”; select “filmname”; select “filming locations”) (last visited Jan. 18, 2014). 
75. PONTI, supra note 11, at 35–36.  Speaking of springs, 
[b]eginning in 1916, when The Seven Swans was filmed in the Silver Springs area 
of Central Florida, six Tarzan movies, Creature from the Black Lagoon, Rebel 
Without a Cause, and Thunderball, among many movies have been filmed there, as 
well as over a hundred episodes of the TV series Sea Hunt, an episode of I Spy, an 
episode of Crocodile Hunter with Steve Irwin, and various vacation episodes of a 
range of series. 
Michael Segers, The Wild Monkeys of Central Florida, YAHOO! VOICES (June 13, 2008), 
http://voices.yahoo.com/the-wild-monkeys-central-florida-1530285.html. 
76. PONTI, supra note 11, at 6, 36. 
77. Id. at 36. 
78. Id. 
79. See id. at 6, 36; Blair Davis, The 1950s B-Movie:  The Economics of 
Cultural Production 73 (Jan. 2007) (unpublished Ph.D. thesis, McGill University), available at 
http://digitool.library.McGill.ca/webclient/streamgate?folder_id=0&dvs=1384119620758~312
; Brian Douglas, Top 10 Horror Films of the 1950s, TOPTENZ (Feb. 14, 2011), http://
www.toptenz.net/top-10-horror-fims-1950s.php.  Davis noted that these three-dimensional, or 
3-D, movies “utilized stereoscopic cinematography to create the illusion of greater image 
depth and a spatially separated foreground, [as seen in] 3-D films such as Bwana Devil (1952), 
House of Wax (1953), It Came From Outer Space (1953), and Creature From the Black 
Lagoon (1954).”  Davis, supra note 79, at 73.  The 3-D process in Creature from the Black 
Lagoon “was dubbed Thrill Wonder 3-D Horrorscope” as a bit of cinematographic hyperbole.  
PONTI, supra note 11, at 35–36. 
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What the terrorizing Man-Eating Gill Creature did to help the 
industry, the Chairman of the Board succeeded in spoiling.
80
  In 1959, Frank 
Sinatra arrived at the Cardozo Hotel on Miami Beach.
81
  A Hole in the Head 
was the story of a widower—played by Sinatra—who had “dreams of 
opening a giant . . . amusement park” in Florida.82  With a star-studded cast, 
including Edward G. Robinson and Keenan Wynn, the movie was sure to be 
a hit, but Sinatra’s temper tantrums, dame chasing, missed appearances, and 
nuisance lawsuits filed by a rival hotel brought more notoriety than good 
publicity.
83
  “[T]he film went on to win an Oscar for [Sinatra’s] song High 
Hopes,” but it did not win many friends in Florida.84 
Florida’s courtship with the film industry definitely was not boring.85  
As she lured a bevy of eligible bachelors, ranging from Ol’ Blue Eyes to 
Elvis Presley, she lacked any boundaries in the relationship.
86
  She needed 
rules in order to make the relationship work.
87
 
IV. FLORIDA’S ALLURING CALL REACHES NEW YORK CITY 
During a brutal winter in the 1950s, twenty-seven year old James 
Pergola exited his New York City apartment and looked down his street.
88
  
Two blizzards, back-to-back, had buried his car and everyone else’s, in a 
pristine blanket of icy snow.
89
  James shoveled for two days until he finally 
found his car.
90
  He proceeded to pack all of his worldly belongings and 
headed south in search of sunshine, beaches, balmy breezes, and a job.
91
 
James had apprenticed under Jack Painter, A.S.C.—the American 
Society of Cinematographers—a world-renowned New York cameraman in 
the New York local union of the International Alliance of Theatrical Stage 
                                                 
80. PONTI, supra note 11 at 6, 63. 
81. Id. at 63. 
82. Id. 
83. Id. at 63–64. 
84. Id. at 64. 
85. See PONTI, supra note 11 at 2–3. 
86. See id. at 2–6, 63–64. 
87. See id. 
88. Interview with James C. Pergola (Sept. 1, 2012) (on file with Nova 
Southeastern University, Shepard Broad Law Center Library).  Pergola worked in the film and 
television industry for fifty years.  Id.  He shot the original pilot episode of Baywatch for NBC 
and continued as both a Producer and the Director of Photography of the television series for 
ten years.  Id.  He retired after the conclusion of the final episode of Baywatch in 1999.  Id.  
For a time, Baywatch was the number one syndicated television show in the world.  Id. 
89. Interview with James C. Pergola, supra note 88. 
90. Id. 
91. See id. 
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Employees (“IATSE”).92  James took his union card with him, which would 
entitle him to work as an assistant cameraman in Florida and earn a lucrative 
salary of $400 to $500 per week; but, that was contingent upon the work 
available in Florida at the time.
93
  His departure surprised everyone and, 
much to the dismay of his colleagues in New York, James left.
94
  James was 
the number one camera assistant in New York; he was making top dollar and 
had a sterling reputation based on his incredible work ethic and talent, but 
something was calling him, luring him to Florida.
95
  He remembered that his 
father, Jimmy V. Pergola, had worked in Florida in the 1920s and 1930s 
shooting newsreel movie shorts and had also worked on one of bathing 
beauty Esther Williams’ aqua ballets in Miami Beach.96 
What followed James to Miami was an enormous influx of talent and 
the explosive growth of the Florida film industry.
97
  James had heard the 
siren call from the waves off the shore of that lush tropical paradise.
98
  At 
that time, Miami had only one Florida-based assistant cameraman and his 
name was Eddie Gibson.
99
  When James Pergola arrived in Miami, the total 
number of Florida film industry, union-card-carrying, New York trained, 
assistant cameramen doubled to two.
100
  Gibson did not mind Pergola’s 
entrance into Miami at all.
101
  He respected James immensely.
102
  James 
Pergola and Eddie Gibson’s fathers had been great friends that worked 
together on covering the Cuban Revolution, Mussolini’s rise to power in 
Italy, and the hottest car races in Daytona Beach.
103
 
The friendship between Eddie Gibson’s father and James Pergola’s 
father abruptly ended on October 17, 1937.
104
  Veteran Pathé News and Fox 
Movietone News cameraman Jimmy V. Pergola was killed when a United 
Airlines “Mainliner . . . crashed . . . into . . . Hayden Peak, high in the Uinta 
                                                 
92. Id. 
93. Id. 
94. Interview with James C. Pergola, supra note 88. 
95. Id. 
96. See Life on the American Newsfront:  Worst Air Crash in U.S. History 
Takes 19 Lives, LIFE, Nov. 1, 1937, at 32, 38; Interview with James C. Pergola, supra note 88. 
97. See Interview with James C. Pergola, supra note 88. 
98. See id. 
99. Id. 
100. Id. 
101. Id. 
102. Interview with James C. Pergola, supra note 88. 
103. Id. 
104. See Life on the American Newsfront:  Worst Air Crash in U.S. History 
Takes 19 Lives, supra note 96, at 38; James Pergola, Father’s Footsteps:  Becoming a 
Filmmaker Like His Father, NAPLESNEWS.COM (June 21, 2009), http://www.naplesnews.com/
news/2009/jun/21/fathers-footsteps-becoming-filmmaker-his-father/?print=1. 
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Range” resulting in the worst air crash in U.S. history.105  He was shooting a 
newsreel story entitled, The Safety of Transcontinental Flying.
106
  This left 
young James with only memories of his dad, now a legend, but he was 
embraced by all who had known and worked with his father.
107
  Florida 
opened her arms as well.
108
 
V. MESMERIZING MIAMI 
By the 1950s and early 1960s, Miami had reached international 
recognition as a thriving hub for both television and film.
109
  Paul Newman 
and Joanne Woodward sizzled in The Long, Hot Summer (1958) and Elvis 
Presley raised the temperature in the Sunshine State in Follow That Dream 
(1962).
110
  From 1966 to 1970, Jackie Gleason filmed his eponymous Jackie 
Gleason Show in Miami.
111
  From short comedy and melodrama to dramatic 
action, the James Bond series thriller Goldfinger (1964) featured luxurious 
shots of Millionaire’s Row located at the Morris Lapidus-designed 
Fontainebleau Hotel in Miami Beach.
112
 
                                                 
105. Life on the American Newsfront:  Worst Air Crash in U.S. History Takes 
19 Lives, supra note 96, at 38. 
106. Id. 
107. Interview with James C. Pergola, supra note 88; see also Pergola, supra 
note 104. 
108. Interview with James C. Pergola, supra note 88; see also Pergola, supra 
note 104. 
109. PONTI, supra note 11, at 6. 
110. See Follow That Dream, IMDB, http://www.imdb.com/title/tt0055992/ 
(last visited Jan. 18, 2014); The Long, Hot Summer, IMDB, http://www.imdb.com/title/
tt0051878/ (last visited Jan. 18, 2014). 
111. The Jackie Gleason Show, IMDB, http://www.imdb.com/title/tt0195466/ 
(last visited Jan. 18, 2014). 
112. GOLDFINGER (Eon Productions 1964); see also Overview, FONTAINEBLEAU 
MIAMI BEACH, www.fontainebleau.com/web/about_bleau (last visited Jan. 18, 2014).  Some 
161 road miles and a world apart from Miami, Key West was the film site for a sizeable 
portion of another Bond film.  See Licence to Kill, IMDB, 
http://www.imdb.com/title/tt0097742/ (last visited Jan. 18, 2014).  Just ninety-seven road 
miles north of Key West lies the island that gained fame as the setting for the 1948 film Key 
Largo; apart from background filming used for establishing shots, however, the film was shot 
on a Warner Brothers sound stage in Hollywood.  See Key Largo–Filming Locations, IMDB, 
http://www.imdb.com/title/tt0040506/locations (last visited Jan. 18, 2014).  Although not a 
filming location for the 1951 Lauren Bacall and Humphrey Bogart movie, The African Queen, 
Key Largo is also home port to a newly restored 100-year-old riverboat figuring prominently 
in the movie’s plot and after which the movie was named.  See The African Queen Sets Sail 
Again, CBSNEWS (Apr. 13, 2012, 3:23 PM), http://www.cbsnews.com/8301-31749_162-
57413816-10391698/the-african-queen-sets-sail-again/. 
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Elsewhere in Miami, Ivan Tors Studios was producing Flipper and 
Gentle Ben, two of the hottest prime time shows on television.
113
  Ivan was 
born in Budapest in 1916 and immigrated to the United States just prior to 
World War II.
114
  He produced the smash hit motion picture Flipper for 
MGM and the film grossed over $23 million.
115
  To put this success in 
perspective, MGM had produced Mutiny on the Bounty, starring Marlon 
Brando, that same year, and Mutiny lost $23 million at the box office.
116
 
“The television series Flipper [aired] on Saturday night[s] at 7:30 
p.m.” on CBS and was the number one show on television; it upstaged The 
Jackie Gleason Show, which had to be moved to a later time slot in order to 
survive.
117
  That friendly dolphin, along with Ranger Porter Ricks and his 
sons, Sandy and Bud, turned all eyes to Miami, Florida.
118
  Luke Halpin, who 
played teen heartthrob Sandy, was featured on the cover of the debut issue of 
Tiger Beat magazine in September 1965, sending millions of teenage girls to 
the newsstands and making the fictitious town of Coral Key Park their dream 
destination.
119
  Today, at fifty years and counting, the ripple effect of 
Flipper’s success is still impacting Florida.120  The Miami Seaquarium still 
boasts “[television] [s]uperstar Flipper and his Atlantic bottlenose dolphin 
friends” in their daily live show Flipper’s Beach Bash.121  Prior to this huge 
boon, friendly Florida provided the gorgeous scenery, but only to local 
craftsmen.
122
  The keys—or team-leaders of the various crews—were still 
being sent down from New York or east from California.
123
  The key-
electricians and key-grips brought their top assistants with them from New 
York City or Hollywood, “and hired locals for the third or fourth 
                                                 
113. PONTI, supra note 11, at 6; see Flipper, IMDB, http://www.imdb.com/title/
tt0057748/ (last visited Jan. 18, 2014); Gentle Ben, IMDB, http://www.imdb.com/title/
tt0061255/ (last visited Jan. 18, 2014). 
114. Interview with James C. Pergola, supra note 88. 
115. Id. 
116. Id.; Mutiny on the Bounty, IMDB, http://www.imdb.com/title/tt0056264/
?ref_=fn_al_tt_1 (last visited Jan. 18, 2014). 
117. Interview with James C. Pergola, supra note 88; see also Paul Mavis, 
Flipper—The Original Series:  Season One, DVD TALK (Apr. 24, 2007), http://
www.dvdtalk.com/reviews/27578/flipper-the-original-series-season-one/. 
118. About Us: History, MIAMI SEAQUARIUM, http://
www.miamiseaquarium.com/AboutUs/History (last visited Jan. 18, 2014); Flipper, supra note 
113. 
119. See The Things That Flip “Flipper’s” Friend Luke Halpin!, LLOYD 
THAXTON’S TIGER, Sept. 1965, at 48, 49; see also Flipper, supra note 113. 
120. About Us: History, supra note 118. 
121. Flipper Dolphin, MIAMI SEAQUARIUM, http://www.miamiseaquarium.com/
Explore/Shows/Flipper-Dolphin (last visited Jan. 18, 2014). 
122. See Interview with James C. Pergola, supra note 88. 
123. Id. 
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electrician,” camera, grip, or set construction positions.124  James Pergola 
was quickly hired for his expertise and worked under camera operators and 
directors of photography from California.
125
  As a result of this symbiotic 
relationship, the local Florida crews became highly skilled technicians, 
having trained under the best teachers in the industry.
126
  It was not long 
before Florida was boasting that it could provide everything a movie 
company needed without shipping in entire crews from Los Angeles and 
New York.
127
  By the mid-1960s, “Hollywood was happy to come” to 
Miami, Florida.
128
  There were enough set builders, art directors, soundmen, 
camera crews, and equipment to fully stock two films simultaneously.
129
 
Meanwhile, back in New York City, the movie industry was 
dying.
130
  The unions in New York “had gotten so demanding and difficult 
that New York [p]roducers went to Los Angeles.”131  There was a mass 
exodus from New York, formerly the television capital of the world, to 
California.
132
  In order to stop this crippling flight, “New York Mayor, [John] 
Lindsay, came up with the Lindsay Plan.”133  He instituted a plan that he 
hoped would enable filmmakers to easily tour locations, have access to fire 
and police, shoot in museums and government buildings, and secure permits 
quickly and easily.
134
  Mayor Lindsay “made deals with the [International 
Alliance of Theatrical Stage Employees] (“IATSE”) to hold costs down” and 
forced them to make sacrifices—no more Triple Golden Time.135  New York 
was forced to mend fences and cooperate with the film and television 
industry.
136
  They had to rebuild their relationship from the ground up.
137
 
                                                 
124. Id. 
125. See id. 
126. Id. 
127. See Interview with James C. Pergola, supra note 88. 
128. Id. 
129. Id. 
130. Id. 
131. Id. 
132. LYNN SPIGEL, TV BY DESIGN: MODERN ART AND THE RISE OF NETWORK 
TELEVISION 138 (2008); Interview with James C. Pergola, supra note 88. 
133. Interview with James C. Pergola, supra note 88. 
134. See id.; The City of N.Y.C. Mayor’s Office of Media & Entm’t, Office 
History, NYC, http://www.nyc.gov/html/film/html/about/office-history.shtml (last visited Jan. 
18, 2014); see also James Sanders, Adventure Playground:  John V. Lindsay and the 
Transformation of Modern New York, DESIGN OBSERVER GROUP (May 4, 2010), 
http://places.designobserver.com/feature/adventure-playground--john-v-lindsay-and-the-
transformation-of-modern-new-york/13338/. 
135. Interview with James C. Pergola, supra note 88. 
136. See The City of N.Y.C Mayor’s Office of Media & Entm’t, supra note 
134. 
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As they watched the painful destruction of such a storied and 
honored industry in the Empire State, the filmmakers and television 
craftsmen in Florida took action.
138
  Greed could have easily destroyed them, 
too, and then everything they had built would have crumble.  James Pergola 
met with the producers, directors, and government agencies in Florida, and 
all agreed that it was necessary to use the same idea in Miami.
139
  James met 
with the Stage Hands local and every other specialty union from Miami to 
Tampa, in order to get a consensus.
140
  It took over three months to come up 
with the Florida Standard Agreement.
141
 
The Standard Agreement contract fixed the start time, end time, and 
realistic overtime wages within all the unions across the state.
142
  “‘I sent 
every producer in the country, in concert with [the] business agents, this 
standard agreement,’” explained Pergola.143  “As films and television shows 
came in to Florida, they used our Standard Agreement.”144  Pergola and his 
crew formed The Florida Motion Picture and Television Association 
(“FMPTA”), which grew to seven chapters by the end of the 1970s.145  The 
FMPTA wanted to influence the governor.
146
  Governor Reubin Askew 
needed to have a hard sell.
147
  Unfortunately, Deep Throat and other 
pornographic films were being shot in Florida,
148
 and the Governor was 
                                                                                                                   
137. See Remembering Steve D’Inzillo, IATSE (Oct. 20, 2000), http://
www.iatse-intl.org/news/remembering-steve-dinzillo; see also The City of N.Y.C. Mayor’s 
Office of Media & Entm’t, supra note 134. 
138. Interview with James C. Pergola, supra note 88. 
139. Id. 
140. Id. 
141. Id. 
142. Id. 
143. Interview with James C. Pergola, supra note 88. 
144. Id.  Not to be confused with the Jacksonville, FL newspaper Florida 
Standard.  See, e.g., Florida Newspapers, FLA. ST. U. LIBR., http://guides.lib.fsu.edu/
content.php?pid=46594&sid=343596 (last updated Nov. 26, 2013). 
145. Interview with James C. Pergola, supra note 88. 
146. See id.; Florida’s Entertainment Industry Success Is Counting on YOU!!!, 
FLA. MOTION PICTURE & TELEVISION ASS’N, http://www.fmpta-mo.com/Home_Page.html (last 
visited Jan. 18, 2014) (explaining both the mission and composition of the association).  
FMPTA is still very much active today.  Florida’s Entertainment Industry Success Is 
Counting on YOU!!!, supra note 146.  For the past thirty-nine years, FMPTA has been a vital 
part of the motion picture and television industry in Florida.  Id.  FMPTA is organized to 
promote Florida’s “motion picture, television, audio recording, theater, and digital media” 
industries, by providing assistance and information to all interested organizations in regards to 
Florida’s skilled personnel, locations, services and fiscal incentives.  Id. 
147. Interview with James C. Pergola, supra note 88. 
148. Id.; Kyle Munzenrieder, Coconut Grove Mansion Where Deep Throat’s 
Most Infamous Scenes Were Filmed is For Sale, MIAMI NEWTIMES (May 2, 2012, 1:28 PM), 
http://blogs.miaminewtimes.com/riptide/2012/05/coconut_grove_mansion_where_de.php. 
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apprehensive about supporting filmmaking in the Sunshine State.
149
  It was 
not until July 1, 1973, that the new Florida Film Coordinator, Sunny Fader, 
was appointed to change Florida’s filmmaking opportunities and image for 
the better with a modest $50,000 budget.
150
 
The Governor also assigned a man named Ben Harris who was 
instrumental in the formation of the FMPTA and “ran the nationally envied 
Florida Film Bureau out of the state’s Department of Commerce.”151  Harris 
explained that the group would have to show the Governor that the Florida 
film industry was economically beneficial to the state of Florida.
152
  And so it 
did.
153
  The group compiled data and appealed to the Governor to supply 
government assistance to this viable industry.
154
  Through the ease of 
obtaining permits, use of state facilities, access to the Florida Highway 
Patrol, ability to block off and use state roads, and developing liaisons and 
healthy relationships with the administrative agencies in Tallahassee—as 
well as county and city governments—the relationship would thrive.155 
The Governor agreed and the Florida Film Commission was born.
156
  
James Pergola and his dedicated group deeply believed they had “[a] 
sleeping giant just waiting to be awakened,” and by all indications, they were 
right.
157
  As with any love story, there are periods of time when lovers may 
quarrel and stop speaking
158—possibly because there has been a 
misunderstanding or because one of them has taken the other for granted.
159
  
In any event, the relationship between Florida and the film industry is a 
relationship that has withstood the tests of time, and has survived undulating 
periods of undying support and unchivalrous repudiation.
160
 
                                                 
149. Interview with James C. Pergola, supra note 88. 
150. Fred Wright, State Urged to Lure Film-Makers, EVENING INDEPENDENT, 
May 31, 1973, at 5B, available at http://news.google.com/newspapers?nid=950&dat=
19730531&id=0n1QAAAAIBAJ&sjid=9lcDAAAAIBAJ&pg=7236,5206907. 
151. Jack Zink, Film Wars Solution:  Rewind, SUN-SENTINEL, May 23, 1999, at 
1D; see also Interview with James C. Pergola, supra note 88. 
152. Interview with James C. Pergola, supra note 88. 
153. See id. 
154. Id. 
155. Id. 
156. Id. 
157. Interview with James C. Pergola, supra note 88. 
158. See id. 
159. See id. 
160. See id. 
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VI. THE GIANT AWAKENS TO CONCEIVE A NEW FILM LAW AND 
COUNCIL 
The Florida Film & Entertainment Advisory Council was formed 
as a result of legislation signed into law by [then] Governor Jeb 
Bush, July 1, 1999.  Created in accordance with Chapter 288.1252 
of the Florida Statutes, the . . . Council consists of [seventeen] 
members, seven appointed by the Governor, five appointed by the 
President of the Senate, and five appointed by the Speaker of the 
House of Representatives.
161
 
The Florida Office of Film and Entertainment (“OFE”) notes that, 
“[t]he Film Commissioner, a representative of Enterprise Florida, Inc., a 
representative of Workforce Florida, Inc., and a representative of the Florida 
Tourism Industry Marketing Corporation (Visit Florida) serve as ex officio, 
nonvoting members of the council, and are in addition to the [seventeen] 
appointed members of the Council.”162  Aside from the very significant 
changes to law and bureaucracy intended to grow Florida’s connections to 
the film industry, Governor Bush also endorsed a five-hundred-page Film 
Florida Production Guide, produced in 2003.
163
  The guide provides a “direct 
link to more than [forty] local film offices throughout the state—from 
Pensacola to Key West” and lists “producers, post-production facilities, 
crews, studios, equipment, support services, government assistance, 
associations, and accommodations . . . all over Florida.”164  Governor Bush 
stated, “[t]he Sunshine State’s entertainment industry has grown over the 
past decade for one reason:  [P]roducers find everything they need in 
Florida.”165 
                                                 
161. The Fla. Office of Film & Entm’t, About Us:  Film & Entertainment 
Advisory Council, FILMINFLORIDA.COM, http://www.filminflorida.com/about/feac.asp (last 
visited Jan. 18, 2014) [hereinafter The Fla. Office of Film & Entm’t, About Us:  Film & 
Entertainment Advisory Council]; see also FLA. STAT. § 288.1252 (2013).  See supra notes 
150, 156, and accompanying text for previous commentary about the role of the Florida Film 
Coordinator, as well as the Florida Film Commission. 
162. The Fla. Office of Film & Entm’t, About Us:  Film & Entertainment 
Advisory Council, supra note 161. 
163. Letter from Jeb Bush, Governor of Fla., to Friends, (Jan. 2003) (on file 
with Nova Southeastern University, Shepard Broad Law Center Library); Letter from the Staff 
of the Governor’s Office of Film & Entm’t, Office of the Governor of Fla., to Friends (Jan. 
2003) (on file with Nova Southeastern University, Shepard Broad Law Center Library); see 
also FILM FLORIDA PRODUCTION GUIDE, supra note 44. 
164. Letter from Jeb Bush to Friends, supra note 163. 
165. Id. 
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The Staff of the Governor’s OFE queries, “[s]ound like a production 
paradise?  It is.  From any angle.”166  The Governor’s OFE is committed to 
the mission of functioning as “an effective link between industry and all 
levels of government to improve the business climate for the growth and 
expansion of the entertainment industry in Florida.”167  The mission includes 
accountability, innovation, partnering, and “strategic focus to capitalize on 
[the] opportunities . . . that set Florida apart from the rest of the world.”168 
In order to encourage success at every level, Florida has instituted 
major incentives for filmmaking, and empowered administrative agencies to 
implement them.
169
  Introduction of legislation that benefits filmmakers—as 
well as easy to use permitting forms, and an abundance of grants and 
assistance—have contributed to the overwhelming success of the film 
industry in Florida.
170
 
VII. FLORIDA PROPOSES WITH TAX INCENTIVES AND THE FILM 
INDUSTRY SAYS, “I DO!” 
In May of 2010, Governor Charlie Christ “inked legislation that 
create[d] a five-year, $242 million transferable tax credit for the state’s film 
and entertainment industry.”171  Qualified “projects . . . receive a rebate of 
20% to 30% on qualified Florida expenditures.”172  There is “an $8 million 
cap for major productions.”173  The tax exemption “allocates a 5% bonus for 
family-friendly projects and an additional 5% for activity taking place during 
hurricane season.”174 
                                                 
166. Letter from the Staff of the Governor’s Office of Film & Entm’t to 
Friends, supra note 163. 
167. The Fla. Office of Film & Entm’t, About Us:  Vision & Mission, 
FILMINFLORIDA.COM, http://filminflorida.com/about/vm.asp (last visited Jan. 18, 2014) 
[hereinafter The Fla. Office of Film & Entm’t, About Us:  Vision & Mission]. 
168. Id. 
169. Rebecca Martel Koegel, Florida’s Financial Incentive Program Lures 
Film & Entertainment Production to the State with Good Ol’ Cash, BRIEFS, Mar. 2008, at 15, 
15–16, available at http://www.hklaw.com/files/Publication/fc1af85a-869e-43f2-9b87-
98c071ceb2e7/Presentation/PublicationAttachment/a75426cd-5cc2-4b27-85f7-
014a855657a0/51905.PDF. 
170. See id. 
171. Peter Caranicas, Florida OKs Tax Breaks for Film, TV, VARIETY (June 2, 
2010, 5:00 AM), http://www.variety.com/2010/film/news/florida-oks-tax-breaks-for-film-tv-
1118020076/. 
172. Id. 
173. Id. 
174. Id. 
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“[This] program covers [both] in-state and out-of-state productions . 
. . .”175  It also benefits post-production and digital productions.176  The 
governor “authorize[d] $53.5 million in transferable tax credits for the 2010–
[20]11 fiscal year.”177  The total increased to $74.5 million for 2011–2012.178  
Suzy Spang, Vice President of the Metro Orlando Film and Entertainment 
Commission, explained, “‘[w]e never knew from one year to the next what 
the rebate would be. . . . This stabilizes everything.’”179  The impact of these 
tax incentives has far ranging implications from Los Angeles, California to 
little towns in Florida.
180
 
When Warner Brothers executives were budgeting for the hit “rock 
musical Rock of Ages, with Tom Cruise, there was no doubt that [the film 
would be shot] in Los Angeles . . . where the story is set.”181  But, as the 
budgeting process began, producers were scanning the country, even the 
world, “tabulating tax credits and exchange rates.”182  Producers looked from 
Sydney to Louisiana before settling on Miami, Florida; but they had to 
transform Miami into “Reagan-era [1980s] rock ‘n’ roll Hollywood.”183  
“‘We needed to reroute traffic, turn a one-way street into a two-way street, 
repaint lines and put up traffic signs,’ sa[id] producer Garrett Grant, ‘and the 
city was just fantastic, along with the State of Florida, making sure we got 
everything we needed.’”184 
While Florida’s climate, topography, and architecture convincingly 
doubled for Los Angeles, what “sealed the deal was the state’s production 
incentive, which offer[ed] a [twenty percent] base tax credit on in-state 
spend[ing], capped at [eight] million [dollars] per production, with [an] 
additional [five percent] . . . for shooting . . . off-season.”185  The potential 
was a total of thirty percent.
186
 
The tax incentives caused an infusion of projects into Florida.
187
  The 
abundance of work came in the “nick of time for local film and [television] 
                                                 
175. Id. 
176. Caranicas, supra note 171. 
177. Id. 
178. Id. 
179. Id. 
180. See Todd Longwell, Sun Shines, Taxes Fall, Biz Rocks, VARIETY (Dec. 16, 
2011, 4:00 AM), http://variety.com/2011/film/news/sun-shines-taxes-fall-biz-rocks-
1118045382/. 
181. Id. 
182. Id. 
183. Id. 
184. Id. 
185. Longwell, supra note 180. 
186. Id. 
187. Id. 
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workers who [were] underemployed or idle.”188  “[C]ostume supervisor 
Emae Villalobos, a [twenty-five]-year veteran of the [movie] biz, [said], ‘I 
was thinking of getting out of the business completely and going into 
retail.’”189  But, then the incentives kicked in, and she was inundated with 
work for A&E network, including the show The Glades, and movies such as 
Dolphin Tale and Rock of Ages.
190
 
Despite the overwhelming success of the tax incentives, there was an 
amendment that went into effect on July 1, 2011.
191
  It mandated that “no 
more than [twenty-five percent of] its funds go to high-impact television 
shows.”192  Although certain series were “grandfathered in through 2015, [it 
left little room] for any major new series or pilots.”193 
In true Floridian form, Film Florida representatives volunteered to 
take legislators on a detailed tour of Florida film and television sets.
194
  Their 
goal was to make certain that all members of Florida’s Congress thoroughly 
understood the significant domino effect of Florida’s film industry.195  
“‘They were blown away by how many people were employed and the 
amount of construction materials used,’ sa[id] Sandy Lighterman, [F]ilm and 
[E]ntertainment [I]ndustr[y] [L]iaison for Miami-Dade County.  ‘Hopefully, 
they [will see] those images in their minds at the next legislative session.’”196 
In addition to monetary incentives, the State of Florida is committed 
to assisting filmmakers through various administrative agencies.
197
  The 
Florida Department of Environmental Protection (“FDEP”) was instrumental 
in the production of Basic, starring John Travolta and Samuel L. Jackson in 
2003.
198
  “‘When a . . . set is doubled to look like another area of the country, 
or the world, for that matter, attention to detail is paramount,’ said [Basic] 
                                                 
188. Id. 
189. Id. 
190. Longwell, supra note 180. 
191. Compare FLA. STAT. § 288.1254(4)(b)(1)(b) (2010) (current version at 
FLA. STAT. § 288.1254 (2013)), with FLA. STAT. § 288.1254(4)(b)(1)(b) (2011) (current 
version at FLA. STAT. § 288.1254 (2013)).  See also Longwell, supra note 180. 
192. Longwell, supra note 180. 
193. Id. (emphasis added). 
194. Id. 
195. See id. 
196. Id. 
197. See Bashirah Muttalib, Reeling in the Sunshine State, VARIETY (Mar. 4, 
2009, 7:08 PM), http://www.variety.com/2009/film/news/reeling-in-the-sunshine-state-
1118000858/. 
198. See id.; Basic, IMDB, http://www.imdb.com/title/tt0264395/ (last visited 
Jan. 18, 2014). 
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location manager Mitch Harbeson,” who made the former Naval Air Station 
at Cecil Field stand in for Panama.
199
 
After the tragedy of 9/11, the Basic location crew had to refocus and 
change their international settings to domestic.
200
  The plot demanded a 
location that would allow “several months of filming machine gun firefight 
scenes” amidst special effects created to produce a hurricane—all without 
disturbing the peace or alarming local residents.
201
  Florida saved the day and 
provided paradise for the filmmakers.
202
  While working in the Florida 
wetlands, near Jacksonville, the team worked night hours.
203
  They had to 
build “a road that would surround the set and was also strong enough to 
support production trucks during Florida’s heavy rainfall.”204  “‘We had to be 
very careful how this road was cut into the dense tropical vegetation and 
forest,’ said Harbeson.  ‘Prevention of senseless tree cutting and trimming 
had to balance with a road designed not to impact camera sight lines during 
filming.’”205  “To create . . . jungles, . . . the team placed 120 truckloads of 
dirt into the area . . . and added two truckloads of plant[s] . . . .”206 
“‘This was only permitted by the [FDEP] because of my guarantee 
that I would not introduce foreign soil or water into the area and that it would 
be brought back to its original condition, within an inch,’ Harbeson 
explained.”207  Based on his relationship with the FDEP and their past 
experience working together, Harbeson was confident that “all would go as 
planned.”208 
Years later, Harbeson returned to scout locations for a new HBO 
project.
209
  Navigating these locations would “require[] the assistance of the 
                                                 
199. Muttalib, supra note 197.  Other Jacksonville, Florida films not already 
mentioned include, but are not limited to:  Brenda Starr, Forces of Nature, G.I. Jane, Like 
Dandelion Dust, Lonely Hearts, Sunshine State, The Devil’s Advocate, The Manchurian 
Candidate, The New Adventures of Pippi Longstocking, Tigerland, & Why Do Fools Fall in 
Love—Filming Locations, IMDB, http://www.imdb.com/ (search “film name”; select “film 
name”; select “filming locations”) (last visited Jan. 18, 2014); Projects Filmed in Jacksonville, 
OFFICIAL WEBSITE CITY JACKSONVILLE, http://www.coj.net/departments/office-of-economic-
development/film-and-television/projects-filmed-in-jacksonville.aspx (last visited Jan. 18, 
2014). 
200. Muttalib, supra note 197. 
201. Id. 
202. See id. 
203. Id. 
204. Id. 
205. Muttalib, supra note 197. 
206. Id. 
207. Id. 
208. Id. (emphasis added). 
209. Id. 
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supervisor of elections, committee leaders, the governor, and [the] mayor.”210  
Towards the end, Harbeson observed that “‘[r]egardless of what jersey [they] 
wore, [whether] Democrat or Republican, Floridians wanted to be a part of 
this film and represented the film well.’”211  Florida’s dedication to the film 
industry has moved the love affair into a profitable, deeply committed 
marriage of sorts.
212
  And this marriage has been blessed with fertility.
213
  
Their Florida-born progeny will leave a legacy for generations.
214
 
VIII. FLORIDA’S FILM INDUSTRY PRODUCES PROGENY 
“In the summer of 1980, a group of overeducated, authority-defying 
comedy writers from the Second City improv[isation] troupe and National 
Lampoon magazine delivered perhaps the funniest sports movie ever 
made.”215  Caddyshack was born.216  Over the past thirty years, the low-
budget $6 million movie has generated over $20 million in video and DVD 
rentals, $40 million in sales at the box office, and a place on American Film 
Institute’s (“AFI”) top one hundred funniest American movies of all time—
with the special effects talents of George Lucas and other talented producers 
and directors enhancing the eleven-week shoot.
217
  Caddyshack is 
particularly memorable, amongst other reasons, for Davie’s gorgeous golf 
greens,
218
 Key Biscayne’s blue yachting waters, and, not to mention, some of 
the funniest lines in film history.
219
 
                                                 
210. Muttalib, supra note 197. 
211. Id. 
212. See FLA. DEP’T OF ECON. OPPORTUNITY & OFFICE OF FILM & ENTM’T, 
FISCAL YEAR 2011/2012 FILM AND ENTERTAINMENT INDUSTRY FINANCIAL INCENTIVE 
PERFORMANCE REPORT 2–3, 10 (2012), available at http://www.filminflorida.com/ifi/PDFs/
annualReports/Entertainment%20Industry%20Financial%20Incentive%20Annual%20Report
%202011%202012.pdf. 
213. See id. at 2–3. 
214. See id. at 9–11. 
215. Chris Nashawaty, Caddyshack, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED, Aug. 2–9, 2010, at 
64, 64, available at http://sportsillustrated.cnn.com/vault/article/magazine/MAG1172571/
index.htm. 
216. CADDYSHACK (Orion Pictures 1980). 
217. AMERICAN FILM INST., AFI’S 100 YEARS 100 LAUGHS:  AMERICA’S 
FUNNIEST MOVIES (2002), available at http://www.afi.com/docs/100years/laughs500.pdf; 
Caddyshack—Box Office/Business, IMDB, http://www.imdb.com/title/tt0080487/business (last 
visited Jan. 18, 2014); see also Nashawaty, supra note 215, at 64, 72.  Specifically, the 
animatronic gopher—with the same sound effects voice as Flipper, no less—was created at 
Lucas’ Industrial Light and Magic (“ILM”).  Nashawaty, supra note 215, at 72; Caddyshack—
Trivia, IMDB, http://www.imdb.com/title/tt0080487/trivia (last visited Jan. 18, 2014). 
218. On Location . . . Caddyshack Filming Locations, ‘80S MOVIES REWIND, 
http://www.fast-rewind.com/locations_caddyshack.htm (last visited Jan. 18, 2014).  Although 
“[t]he gates to the country club where Danny rides his bike [in] the opening” scene were 
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In addition to the aforementioned comedies, the AFI compilation of 
the top one hundred funniest American movies also includes another Florida 
sibling from 1994:  Ace Ventura, Pet Detective.
220
  Ace Ventura—played by 
Jim Carrey—is a private detective who is hired when the Miami Dolphins’ 
mascot, Snowflake, the bottle-nosed dolphin, is kidnapped.
221
  Ace embarks 
on a veritable tour of Miami and Collier County as he searches for clues to 
the kidnapper’s identity and Snowflake’s location.222  Ace Ventura grossed 
over $12 million when released in theatres the first weekend.
223
  With a 
production budget of $12 million,
224
 the film went on to gross over $107 
million worldwide.
225
  Former Miami Dolphins’ quarterback Dan Marino, 
Courtney Cox, and Tone Loc helped to make Ace Ventura a splashing 
success, as priceless gems of dialogue flowed from Jim Carey’s lips.226 
Caddyshack and Ace Ventura were not award winning for acting or 
cinematography, but are excellent examples of small budget Florida films 
with major impact.
227
  Together, grossing over $100 million at the box office 
                                                                                                                   
filmed in Bel Air, California on Sunset Boulevard, “Caddyshack was filmed on location at the 
Boca Raton Hotel [and] Country Club, Boca Raton and The Rolling Hills Golf & Tennis Club, 
Davie, Florida.”  Id.  “The pool scene was filmed at the Plantation Preserve Golf Course in 
Plantation, [Florida]” and clubhouse scenes at Rolling Hills.  Id.  “The yacht club scene was 
filmed at the Rusty Pelican Restaurant . . . [in] Key Biscayne, . . . Florida.”  Id. 
219. See CADDYSHACK, supra note 216.  For example, the line uttered by Carl 
the greens keeper:  “On your deathbed, you will receive total consciousness.  So I got that 
going for me, which is nice.”  Id.  Another nice—but some would argue utterly forgettable—
movie made in St. Petersburg was Summer Rental, a 1985 comedy film directed by Carl 
Reiner, starring John Candy.  Summer Rental, IMDB, http://www.imdb.com/title/tt0090098/ 
(last visited Jan. 18, 2014).  It was filmed in St. Petersburg Beach near St. Petersburg, and 
includes as part of its soundtrack one of the only Jimmy Buffett songs which is impossible to 
get on iTunes or in any legitimate—non-bootleg—album:  “Turn It Around.”  See Mikey 
Hersh, Out There!:  “Turning Around” by Jimmy Buffet, MISENPOPIC (Jan. 2, 2010), http://
misenpopic.blogspot.com/2010/01/out-there-turning-around-by-jimmy.html; Summer 
Rental—Filming Locations, IMDB, http://www.imdb.com/title/tt0090098/locations (last 
visited Jan. 18, 2014). 
220. AMERICAN FILM INST., supra note 217; Ace Ventura:  Pet Detective, 
IMDB, http://www.imdb.com/title/tt0109040 (last visited Jan. 18, 2014). 
221. ACE VENTURA:  PET DETECTIVE (Warner Bros. Pictures 1994). 
222. See id. 
223. Ace Ventura:  Pet Detective—Box Office/Business, IMDB, http://
www.imdb.com/title/tt0109040/business (last visited Jan. 18, 2014). 
224. Id. 
225. Ace Ventura:  Pet Detective, NUMBERS, http://www.the-numbers.com/
movies/1994/0ACV1.php (last visited Jan. 18, 2014). 
226. Ace Ventura:  Pet Detective, supra note 220. 
227. See PHYLLIS K. POOLEY, HAAS CTR. FOR BUS. RESEARCH & ECON. DEV., 
UNIV. OF W. FLA., ANALYSIS OF THE FLORIDA FILM AND ENTERTAINMENT INDUSTRY 179 
(2009), available at http://www.filminflorida.com/docs/pdf/
Analysis%20of%20the%20Florida%20Film%20and%20Entertainment%20Industry.pdf; Ace 
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and landing on AFI’s top one hundred funniest films of all time are 
accomplishments that any parent could be proud of.
228
 
And the dolphin does it again.
229
  A 2012 study conducted by the 
University of South Florida College of Business shows that the little Florida 
movie “Dolphin Tale, which was shot on location in Pinellas County and 
produced a direct local economic impact of more than $18 million during the 
three-month shoot alone,” is set to generate “an economic impact of $580 
million in 2013.”230  In addition to Pinellas County’s St. 
Petersburg/Clearwater Film Commission assessment,
231
 the University of 
South Florida report shows the far-reaching impact of the film across all 
sectors of Florida’s economy, but especially in Clearwater, and most directly 
at the Clearwater Marine Aquarium, where Winter, the dolphin star, 
resides.
232
  The film has generated jobs and increased tourism, with a 
forecasted 2.3 million visitors to the St. Petersburg/Clearwater area and to 
the Aquarium in 2016.
233
  The economic impact of these visitors totals $5 
billion to the Florida economy
234
 including actual on location vacation 
tourism around Florida and those pursuing cast extra opportunities.
235
 
                                                                                                                   
Ventura:  Pet Detective—Box Office/Business, supra note 223; Caddyshack—Box 
Office/Business, supra note 217. 
228. AMERICAN FILM INST., supra note 217; Ace Ventura:  Pet Detective—Box 
Office/Business, supra note 223; Caddyshack—Box Office/Business, supra note 217.  And if 
grossing over $40 million dollars is not honor enough, Caddyshack prominently appears in a 
law review article entitled Lightning:  A Double Hit for Golf Course Operators, by Michael 
Flynn, quoting Carl Spackler—in the middle of a torrential thunder and lightning storm—“‘I’d 
keep playing, I don’t think the heavy stuff is going to come down for quite a while.’  The 
Bishop responded, ‘you’re right, anyway the good Lord would never disrupt the best game of 
my life.’  The Bishop was then struck down by lightning.”  Michael Flynn, Lightning:  A 
Double Hit for Golf Course Operators, 6 MARQUETTE SPORTS L.J. 133, 134–35 n.11 (1995) 
(quoting CADDYSHACK, supra note 216). 
229. See Study:  ‘Dolphin Tale’ Creates Millions in Economic Impact, TAMPA 
BAY BUS. J. (Aug. 16, 2012, 2:07 PM), http://www.bizjournals.com/tampabay/news/2012/08/
16/study-dolphin-tale-creates.html. 
230. Id.; VISIT ST. PETE CLEARWATER, PINELLAS CNTY. GOV’T, 2013 VISIT ST. 
PETE/CLEARWATER ANNUAL PLAN 9 (2013), available at http://www.pinellascvb.com/files/
2013_visit_st._petersburg_clearwater_annual_plan(reduced).pdf. 
231. VISIT ST. PETE CLEARWATER, supra note 230, at 9. 
232. MARIA LUISA CORTON & MALING EBRAHIMPOUR, UNIV. OF S. FLA., THE 
ECONOMIC IMPACT OF DOLPHIN TALE: ON THE ST. PETERSBURG/CLEARWATER LOCAL ECONOMY 
2 (2012). 
233. Id. 
234. Study:  ‘Dolphin Tale’ Creates Millions in Economic Impact, supra note 
229. 
235. See CORTON & EBRAHIMPOUR, supra note 232, at 2; ‘Chu and Blossom’ 
Needs Extras in Largo, FL This Weekend, OLV (Aug. 18, 2012), 
www.onlocationvacations.com/2012/08/18/chu-and-blossom-needs-extras-in-largo-fl-this-
weekend/. 
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One of the longest running, if not most flattering, depictions of 
Miami in film or television, were “[t]he adventures of the vice squad 
detectives of the Miami Police Department,” as portrayed over seven seasons 
from 1984 through 1990 in Miami Vice, and the movie adaptation by the 
same name in 2006.
236
  This “massively successful national and international 
hit” featured “[t]he Art Deco buildings of South Beach . . . as a backdrop for 
much of the show,” the plot “glamorized the very real crime problems the 
area was suffering, and city officials were concerned about the image it was 
giving of their community.”237  As tourists came to visit the exotic splendor 
of the series’ locations and other Miami area movies and television shows,238 
businesses invested more in renovating South Beach and city leaders 
increased law enforcement vigilance.
239
  By 2008, “[t]he Art Deco District 
and South Beach were the top tourist attractions in Miami-Dade County . . . 
visited by nearly 52% of its 12 million visitors.”240  During a fourteen year 
period “[f]rom 1995–2009, these visitors to Miami Beach spent . . . $15 
billion for food, drinks and lodging, with historic South Beach [accounting 
for] nearly 75% of [that] spending.”241 
IX. FLORIDA AND THE FILM INDUSTRY IN THE 21ST CENTURY 
More than any other time in filmmaking history, the latter portions 
of the twentieth and early twenty-first centuries were marked by the 
cinematographic equivalent of outsourcing, also known in the film industry 
as runaway productions.
242
  This term describes filmmaking and television 
productions that are “intended for initial release/exhibition or television 
                                                 
236. Miami Vice (1984–1990), IMDB, http://www.imdb.com/title/tt0086759/ 
(last visited Jan. 18, 2014); Miami Vice (2006), IMDB, http://www.imdb.com/title/tt0430357/ 
(last visited Jan. 18, 2014). 
237. Jedediah Drolet et al., Chapter Seven: South Beach, Miami Beach, Florida 
Case Study:  Synthesis of Historic Preservation and Economic Development, in ECONOMIC 
IMPACTS OF HISTORIC PRESERVATION UPDATE 2010 83, 96–97 (2010), available at http://
mimoonthebeach.com/pdfs/South%20Beach%20Economic%20Case%20Study.pdf. 
238. Id. at 97; see also Bad Boys, Bad Boys II, The Bird Cage, & True Lies—
Filming Locations, IMDB, http://www.imdb.com/ (search “film name”; select “film name”; 
select “filming locations”) (last visited Jan. 18, 2014). 
239. See Drolet et al., supra note 237, at 96–97. 
240. Id. at foreword. 
241. Id. 
242. See STEPHEN M. KATZ, CTR. FOR ENTM’T INDUS. DATA & RESEARCH, THE 
GLOBAL SUCCESS OF PRODUCTION TAX INCENTIVES AND THE MIGRATION OF FEATURE FILM 
PRODUCTION FROM THE U.S. TO THE WORLD: YEAR 2005 PRODUCTION REPORT 1–2 (Mark A. 
Rosenthal ed., 2006), available at http://www.ceidr.org/2005CEIDRReport.pdf; SCREEN 
ACTORS GUILD & DIRS. GUILD OF AM., U.S. RUNAWAY FILM AND TELEVISION PRODUCTION 
STUDY REPORT 2 (n.d.), available at http://www.hhill.org/images/uploads/monitor_report.pdf. 
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broadcast in the U.S., but are actually filmed in another country.”243  Hardly 
a new complaint in the media industry, film crews often “left Los Angeles to 
shoot in exotic [often overseas] locales—creative runaways—but in the 
1970s and 1980s, technological changes related to the advent of television 
production methods made filmmaking more mobile.”244  In some instances, 
the choice to produce creative runaways was based on requirements of the 
script, setting, or due to preferences of the actors or director.
245
  
Alternatively, economic runaways are and have been productions made in 
other countries to reduce costs.
246
  For instance, in 2002, only one of the five 
Best Picture nominees, The Hours, for that year’s Academy Awards was shot 
in Hollywood—Hollywood, Florida, that is.247 
The United States Federal Government and many states, including 
Florida, recognized “the substantial economic damage inflicted by [r]unaway 
[p]roductions” proliferating in the 1980s and beyond.248  In turn, “Congress 
enacted section 181 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986, as amended (“the 
Code”),249 as part of the American Jobs Creation Act of 2004.”250  “Section 
181 allows for certain expenses associated with films and television 
productions costing less than $15 million to be immediately deducted in the 
                                                 
243. SCREEN ACTORS GUILD & DIRS. GUILD OF AM., supra note 242, at 2; see 
also HERD, supra note 58, at 40–41 (U.S. production went offshore to Australia, in part, 
because of government incentives).  For runaway productions in Canada, see Debra Felstead, 
Toronto TV Production Is Fading to Black; Actors Scrambling to Find Work Funding Cuts, 
SARS to Blame, TORONTO STAR, July 6, 2003, at D03.  For an appreciation of the global effect 
of creative and economic runaways, see KATZ, supra note 242, at 1–2. 
244. Susan Christopherson, Divide and Conquer:  Regional Competition in a 
Concentrated Media Industry, in CONTRACTING OUT HOLLYWOOD: RUNAWAY PRODUCTIONS 
AND FOREIGN LOCATION SHOOTING 21, 21 (Greg Elmer & Mike Gasher eds., 2005). 
245. SCREEN ACTORS GUILD & DIRS. GUILD OF AM., supra note 242, at 6. 
246. Id. 
247. CONTRACTING OUT HOLLYWOOD: RUNAWAY PRODUCTIONS AND FOREIGN 
LOCATION SHOOTING 1, 3 (Greg Elmer & Mike Gasher eds., 2005). 
248. KATZ, supra note 242, at 57; JORGE MEDINA & PATRICK S. KLEIN, TAX 
DEDUCTIONS FOR FILM AND TELEVISION PRODUCTIONS UNDER SECTION 181, 2 (n.d.), available 
at http://www.lacba.org/files/main%20Folder/sections/taxation/files/8.pdf.  “U.S. states 
offering significant incentives include:  Arizona, Florida, Georgia, Illinois, Louisiana, 
Massachusetts, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York, North Carolina, Pennsylvania, Puerto 
Rico, South Carolina, with more are [sic] on the way.”  KATZ, supra note 242, at 2. 
249. MEDINA & KLEIN, supra note 248, at 2 (emphasis added).  See T.D. 9603, 
2013-3 I.R.B., 273, for “final regulations that amend[ed] 26 CFR part 1 to reflect amendments 
made to [the] . . . Code by section 502 of the Tax Extenders and Alternative Minimum Tax 
Relief Act of 2008, Public Law No. 110-343 (122 Stat. 3765) (October 3, 2008).” 
250. MEDINA & KLEIN, supra note 247, at 2; see also KATZ, supra note 242, at 
60 (“The language allows producers of films with budgets under $15 million to immediately 
write off their costs in a single year—if 75% of their principal costs are incurred via shooting 
in the [United States].  Previously, producers had to amortize those costs over several years.”). 
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year incurred.”251  At present, section 181 of the CodeTreatment of certain 
qualified film and television productionsprovides that “[a] taxpayer may 
elect to treat the cost of any qualified film or television production as an 
expense which is not chargeable to capital account.  Any cost so treated shall 
be allowed as a deduction.”252  As currently in force, “[s]ection 181 has the 
potential to be very effective in limiting the negative economic impact of 
[r]unaway [p]roductions,”253 encouraging television and film productions in 
the United States in general and, with economic enticements, in Florida in 
particular.
254
 
The Governor’s OFE commissioned an independent assessment of 
Florida’s film and entertainment industry, conducted by the Haas Center for 
Business Research and Economic Development.
255
  The study revealed that 
“[t]he estimated . . . impact of . . . Florida[’s] [f]ilm and [e]ntertainment 
[i]ndustry grew from . . . $27 billion in 2003 to [almost $30] billion in 
2007.”256  In no small part, this growth was fueled by Florida’s own financial 
incentive program for the entertainment industry, codified in section 
288.1254 of the Florida Statutes.
257
  Florida’s Entertainment Industry 
Financial Incentive Program—which became effective July 1, 2007—“was 
created within the Governor’s . . . (OFE) to ‘encourage the use of this state as 
a site for filming and to develop and sustain the workforce and infrastructure 
for film and entertainment production.’”258  “To further support this mission 
[of maximizing film and entertainment production in Florida], the Governor 
and the Florida Legislature provided $25 [million] in funding for the 2007–
2008 fiscal year, . . . up $5 million from the previous fiscal year.”259  In its 
present inception as a six-year program—which “began on July 1, 2010 and 
sunsets June 30, 2016”—some $12 million have been allocated by the State 
Legislature in tax credits beyond the initial 2010 allocation of $242 
million.
260
  In “2012, the legislature allocated an additional $42 million in tax 
credits to the program, totaling $296 million.”261  As a cost-to-benefit bottom 
                                                 
251. MEDINA & KLEIN, supra note 247, at 2. 
252. I.R.C. § 181(a)(1) (2006). 
253. MEDINA & KLEIN, supra note 247, at 2. 
254. Id.; see also KATZ, supra note 242, at 62; Koegel, supra note 169, at 15. 
255. POOLEY, supra note 227, at 1. 
256. Id. at 20. 
257. FLA. STAT. § 288.1254 (2013); see also Koegel, supra note 169, at 15. 
258. Koegel, supra note 169, at 15 (quoting FLA. STAT. § 288.1254(2) (2007) 
(current version at FLA. STAT. § 288.1254(2) (2013))). 
259. Id. 
260. FLA. DEP’T OF ECON. OPPORTUNITY & OFFICE OF FILM & ENTM’T, supra 
note 212, at 2. 
261. Id. 
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line, Florida’s Department of Economic Opportunity claims that since the 
program’s inception, the OFE has: 
 [S]ubmitted and processed 481 applications; 
 [Q]ualified and certified 230 of those productions for tax 
credits with projected Florida expenditures of 
approximately $1.3 billion; [and] 
 [Estimated that] [w]ages to Floridians associated with the 
230 productions are currently projected to be close to 
$760 million and are associated with 161,000 positions 
for Florida residents.
262
 
Governor Charlie Crist renewed and re-enforced his public 
commitment to the program by stating:  “‘As we continue to seek growth 
opportunities for Florida’s economy, it is important to remember the 
significant role film and entertainment plays in our state, directly employing 
more than 100,000 Floridians.’”263  Crist was well aware that ‘“[t]hese 
findings highlight how important it is for Florida’s businesses and workforce 
to ensure this revenue stream continues flowing into our state.’”264 
The study reiterated the unique benefits that are generated by the 
film and entertainment industry.
265
  “[T]he economic benefits extend into 
other industries: . . . [R]estaurants, lodging, retail, construction, and 
tourism.”266  The economic benefits set in motion “an additional estimated 
105,000 related spinoff jobs in 2007 [alone].”267  “[I]n 2007, the [film and 
entertainment] industry [in Florida] accounted for:  $17.9 billion in Gross 
State Product (“GSP”); $8.5 billion in income to Floridians; and $498 
million in tax revenue.”268 
                                                 
262. Id. 
The production types certified to date [as of 2011/2012] include:  58 motion 
pictures (theatrical, made for [television], direct to video, documentaries, visual 
effects sequences in conjunction with a motion picture); 42 digital media 
productions; and 101 television productions ([television] series, including high-
impact, drama, comedy, game shows, variety, entertainment shows, reality), 
[television] series pilots, telenovelas, and award shows; and 29 commercials. 
Id. 
263. Study Shows $29.2 Billion Economic Impact for Film and Entertainment 
Industry in Florida, FILM FLA. (Mar. 2, 2009), http://www.filmflorida.org/news/
view.aspx?item=86. 
264. Id. 
265. Id. 
266. Id. 
267. Id. 
268. Study Shows $29.2 Billion Economic Impact for Film and Entertainment 
Industry in Florida, supra note 263. 
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In 2012, Ernst & Young was commissioned by the Motion Picture 
Association of America (“MPAA”) to complete a study evaluating the 
effectiveness of film tax credits.
269
  In that report, Ernst & Young noted  
[t]he net fiscal benefit for state and local budgets is 
generally determined by comparing the cost of incentives to the 
additional state and local taxes generated by the film industry 
expansion.  The net fiscal effect could be positive or negative 
depending upon both the features of state film credits and the 
economic characteristics of each production.
270
 
Elsewhere in the report, Ernst & Young found Florida comparable to 
California when comparing “film tax credit programs in selected states with 
highest FY2010 credit program expenditures,” yet not as generous as eight of 
its peer-competitor film-making states—Connecticut, Georgia, Louisiana, 
Massachusetts, Michigan, New Mexico, New York, and Pennsylvania—with 
respect to “[s]tatutory credit rates by type of qualified expenditure.”271 
The Association of National Advertisers (“ANA”) published a white 
paper titled The Found Money of State Commercial Production Incentives 
highlighting that: 
The list of states that offer commercial production 
incentives and the specific details for each state, are continually 
evolving.  Commercial production incentives are currently 
available from Alaska, Connecticut, Florida, Georgia, Hawaii, 
Illinois, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maryland, Mississippi, Missouri, 
                                                 
269. ANDREW PHILLIPS ET AL., ERNST & YOUNG, EVALUATING THE 
EFFECTIVENESS OF STATE FILM TAX CREDIT PROGRAMS: ISSUES THAT NEED TO BE CONSIDERED 
(2012), available at http://www.ey.com/Publication/vwLUAssetsPI/Evaluating_the_
effectiveness_of_state_film_tax_credit_programs/$FILE/1203-1342731%20Motion%
20Picture%20assoc.%20film%20credit%20study.pdf. 
270. Id. at 7.  In the report, Ernst & Young cited how 
[t]he advertising value of film and television productions, at a minimum, can be 
evaluated by comparing the costs of generating similar awareness of a state through 
paid advertising.  For decades, states have purchased advertising in magazines and 
on television to promote awareness of their states as a destination for tourists.  
Examples include Michigan’s “Pure Michigan” campaign, which cost nearly $30 
million in 2009; California’s “Find Yourself Here” campaign, which has cost $50 
million annually since 2007–08; Hawaii’s leisure and sports marketing budget of 
$44 million in 2010; Florida’s marketing cost of $23 million in 2002; and Las 
Vegas’ $87 million spent on advertising in 2009, including its “What Happens in 
Vegas, Stays in Vegas” campaign. 
Id. 
271. Id. at 21 tbl. A-2. 
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Montana, New Mexico, North Carolina, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, 
Puerto Rico, Texas, Washington, and West Virginia.
272
 
The Florida Film and Entertainment Industry Financial Incentive 
Program, overseen by the Governor’s Office of Tourism, Trade, and 
Economic Development—in the Governor’s OFE—builds, supports and 
markets the high-wage, high-growth motion picture and entertainment 
industry sectors in Florida.
273
  With offices in Tallahassee and Los Angeles, 
Florida is able to implement innovative strategies to attract world-class 
productions to the state that provide economic benefits to residents and 
businesses.
274
  A study released in March 2013 
on the economic impact of The Florida Film and Entertainment 
Industry Financial Incentive Program found a return on investment 
(“ROI”) of 4.7, with estimated state and local tax revenues in 
Florida last fiscal year totaling $547 million and the present value 
                                                 
272. Bill Duggan, The Found Money of State Commercial Production 
Incentives, ASS’N NAT’L ADVERTISERS (Apr. 23, 2012), http://www.ana.net/blogs/show/id/
23341.  The ANA cross-references “The Official Guide to United States Production Incentives 
at http://www.easecommercial.com/” as “[o]ne resource available to help stay up to date on 
the various state policies.”  Id.; see also DAMA CLAIRE & MIKE ROSE, THE OFFICIAL GUIDE TO 
U.S. PRODUCTION INCENTIVES FOR THE ADVERTISING INDUSTRY 6 (Russ Nissen & Garrett 
Hauenstein eds., 2013), available at http://easeentertainment.com/wp-content/themes/
ease/images/ECS_Incentives_Guide_Summer_2013.pdf.  For other updates by jurisdiction—
within the United States and abroad—see also Updates by Jurisdiction, ENT. PARTNERS (May 
30, 2012), http://www.entertainmentpartners.com/result/?nid=6872. 
273. See The Fla. Office of Film & Entm’t, Florida Film & Entertainment 
Industry Financial Incentive Program, supra note 2.  A brief overview of the program 
benefits identified included: 
20%–30% transferable tax credit; 20% base percentage; 5% Off Season Bonus (for 
certain production types); 5% Family Friendly Bonus (for certain production types); 
5% Underutilized Region Bonus (for General Production Queue only); 5% 
Qualified Production Facility/Digital Media Facility Bonus (for General Production 
Queue, on expenditures associated with production activity at a Qualified 
Production Facility/Digital Media Facility); 15% Florida Student/Recent Graduate 
Bonus (for General Production Queue, on student/recent grad wages and other 
compensation).  The priority for qualifying/certifying projects for tax credit awards 
is determined on a first-come, first-served basis within its appropriate queue. 
Id.  For a comparison and contrast of Florida’s peer-competitor states seeking film industry 
revenues, and second-order-of-effect tourism and service industry benefits, see, for example, 
EMILY PATRICIA GRAHAM, COMPILED COMPARISON OF FILM TAX INCENTIVES IN LOUISIANA, 
FLORIDA, TEXAS AND NEW MEXICO (n.d.), available at http://www.americanbar.org/
content/dam/aba/migrated/2011_build/entertainment_sports/film_incentives_compiled_compa
rison.authcheckdam.pdf. 
274. See The Fla. Office of Film & Entm’t, Florida Film & Entertainment 
Industry Financial Incentive Program, supra note 2; The Fla. Office of Film & Entm’t, 
Location Resources, FILMINFLORIDA.COM, http://www.filminflorida.com/lr/default.asp (last 
visited Jan. 18, 2014) [hereinafter The Fla. Office of Film & Entm’t, Location Resources]. 
81
: Nova Law Review 38, #1
Published by NSUWorks, 2013
2013] FLORIDA AND THE FILM INDUSTRY 73 
of the tax credit totaling $117 million.  The ROI is 4.7 when the 
state and local tax revenue effects of film-induced tourism, 
production spending, and infrastructure spending are taken into 
account.
275
 
That means, “for every $1.00 of credit distributed, the state and local 
governments received a combined $4.70 in taxes.”276  The incentive also 
supported an estimated 87,870 jobs and $7.2 billion in economic spending 
across the state, both through production spending and induced tourism.
277
 
Vans Stevenson, Senior Vice President for State Government Affairs 
at the MPAA, aptly pointed out in 2013 that the range of “major theatrical 
releases like Magic Mike and Dolphin Tale to some of television’s most 
watched shows like Burn Notice and The Glades [in] the entertainment 
industry is a fundamental element to Florida’s economy.”278  Indeed, “[t]he 
Emmy-nominated show [Burn Notice] infused more than $28.6 million into 
South Florida’s economy during [its] first two seasons [alone of a seven 
season run], and . . . created more than 2700 jobs”279 while receiving $5.2 
million of the 2009 State of Florida incentive budget totaling $10.8 
million.
280
  “[H]oliday box office [hit] Marley & Me . . . injected more than 
$10 million into South Florida’s economy, employing nearly 1400 
Floridians,” as the number one hit at the box office for two weeks and 
“effectively market[ed] South Florida[] [as the perfect] . . . destination[] [for] 
millions of winter moviegoers.”281 
For over a billion warm climate moviegoers in India, Mumbai’s so-
called Bollywood has traditionally satisfied cinematic cravings,
282
 at least 
                                                 
275. Press Release, Motion Picture Ass’n of Am., Inc., Motion Picture & 
Television Production Incentive Program Results in Significant Economic Impact, Investment 
Return in Florida (Mar. 20, 2013), available at http://www.mpaa.org/resources/53dedf92-
dbf0-45f1-9d63-dce86a488c70.pdf. 
276. Id. 
277. Id. 
278. Id. 
279. Study Shows $29.2 Billion Economic Impact for Film and Entertainment 
Industry in Florida, supra note 263. 
280. Lee Logan, Burn Notice Star Stumps for Film Tax Credits, MIAMI HERALD 
(Nov. 3, 2009, 1:30 PM), http://miamiherald.typepad.com/nakedpolitics/2009/11/burn-notice-
star-stumps-for-film-tax-credits.html. 
281. Study Shows $29.2 Billion Economic Impact for Film and Entertainment 
Industry in Florida, supra note 263. 
282. See Richard Corliss, Hooray for Bollywood!, TIME MAG., Sept. 16, 1996, 
at 88.  Bollywood is the informal term popularly used for the Hindi-language film industry 
based in Mumbai (Bombay), Maharashtra, India.  EJVIND VOGG, DANSK INDUSTRI, THE INDIAN 
BOLLYWOOD INDUSTRY (2012), available at http://di.dk/SiteCollectionDocuments/
DIBD/sektoranalyser/The%20Indian%20Bollywood%20Industry_2013.pdf. 
82
Nova Law Review, Vol. 38, Iss. 1 [2013], Art. 1
http://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol38/iss1/1
74 NOVA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 38 
until Miami beckoned for a creative runaway
283
 to its sandy shores and hot 
nightlife.
284
  Dharma Productions’ feature film Dostana—Friendship in 
Hindi and Urdu—starring John Abraham, Abhishek Bachchan, and Priyanka 
Chopra, produced by Karan Johar, was “the first major Bollywood [f]ilm to 
shoot in Miami-Dade County.”285  The romantic-comedy Dostana went on to 
become the eighth highest grossing film at the Indian box office,
286
 grossing 
one billion Indian rupees, or $16.8 million, in its first four weeks alone at the 
box office
287—no small measure in the world’s largest movie market—which 
“had a revenue of . . . $3 [billion] in 2011, and has been growing at 
approx[imately] 10.1% a year.  The revenue is expected to reach . . . $4.5 
[billion] by 2016.”288  As a low budget sequel of five hundred and six 
thousand—compared to two million dollars for the original Dostana289—
actor “John Abraham promises [a] kid-friendly Dostana 2,” with Abraham 
and Bachchan “migrat[ing] from Miami to Punjab,”290 as only a partial 
creative runaway.
291
 
Because of this unprecedented governmental support, “there is an 
established film office and film liaison infrastructure within Florida.”292  In 
addition to the “Florida[] film office . . . housed in the Governor’s office, . . . 
there are [fifty-four] film liaisons located throughout the [s]tate.”293  The 
Sunshine State is also the only state with a full time Los Angeles film office 
                                                 
283. For a discussion of creative versus economic runaways, see SCREEN 
ACTORS GUILD & DIRS. GUILD OF AM., supra note 242, at 2. 
284. M. BARRON STOFIK, SAVING SOUTH BEACH 239–41 (2005). 
285. Don’t Miss the Miami Premiere of the Bollywood Feature Film Dostana . 
. ., FILMIAMI.ORG, http://www.miamidade.gov/filmiami/home-TS-110608-1.asp (last visited 
Jan. 18, 2014); Dostana Grosses Rs 1 Billion Worldwide in Four Weeks, BUS. CINEMA (Dec. 
11, 2008), http://businessofcinema.com/bollywood-news/dostana-grosses-rs-1-billion-
worldwide-in-four-weeks/26099. 
286. Box Office 2008, BOXOFFICEINDIA.COM, http://www.boxofficeindia.com/
showProd.php?itemCat=215 (last visited Jan. 18, 2014). 
287. Dostana Grosses Rs 1 Billion Worldwide in Four Weeks, supra note 285.  
Conversion calculated based upon June 23, 2013 foreign currency exchange rate of one Indian 
rupee to .0168703764625 United States dollars.  INR to USD Rate, FOREX MONEY CHANGER, 
http://www.fxmoneychanger.com/inr/usd/rate/?q=180 (last updated Nov. 10, 2013). 
288. Vogg, supra note 282. 
289. See Dostana—Box Office/Business, IMDB, http://www.imdb.com/title/
tt1185420/business?ref_=tt_dt_bus (last visited Jan. 18, 2014). 
290. Shalvi Mangaokar, John Abraham Promises Kid-Friendly Dostana 2, 
HINDUSTAN TIMES (June 20, 2013), http://www.hindustantimes.com/Entertainment/
Bollywood/John-Abraham-promises-kid-friendly-Dostana-2/Article1-1079368.aspx. 
291. Id.; see also SCREEN ACTORS GUILD & DIRS. GUILD OF AM., supra note 
241, at 2. 
292. POOLEY, supra note 227, at 22. 
293. Id. 
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whose goal is to bridge the gap between Hollywood and Florida.
294
  
Extending Florida’s reach to California cements a strong and enduring 
relationship with Hollywood and exemplifies Florida’s steadfast commitment 
to the film industry.
295
  Florida is aggressively implementing innovative 
strategies to attract productions from all over the world.
296
  World-class 
productions provide billions of dollars of economic benefits to Florida 
residents and businesses.
297
 
X. FLORIDA’S FUTURE:  FAITHFULNESS AND FIDELITY TO THE FILM 
INDUSTRY 
Florida is not about to take its relationship with the movie industry 
for granted.
298
  Dedicated to the successful growth of the industry, Florida 
continues to find ways to reinforce the bonds, reveal weaknesses and re-
affirm its strengths.
299
  The Tourism Committee of the Florida House of 
Representatives State Infrastructure Council authored a report in 2006, 
entitled Florida’s Entertainment Industry Infrastructure:  Are We Growing 
the Indigenous Industry as well as Supporting Production?
300
  The report 
made recommendations for the operations within the Governor’s Office and 
the film industry within the state.
301
  Recommendations included re-
evaluation of Florida’s tax incentives, fully funding and staffing the 
Governor’s Office of Film and Entertainment, and aggressively bringing in 
production from other states.
302
 
The 2009 Haas Analysis of the Florida Film and Entertainment 
Industry (“Haas Analysis”) explored Florida’s strengths, weaknesses, and 
opportunities.
303
  Florida’s “[u]niqueness of place . . . offers a wide variety of 
filming locations,” and Miami is now internationally recognizable because of 
Florida’s film industry.304  Notably, Matt Nix, Executive Producer of Burn 
                                                 
294. Id. 
295. See id. 
296. See, e.g., FLA. H.R. COMM. ON TOURISM, FLORIDA’S ENTERTAINMENT 
INDUSTRY INFRASTRUCTURE:  ARE WE GROWING THE INDIGENOUS INDUSTRY AS WELL AS 
SUPPORTING PRODUCTION? i–iii (2006), available at http://www.myfloridahouse.gov/
sections/Documents/loaddoc.aspx?PublicationType=Committees&committeeId=2235&Sessio
n=2006&DocumentType=Reports&FileName=Entertainment%20Industry%20Infrastructureo
nline.pdf. 
297. POOLEY, supra note 227, at 1920. 
298. See FLA. H.R. COMM. ON TOURISM, supra note 296, at i. 
299. Id. 
300. Id. 
301. Id. at i, v, xi–xv. 
302. Id. at v, xi–xv. 
303. POOLEY, supra note 227, at 21–24. 
304. Id. at 21. 
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Notice, explained about Miami, “Miami [is] just a very convenient place for 
[the lead character, Michael].  It [is] a place where you can blow things up 
and nobody notices.”305 
The Haas Analysis report points out a weakness in labor rates.
306
  
“[T]he current structuring of labor rates by unions, [especially the] IATSE, 
results in wage rates [of] $5.25 to $6.00 . . . higher on productions taking 
place in Florida as compared to . . . competing states.  There is also a[] . . . 
perception that unions are [hard] to deal with in Florida.”307  Also, recent 
severe weather, tropical storms, and hurricanes add an additional concern to 
productions choosing Florida.
308
 
But, there are opportunities for increased production in niche 
markets.
309
  Florida is looking to get a competitive edge by appealing to 
Spanish-language television and the Spanish-language workforce.
310
  The 
overall conclusion, as a result of all the industry analysis, is that if Florida 
wants to attract on-location filming to the Sunshine State, it will have to 
provide the most attractive incentive programs.
311
  A statement from Warner 
Brothers Worldwide Television summed this up:  “[I]n the past few years, 
financial incentives have overwhelmed the where to shoot equation.  Major 
studios and smart independents are going to locations that have the best 
incentives.  It [is] as simple as that.”312 
The Film in Florida website—www.filminflorida.com—is the new 
guide to the Florida Film Industry for 2013, highlighting the Florida OFE’s 
mission to support, build, and market Florida’s entertainment industry.313  
The mission reaffirms the importance of “collaborat[ion] with the indigenous 
. . . community [and dedication] to implement[ation of] innovative ways to 
grow [the] industry.”314  The OFE strives to provide “hands-on, world-class 
service that our clients need and deserve, and exceed our annual business 
goals to become the number two global . . . leader.”315  They are committed 
                                                 
305. April MacIntyre, USA’s ‘Burn Notice’ Matt Nix Interview, M & C (Aug. 
5, 2008), http://www.monstersandcritics.com/smallscreen/features/article_1421668.php/
USA_s_Burn_Notice_Matt_Nix_interview. 
306. POOLEY, supra note 227, at 23. 
307. Id. 
308. Id. 
309. Id. at 170–71. 
310. Id. at 24, 31. 
311. See POOLEY, supra note 227, at 30. 
312. Id. 
313. FILMINFLORIDA.COM, http://www.filminflorida.com (last visited Jan. 18, 
2014); The Fla. Office of Film & Entm’t, About Us:  Vision & Mission, supra note 167. 
314. The Fla. Office of Film & Entm’t, About Us:  Vision & Mission, supra 
note 167. 
315. Id. 
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to integrity, inclusiveness, accountability, partnering, empowerment, and 
innovation.
316
  Links from the website include easy on-line permitting, 
federal incentive programs, and contact information to guilds, unions and 
associations.
317
 
The film office website has launched the Florida Green Production 
Plan, which includes guidance to production companies so that they can 
“make environmentally-wise decisions at every phase of production” in 
Florida.
318
  This initiative involves interaction with multiple Florida 
agencies.
319
  The Forest Stewardship Council, recycling centers, the Florida 
Green Lodging program, hazardous waste centers, and regulations are clearly 
linked and articulated to ease production companies in going green in 
Florida.
320
 
The Governor’s Office also provides, through the Film in Florida 
organization, a Hurricane Preparedness Plan for filmmakers.
321
  It explains 
specific insurance provisions through Insuring Florida, links to the Central 
Florida Hurricane Center, numerous phone numbers and links for emergency 
evacuation assistance, mayors’ offices, disaster preparedness centers, and 
storm surge evacuation maps.
322
 
The website includes an almost limitless library of photographs and 
a rich inventory of locations that showcase the expansive diversity of 
Florida.
323
  This is incredibly helpful to out-of-state producers, who can scout 
locations in cyberspace without the expense of physically traveling to Florida 
during the early phase of production planning.
324
 
It appears that by 2014 and beyond, the Governor’s Office, Florida 
administrative agencies, and film liaisons will have covered every 
conceivable whim, wish, want, sine qua non, and exigency.
325
  The Film in 
Florida website is a fascinating display of Florida’s undying dedication to 
Hollywood and the film industry.
326
 
                                                 
316. Id. 
317. Id. 
318. The Fla. Office of Film & Entm’t, Florida Green Production Plan, 
FILMINFLORIDA.COM, http://www.filminflorida.com/prl/gpp.asp (last visited Jan. 18, 2014). 
319. See id. 
320. Id. 
321. FILM FLA. & GOVERNOR’S OFFICE OF FILM & ENTM’T, FLORIDA FILM, 
TELEVISION, AND ENTERTAINMENT HURRICANE PREPAREDNESS PLAN 1 (n.d.), available at 
http://www.miamidade.gov/filmiami/hurricane-preparedness.pdf. 
322. Id. at 8–10. 
323. The Fla. Office of Film & Entm’t, Location Resources, supra note 274. 
324. See id. 
325. See FILM FLA. & GOVERNOR’S OFFICE OF FILM & ENTM’T, supra note 321, 
at 1–3; FILMINFLORIDA.COM, supra note 313; The Fla. Office of Film & Entm’t, Location 
Resources, supra note 274. 
326. See FILMINFLORIDA.COM, supra note 313. 
86
Nova Law Review, Vol. 38, Iss. 1 [2013], Art. 1
http://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol38/iss1/1
78 NOVA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 38 
A recent study commissioned by the MPAA is a revealing 
quantification of the economic impact of the film industry in Florida, as 
already experienced in fiscal year (“FY”) 2011/2012.327 
 
Florida Impacts FY 2011/2012 Production Impacts 
Production Expenditure ($2005 millions)  $1512 
Output ($2005 millions) $2536 
Gross State Product ($2005 millions) $1507 
Employment (FTEs) 19,308 
Labor Income ($2005 millions) $761 
State and Local Taxes (Nominal $ 
millions) 
$140.44 
Figure 1—Estimated Florida Economic Impacts of Production Spending in 
FY 2011/2012
328
 
 
What may well be most telling of the future economic impact of 
Florida’s film industry was the study’s estimates for the exponential revenue 
growth, employment increases, and raised tax revenues in the five-year 
period beginning in 2011 forward.
329
 
 
Florida Impacts 
(2011–2016) 
IMPLAN 
Estimates 
REMI Tax-PI 
Estimates 
Midpoint 
Production 
Expenditure ($2005 
millions) 
$3769 $3769 $3769 
Output ($2005 
millions) 
$6235 $6389 $6321 
Gross State Product 
($2005 millions) 
$3631 $3885 $3758 
Employment (FTEs) 53,466 42,803 48,134 
Labor Income ($2005 
millions) 
$1984 $1812 $1898 
State and Local Taxes 
(Nominal $ millions) 
$350.1 Not Reported $350.1 
Figure 2—Midpoint of IMPLAN and REMI TAX-PI Estimated Florida 
Economic Impacts of Production Spending
330 
                                                 
327. MNP, ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL IMPACTS OF THE FLORIDA FILM AND 
ENTERTAINMENT INDUSTRY FINANCIAL INCENTIVE PROGRAM 2 (2013), available at http://
www.mpaa.org/Resources/0a432ae0-5b5e-4c7f-b3de-dc6693722914.pdf. 
328. Id. 
329. See id. at 1. 
330. Id.  Note:  IMPLAN=Impact Analysis for Planning; REMI=Regional 
Economic Models, Inc.; TAX-PI=a ready-to-use, “dynamic fiscal and economic impact 
model” that captures the direct, indirect, and induced “fiscal and economic effects of 
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XI. CONCLUSION 
Florida and the film industry:  A match made in heaven, or rather, 
paradise.  Florida’s ineradicable dedication to the needs and desires of the 
film industry proves her unwavering commitment to this treasured 
relationship.
331
  Globally, grateful members of the film industry show respect 
and loyalty in return.
332
  This allegiance allows the benefits of the 
relationship to flow both ways, and ultimately the citizens of the Sunshine 
State reap the greatest rewards.
333
 
Proof of Florida’s steadfastness continues as Governor Rick Scott 
highlighted Dolphin Tale 2’s production in Florida highlighted earlier.334  
Dolphin Tale 2 is the true story of baby dolphin, named Hope, who was 
rescued and rehabilitated by the Clearwater Marine Aquarium in 2010.  
Florida Representative Ed Hooper said, “Its’ great news that Dolphin Tale 2 
will be filmed in Clearwater, creating an economic benefit to the entire 
area.”335  Hooper went on to thank Governor Scott for “focusing on creating 
jobs in Florida.”336  According to the Governor’s Office, the 2013-2014 
Florida Families First budget includes $5 million in general revenue funds to 
be allocated to the production.
337
  Also anxiously anticipated for its 
entertainment prospects, and much appreciated from a jobs and revenue 
perspective, is the May 2015 release of an upcoming science fiction mystery 
film, Tomorrowland; it is being filmed at various Disney theme parks, and 
directed, co-written, and produced by Brad Bird and produced and co-written 
by Damon Lindelof, starring the non-Delphinidae human actors Britt 
Robertson and George Clooney, with Hugh Laurie as the primary villain.
338
 
                                                                                                                   
tax[ation] [and other] policy changes” over multiple years.  Statewide Policy Analysis Tools, 
FLA. OFF. ECON. & DEMOGRAPHIC RES., http://edr.state.fl.us/Content/statewide-policy-
analysis-tools/index.cfm (last visited Jan. 18, 2014). 
331. See FLA. H.R. COMM. ON TOURISM, supra note 296, at i–ii. 
332. See id. at ii, iv, viii; Longwell, supra note 180. 
333. See FLA. H.R. COMM. ON TOURISM, supra note 296, at v; Longwell, supra 
note 180. 
334. Visit St. Pete Clearwater, supra note 230, at 9. 
335. Governor Rick Scott Announces Dolphin Tale 2 to be Filmed in 
Clearwater, RICK SCOTT (July 26, 2013), http://www.flgov.com/governor-rick-scott-
announces-dolphin-tale-2-to-be-filmed-in-clearwater. 
336. Id. 
337. Id. 
338. Tomorrowland, is being filmed at the Tomorrowland attraction at Walt 
Disney World, Lake Buena Vista, Florida, as well as various locations around Titusville and 
New Smyrna Beach, Florida.  See, e.g., Anthony Breznican, Disney’s Mysterious ‘1952’ 
Movie Has a New Name . . . ‘Tomorrowland’–Exclusive, ENT. WKLY. (Jan. 28, 2013, 3:15 
PM), http://insidemovies.ew.com/2013/01/28/disneys-1952-is-tomorrowland/; Mike Fleming, 
‘Lost’s Damon Lindelof Makes 7–Figure Disney Deal to Write Secret Sci-Fi Feature, 
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As this multi-billion dollar relationship continues into its second 
century, with over 120 films and television shows and counting,
339
 
filmmakers and Floridians can look forward to many more success stories—
especially if they focus on diligent collaboration, economic incentives, and 
absolutely any tale about a bottlenose dolphin.
340
 
                                                                                                                   
DEADLINE HOLLYWOOD (June 9, 2011, 11:43 AM), http://www.deadline.com/2011/06/losts-
damon-lindelof-makes-7-figure-disney-deal-to-write-secret-sci-fi-feature/; Eugene Garcia, Is 
‘Tomorrowland’ Movie Tied to Disneyland Area?, ORANGE COUNTY REG. (Jan. 28, 2013), 
http://www.ocregister.com/news/movie-409540-disney-tomorrowland.html; Tomorrowland—
Filming Locations, IMBD, http://www.imdb.com/title/tt1964418/locations?ref_=tt_dt_dt (last 
visited Jan. 18, 2014).  For those unfamiliar with the Delphinidae family by its Latin name, 
Bottlenose dolphins, the genus Tursiops, are the most common and well-known members of 
oceanic dolphins.  See Scientific Classification: Bottlenose Dolphins, SEAWORLD PARKS & 
ENT., http://seaworld.org/en/Animal-Info/Animal-InfoBooks/Bottlenose-Dolphins/Scientific-
Classification (last visited Jan. 18, 2014). 
339. See The Fla. Office of Film & Entm’t, Florida Entertainment Industry 
Financial Incentive Recipients, FILMINFLORIDA.COM, http://www.filminflorida.com/ifi/fir.asp 
(last visited Jan. 18, 2014); Films Made in Florida, WORLDWIDE GUIDE TO MOVIE LOCATIONS, 
http://www.movie-locations.com/places/usa/florida.html (last updated Oct. 2, 2013).  This has 
been an incomplete and non-exclusive chronicling of movies and television shows in Florida.  
Films Made in Florida, supra note 339.  For more resources for cinephiles to explore noted 
movies, television shows, and more, see ‘Chu and Blossom’ Needs Extras in Largo, FL This 
Weekend, supra note 235, and see J.A. Jones, Florida on Film, FLORIDA MOVIES, SPRING 
2013, http://faculty.scf.edu/jonesj/hum2230/FLORIDAMOVIES.html#pre, and Pictures: 
 Movies Filmed in Orlando, Orlando Sentinel, October 11, 2013, http://
www.orlandosentinel.com/entertainment/movies/os-movies-filmed-in-orlando-
pictures,0,6105676.photogallery.  For information on the sixty-two film festivals in Florida, 
and counting, see, e.g., Film Festivals, filminflorida.com, 2014, http://www.filminflorida.com/
wh/ff.asp. 
340. See FLA. H.R. COMM. ON TOURISM, supra note 296, at ii; Flipper Dolphin, 
supra note 121. 
89
: Nova Law Review 38, #1
Published by NSUWorks, 2013
2013 SURVEY OF JUVENILE LAW 
MICHAEL J. DALE
*
 
 
I. INTRODUCTION ................................................................................. 81 
II. DEPENDENCY ................................................................................... 82 
III. TERMINATION OF PARENTAL RIGHTS .............................................. 86 
IV. JUVENILE DELINQUENCY ................................................................. 89 
V. CONCLUSION .................................................................................... 99 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The Supreme Court of Florida decided three cases this past year 
involving juveniles, all in the delinquency field involving significant but 
technical matters.
1
  In the first case, the court held that it was necessary to prove 
that a school police officer was the designee of the school principal in order for a 
juvenile to be adjudicated for committing trespass on school grounds.
2
  In the 
second case, the court held, over a dissent, that a juvenile who committed several 
acts of indirect criminal contempt could be sentenced to consecutive periods of 
secure detention for each of the two offenses,
3
 thus resolving a conflict in the 
district courts of appeal.
4
 In the third case, the court held that a juvenile detention 
center falls within the criminal law definition of a detention facility.
5
 
The intermediate appellate courts were quite busy in the juvenile 
delinquency field, deciding both important issues and also reversing regretful 
fundamental errors by the trial courts.
6
  In the dependency and termination of 
parental rights (“TPR”) field, the appellate courts were less busy, but 
                                                 
* Professor of Law, Nova Southeastern University, Shepard Broad Law Center.  This 
survey covers cases decided during the period from July 1, 2012 through June 30, 2013.  The 
author thanks law librarian Robert Beharriell, Esq. for his help in the preparation of this survey. 
1. J.M. v. Gargett (J.M. II), 101 So. 3d 352, 355 (Fla. 2012) (per curiam); 
Hopkins v. State (Hopkins II), 105 So. 3d 470, 471 (Fla. 2012); J.R. v. State, 99 So. 3d 427, 427–
28 (Fla. 2012) (per curiam). 
2. J.R., 99 So. 3d at 428. 
3. Compare J.M. II, 101 So. 3d at 356, with J.M. II, 101 So. 3d at 357 
(Quince, J., dissenting). 
4. J.M. II, 101 So. 3d at 353, 357.  Compare J.M. v. Gargett (J.M. I), 53 So. 3d 
1245, 1248 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App.), review granted, 58 So. 3d 260 (Fla. 2011), (unpublished 
table decision), aff’d, 101 So. 3d 352 (Fla. 2012) (per curiam), with M.P. v. State, 988 So. 2d 
1266, 1267 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 2008). 
5. Hopkins II, 105 So. 3d at 471. 
6. P.R. v. State, 97 So. 3d 980, 981, 985 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2012); G.G. v. 
State, 84 So. 3d 1162, 1163–64 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2012). 
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nonetheless, decided several important cases.
7
  And again, some of the opinions 
involved rudimentary trial court error.
8
 
II. DEPENDENCY 
Issues regarding non-offending parents come up regularly in the 
appellate decisions in Florida, including issues of due process.
9
  In A.S. v. 
Department of Children & Family Services (In re Interest of E.G-S.),
10
 a 
dependency petition was filed against a mother who was divorced and in which 
the petitioner made no allegation against the father.
11
  After a trial on the 
petition, the court found the child dependent and ordered the child placed with 
the non-offending father, terminated its jurisdiction along with Department of 
Children and Families’ (“DCF” or “Department”) supervision.12  The mother 
based her appeal on a violation of her due process rights, resulting in the court’s 
termination of jurisdiction and supervision, without a hearing.
13
  The appellate 
court agreed.
14
  The mother was entitled to notice that the court would determine 
the child’s permanent placement at the dispositional hearing, and further that “a 
court may not place [the] child permanently with [the] non-offending parent 
when the offending parent is either in substantial compliance with [the] 
reunification . . . plan or the time for compliance has not expired.”15  The court 
then remanded for an “evidentiary hearing to determine whether allowing the 
case to remain pending while [the mother] complete[d] her case plan would be 
detrimental to the child’s interest, and . . . whether a preponderance of the 
evidence support[ed] changing the goal of [the] case plan” to custody for the 
father.
16
 
In F.O. v. Department of Children & Families,
17
 a father appealed an 
order after the adjudicatory hearing found no evidence that he abused, 
abandoned, or neglected the children, and entered the mother consent plea to the 
petition for dependency.
18
  The problem was that the trial court nonetheless 
                                                 
7. See infra Parts II, III. 
8. See id. 
9. See Michael J. Dale, 2011 Survey of Juvenile Law, 36 NOVA L. REV. 179, 180 
(2011) [hereinafter Dale, 2011 Survey of Juvenile Law]. 
10. 113 So. 3d 77 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2013). 
11. Id. at 78. 
12. Id. 
13. Id. at 79–80. 
14. Id. at 80. 
15. In re Interest of E.GS., 113 So. 3d at 79. 
16. Id. at 80. 
17. 94 So. 3d 709 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 2012). 
18. Id. at 709–10. 
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ordered the father to participate in the case plan.
19
  Relying upon two earlier 
intermediate appellate court decisions, but without any discussion, the appellate 
court held that even when the parent had not been found to have abused, 
neglected, or abandoned the child at issue, the parent could be ordered to 
participate in the case plan.
20
 
In M.P. v. Department of Children & Family Services (In re Interest of 
T.B. & T.P.),
21
 the issue was whether temporary legal custody could be shared 
with DCF in a case where the dependency adjudication by consent was made as 
to the father, but an order of dependency was withheld as to the mother, except 
for the case plan for the children.
22
  In its order, the trial court determined that 
remaining in the mother’s custody, with protective supervision, was in the best 
interests of the children.
23
  However, the order also determined that the mother 
“share temporary physical custody of the children” with the DCF.24  Given the 
trial court’s grant of legal custody of the children to the mother, it was reversible 
error to also order temporary physical custody of the children to the 
Department.
25
 
Once parents have completed tasks assigned to them pursuant to a case 
plan after a finding of or consent to dependency, they may seek reunification 
with their children.
26
  However, a trial court must determine if the parents 
“compli[ed] with the case plan” and if “reunification [is] detrimental to the 
child” before considering an order of reunification.27  In addition, “[t]he court is 
also [obligated] to make written . . . findings as to the six statutory factors.”28  In 
Department of Children & Families v. W.H.,
29
 the trial court failed to make 
findings on a number of the statutory factors.
30
  Nor was there competent 
evidence in support of finding the factors; DCF did not have notice that a 
hearing may result in the possibility of reunification, and no evidence of the issue 
                                                 
19. Id. at 710. 
20. Id. 
21. 107 So. 3d 515 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2013). 
22. Id. at 516. 
23. Id. 
24. Id. 
25. Id. at 516–17. 
26. FLA. STAT. § 39.522(2) (2013); see also id. §§ .521(d)(9), .6011(1). 
27. Id. § 39.522(2); Dep’t of Children & Families v. W.H., 109 So. 3d 1269, 
1270 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 2013) (per curiam) (quoting C.D. v. Dep’t of Children & Families, 
974 So. 2d 495, 500 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 2008)). 
28. FLA. STAT. § 39.621(10); W.H., 109 So. 3d at 1270. 
29. 109 So. 3d 1269 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 2013) (per curiam). 
30. Id. at 1270. 
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was presented at trial.
31
  The appellate court reversed given the absence of both 
notice and “an evidentiary hearing on reunification.”32 
In State Department of Children & Families v. B.D.,
33
 the trial court 
adjudicated the child dependent and placed the child with her maternal cousin as 
permanent guardian.
34
  Subsequently, the mother’s motion was granted and DCF 
was ordered to reinstate protective supervision, “without scheduling or holding 
an evidentiary hearing or setting out specific findings of fact.”35  From that order, 
the Department sought certiorari.
36
  The appellate court issued a writ quashing 
the trial court’s order.37  The appellate court opined that the trial court order 
departed from the essential requirements of law as it “failed to make specific, 
required findings of fact addressing the child’s best interest[s], stating the 
circumstances that caused the . . . dependency, and explaining [why the] 
circumstances [were] resolved.”38  The appellate court then added: 
“Time is of the essence for . . . children in [a] dependency 
system.” . . . [T]he court’s failure to comply with the express 
requirements of the law significantly disrupts what was supposed to 
be a permanent guardianship, leav[ing] the child’s status in a 
continuing state of uncertainty, subject[ing] the child to [a] risk of 
harm, and requir[ing] immediate relief that cannot be provided at 
some uncertain future time on plenary appeal.
39
 
In a third case, a mother appealed from an order granting the state’s 
motion for reunification with her two children, closing the case as to a third 
child, and placing that third child with the father.
40
  The appellate court held, 
quite simply, that an evidentiary hearing must be held where there are disputed 
facts concerning the “detriment to the child,” allowing an offending parent to 
contest the issue.
41
  As “the [trial] court made findings of fact without 
conducting an evidentiary hearing,” this was a reversible error.42 
                                                 
31. Id. 
32. Id. 
33. 102 So. 3d 707 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 2012). 
34. Id. at 708. 
35. Id. 
36. Id. 
37. Id. 
38. B.D., 102 So. 3d at 710. 
39. Id. at 711 (citation omitted) (quoting FLA. STAT. § 39.621(1) (2013)). 
40. B.W. v. Dep't of Children & Families, 114 So. 3d 243, 244 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. 
App. 2013) (per curiam). 
41. Id. at 249. 
42. Id. 
93
: Nova Law Review 38, #1
Published by NSUWorks, 2013
2013] 2013 SURVEY OF JUVENILE LAW 85 
For over two decades, the Florida courts have dealt with dependency 
determinations based upon prospective neglect.
43
  In the leading case, Padgett v. 
Department of Health & Rehabilitative Services,
44
 the Supreme Court of Florida 
held that in order to make a finding of prospective neglect, there must be “a 
nexus between the parent’s problem and the potential for future neglect.”45  The 
issue arose again in J.V. v. Department of Children & Family Services (In re 
Interest of J.J.V.).
46
  In that case, a father appealed an order adjudicating his son 
dependent.
47
  The basis for the petition to adjudicate the child dependent was 
that the father was a danger to the son because the father was a member of the 
Bloods gang; the police officer testified that the father’s gang involvement was 
proven by his numerous tattoos.
48
  The twenty-three year old father obtained 
some of the tattoos as a teenager.
49
  Both the DCF and the Guardian Ad Litem 
(“GAL”) Program conceded error, and the appellate court recognized that while 
tattoos may indicate previous gang association, there was nothing to indicate his 
involvement in any criminal activity since he was released from prison two years 
earlier; further, all other testimony was that he “had been . . . diligent in visiting 
his son and offering financial support.”50 
Finally, in a case of first impression, perhaps nationally, in R.L.R. v. 
State,
51
 a seventeen-year-old minor in a dependency case sought a writ of 
mandamus to compel a reversal of the trial court’s order, “directing the [child’s] 
Attorneys Ad Litem [(“AAL”)] to disclose the [child’s] whereabouts,” to whom 
the child had formerly provided this information and requested that it not be 
shared.
52
  The trial court “recognize[d] the attorney-client privilege, but [found] 
the disclosure [was] required ‘for the proper administration of justice.’”53  
Finding no exception to the attorney-client privilege that would support the trial 
                                                 
43. See 1 MICHAEL J. DALE ET AL., REPRESENTING THE CHILD CLIENT ¶ 4.14(4)(d) 
(2013); Dale, 2011 Survey of Juvenile Law, supra note 9, at 182; Michael J. Dale, 2004 Survey of 
Florida Juvenile Law, 29 NOVA L. REV. 397, 413 (2005). 
44. 577 So. 2d 565 (Fla. 1991). 
45. See id. at 568, 571; see also S.T. v. Dep’t of Children & Family Servs. (In re 
Interest of K.C. & D.C.), 87 So. 3d 827, 833–34 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2012); R.M. v. Dep’t of 
Children & Family Servs. (In re Interest of J.B.), 40 So. 3d 917, 918 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2010) 
(citing N.D. v. Dep’t of Children & Family Servs. (In re Interest of T.B.), 939 So. 2d 1192, 1194 
(Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2006)). 
46. 99 So. 3d 578, 579 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2012). 
47. Id. at 578. 
48. Id. at 579. 
49. Id. 
50. Id. at 578, 580. 
51. 116 So. 3d 570 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 2013). 
52. Id. at 571, 572 n.2. 
53. Id. at 571. 
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court’s order to disclose, the appellate court reversed.54  In doing so, it relied in 
part on the brief of amicus curiae the Florida Association of Counsel for 
Children, the Juvenile Law Center of Philadelphia, the National Association of 
Counsel for Children, and the Youth Law Center of San Francisco
55
 for the 
proposition that any exceptions to the lawyer-client privilege in certain lower 
court cases were inapposite.
56
  Finally, the appellate court recognized that 
“[c]ourts and legislatures in other jurisdictions have recognized and enforced the 
attorney-client privilege in dependency proceedings.”57 
III. TERMINATION OF PARENTAL RIGHTS 
Just as parents are statutorily entitled to counsel in dependency 
proceedings in Florida by statute, they are entitled to counsel in TPR proceedings 
as a matter of constitutional right.
58
  The same court in Miami that failed to 
provide counsel in a dependency case in G.W. v. Department of Children & 
Families
59
 during the course of a staccato-case shelter hearing—as discussed in 
last year’s survey article60—was reversed in F.M. v. State Department of 
Children & Families,
61
 when it defaulted a father in a termination of parental 
rights case when he failed to appear personally, although he appeared 
telephonically at the advisory hearing.
62
  At that hearing, as quoted by the 
appellate court, both the mother and father appeared by telephone.
63
  “When the 
judge discovered the father was appearing telephonically, the following brief 
exchange took place”: 
The Court [calling]:  Well that [is] not good enough.  You’re 
supposed to be here. 
The Father [calling]:  I could [not] afford it. 
The Court [calling]:  Well, that [is] really too bad. 
DCF [calling]:  How is he on the phone? 
                                                 
54. Id. at 573–74. 
55. Brief on file with the Nova Law Review. 
56. R.L.R., 116 So. 3d at 571, 573 n.5. 
57. Id. at 574 n.8. 
58. In re Interest of D.B. & D.S., 385 So. 2d 83, 87 (Fla. 1980); Dale, 2011 
Survey of Juvenile Law, supra note 9, at 179. 
59. 92 So. 3d 307 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 2012). 
60. Michael J. Dale, 2012 Survey of Florida Juvenile Law, 37 NOVA L. REV. 333, 
334 (2013) [hereinafter Dale, 2012 Survey of Juvenile Law]. 
61. 95 So. 3d 378 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 2012). 
62. Id. at 382–83. 
63. Id. at 380. 
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The Court [calling]:  Okay, so go ahead. 
Counsel for the mother:  With the mother? 
DCF [calling]:  No, that [is the father].  Judge, well, [the father] is 
present via phone.  There is publication.  His attorney over there [in 
Louisiana] was noticed to be present. 
The Court [calling]:  He is not present.  I am granting the termination 
of parental rights and closing the case.  Mr. M. has no contact with 
his children. 
. . . . 
The Court [calling]:  . . . Well, he [is] not here, and a default has been 
issued.  Mr. M., your parental rights have been terminated and you 
have no contact whatsoever with these children.
64 
Citing prior case law to the effect that the “‘termination of parental 
rights [ought] never be determined on a default basis or by gotcha practices 
when [the] parent makes a reasonable [attempt] to be present at [the] hearing and 
is delayed by circumstances beyond [that parent’s] control,’” the appellate court 
reversed the termination of parental rights.
65
 
The issue of whether parental rights can be terminated based upon the 
abuse of a sibling or another child in the family, is predicated upon a showing of 
a totality of the circumstances surrounding the current petition by applying the 
Padgett nexus test.
66
  The issue before the Fourth District Court of Appeal in 
A.J. v. Department of Children & Families
67
 was whether a father’s parental 
rights to five children should be terminated because, while there was proof of 
sexual abuse as to two daughters, the record did not provide support for a finding 
harm or a risk of harm with regard to their two brothers.
68
  While there was 
evidence of mental health problems with the two boys, it was unclear if the 
issues stemmed from the domestic abuse.
69
  On that basis, the appellate court 
reversed as to the brothers.
70
 
                                                 
64. Id. at 380–81 (alteration in original). 
65. Id. at 381, 382–83 (quoting B.H. v. Dep’t of Children & Families, 882 So. 2d 
1099, 1100 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2004)). 
66. Padgett v. Dep’t of Health & Rehabilitative Servs., 577 So. 2d 565, 571 (Fla. 
1991). 
67. 97 So. 3d 985 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2012) (per curiam). 
68. Id. at 986. 
69. Id. at 987–88. 
70. Id. at 986. 
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In G.O. v. Department of Children & Families,
71
 the appellate court 
reversed as a matter of statutory construction because the general magistrate who 
presided over the advisory hearing found that the parents gave constructive 
consent for TPR by not appearing, and later allowed the guardian ad litem to 
testify as to the child’s best interest.72  The trial court signed an order that 
conformed to the general magistrate recommendation for TPR.
73
  Under Florida 
law, general magistrates are prohibited from presiding over advisory hearings.
74
  
The hearing at which the guardian ad litem testified “was an adjudicatory 
hearing on the petition for [TPR].”75  The appellate court reversed, since the 
proper court presiding over the adjudicatory hearing should have been the trial 
court.
76
 
The rights of putative fathers in TPR and adoption cases are limited in 
Florida by statute.
77
  In only one case, Heart of Adoptions, Inc. v. J.A.,
78
 has the 
Supreme Court of Florida addressed the constitutionality of the adoption statute 
as it relates to putative fathers.
79
  In S.C. v. Gift of Life Adoptions,
80
 an adoption 
agency filed a petition to terminate a father’s parental rights as a precursor to an 
adoption involving a biological mother who intended to place the child up for 
adoption with the agency.
81
  The appellate court affirmed and granted the 
petition to terminate the putative father’s parental rights, but avoided any 
constitutional claim, finding that there was abandonment, which independently 
supported the granting of the petition.
82
  The father had argued that he was not 
appointed counsel in a timely fashion “until the first hearing on the petition.”83  
The court did recognize “that the filing requirements [were] very technical and 
might be a challenge to the nonlawyer biological father,”84 and in his 
concurrence, Judge Davis expressed his concern that unwed biological fathers 
                                                 
71. 100 So. 3d 232 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 2012). 
72. Id. at 233. 
73. Id. 
74. FLA. R. JUV. P. 8.257(h); G.O., 100 So. 3d at 233. 
75. G.O., 100 So. 3d at 233. 
76. Id. 
77. FLA. STAT. §§ 63.053(1), .054(1) (2013). 
78. 963 So. 2d 189 (Fla. 2007). 
79. Id. at 191.  See Michael J. Dale, 2007–2008 Survey of Juvenile Law, 33 
NOVA L. REV. 357, 388 (2009) [hereinafter Dale, 2007–2008 Survey of Juvenile Law] for a 
discussion of the possible constitutional infirmities in the Florida law. 
80. 100 So. 3d 774 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2012) (per curiam). 
81. Id. at 774–75. 
82. Id. at 775. 
83. Id. 
84. Id. 
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should be entitled to all the due process rights of other parties, including the right 
to counsel.
85
 
IV. JUVENILE DELINQUENCY 
The question of how indirect criminal contempt applies in juvenile 
delinquency cases was before the Supreme Court of Florida in J.M. v. Gargett 
(J.M. II).
86
  The specific issue was whether, when an adjudicated delinquent 
violates a single probation order on multiple occasions, that juvenile may be held 
in contempt and placed in a secure detention facility for consecutive periods.
87
  
In the case at bar, the juvenile was placed on probation and was held in indirect 
criminal contempt as a result of violating curfew, as well as violation of a second 
order to obey household rules.
88
  The juvenile was placed in secure detention for 
both offenses; five days for the first offense and fifteen days for the second.
89
  
Specifically, after the first period was satisfied, the second period began.
90
  The 
Supreme Court of Florida—recognizing a split in opinions between the Second 
and Fifth District Courts of Appeal—held that the consecutive sentences could 
properly be instituted.
91
  Justices Quince and Pariente dissented on the grounds 
that there was “only a single act of indirect contempt” under the Florida 
dependency statute.
92
 
In the second case before the Supreme Court of Florida this year, the 
issue involved a school-related matter.
93
  Juveniles are often the subject of 
delinquency cases that arise out of events which occur at school.
94
  The issue in 
J.R. v. State
95
 was whether a juvenile could be found to have committed a 
trespass on school grounds without evidence that the juvenile had formerly been 
warned by the school principal’s designee for trespassing.96  The Supreme Court 
                                                 
85. S.C., 100 So. 3d at 776 (Davis, J., concurring). 
86. 101 So. 3d 352, 353 (Fla. 2012) (per curiam). 
87. Id. at 355. 
88. Id. at 353. 
89. Id. 
90. Id. at 353–54. 
91. J.M. II, 101 So. 3d at 356–57.  Compare J.M. I, 53 So. 3d 1245, 1247 (Fla. 
2d Dist. Ct. App.), review granted, 58 So. 3d 260 (Fla. 2011) (unpublished table decision), aff’d, 
101 So. 3d 352 (Fla. 2012) (per curiam), with M.P. v. State, 988 So. 2d 1266, 1267 (Fla. 5th Dist. 
Ct. App. 2008). 
92. J.M. II, 101 So. 3d at 357 (Quince, J., dissenting). 
93. J.R. v. State, 99 So. 3d 427, 427 (Fla. 2012) (per curiam). 
94. See 2 MICHAEL J. DALE ET AL., REPRESENTING THE CHILD CLIENT ¶ 10.07(1) 
(2013). 
95. 99 So. 3d 427 (Fla. 2012) (per curiam). 
96. Id. at 427 (citing D.J. v. State, 43 So. 3d 176, 177 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App.), 
review granted, 47 So. 3d 1287 (Fla. 2010) (unpublished table decision), and quashed, 67 So. 3d 
98
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of Florida held that the failure to present evidence at trial that the individuals 
who warned the child were designees of the school’s principal was reversible 
error.
97
  In addition, the Supreme Court of Florida held that the trial court failed 
to properly comply with the conditions for taking judicial notice under Florida’s 
rules of evidence.
98
 
The third case in the Supreme Court of Florida was Hopkins v. State 
(Hopkins II),
99
 in which the court decided the question of whether a detainee’s 
act of battery at a juvenile detention center, and charged with battery falls under 
Florida’s criminal law within this setting.100  Resolving a question of conflict 
between the First and Fourth District Courts of Appeal—as a matter of statutory 
construction—the court found that a detention center does qualify as a detention 
facility for purposes of the criminal law.
101
 
In what would seem like a simple proposition, juvenile court jurisdiction 
over a subject child in delinquency ends at age nineteen.
102
  In State v. E.I.,
103
 the 
appellate court—in a one-paragraph opinion—dismissed the State’s appeal as 
moot, as the juvenile had reached his nineteenth birthday.
104
  However, the court 
explained that the trial court was correct and that its jurisdiction ends over any 
child at any time after the juvenile’s nineteenth birthday, “[u]nless [the] child is 
already under commitment, in a transition program, or subject to a restitution 
order.”105 
The rules concerning a determination of whether a juvenile is 
incompetent to proceed in a delinquency case are quite clear.
106
  Among them is 
the provision that the court must base its competency determination on the 
evaluation of at least “two . . . experts appointed by the court.”107  In State v. 
D.V.,
108
 following an unauthorized absence, the juvenile was charged with 
threatening school personnel.
109
  The juvenile allegedly slapped another student 
                                                                                                                   
1029 (Fla. 2011)). 
97. Id. at 430. 
98. Id.; see also FLA. STAT. § 90.201(1) (2013). 
99. 105 So. 3d 470 (Fla. 2012). 
100. Id. at 471. 
101. Id.; see also State v. Hopkins (Hopkins I), 47 So. 3d 974, 975 (Fla. 4th Dist. 
Ct. App. 2010), review granted, 63 So. 3d 749 (Fla. 2011) (unpublished table decision), aff’d, 
105 So. 3d 470 (Fla. 2012); T.C. v. State, 852 So. 2d 276, 276 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 2003) (per 
curiam). 
102. FLA. STAT. § 985.0301(5)(a). 
103. 114 So. 3d 309 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2013) (per curiam). 
104. Id. at 310. 
105. Id. 
106. See FLA. STAT. § 985.19. 
107. Id. § 985.19(1)(b). 
108. 111 So. 3d 234 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2013). 
109. Id. at 235. 
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seven weeks later.
110
  Formerly, the juvenile had been adjudicated incompetent 
to proceed after allegations were raised with respect to the commission other 
crimes.
111
  The first expert appointed by the court evaluated the mental condition 
of the child and “determined that [the child] was not competent to proceed.”112  
The court did not appoint a second expert, relying upon an earlier report from an 
expert who had been appointed by the Department of Children and Families, on 
the grounds that one could save money in so doing.
113
  The appellate court 
reversed, finding that as a matter of statutory construction the trial court is 
required to base determinations of competency on the evaluations of at least two 
court-appointed experts.
114
  As the court only appointed one expert, reversal was 
required.
115
 
Issues of the suppression of inculpatory statements by juveniles have 
been the source of discussion in this survey on a number of occasions.
116
  In 
State v. M.R.,
117
 one of the issues on appeal was whether a statement that the 
juvenile—who was subsequently “charged in a petition for . . . possession with 
intent to sell, manufacture, or deliver cannabis within 1000 feet of a school”—
made in front of his mother and in the presence of a police officer could be 
suppressed.
118
  The police officer had called the mother, and when the mother 
arrived, the juvenile was sitting, handcuffed, in the rear of a police car in custody 
and in the presence of the officer.
119
  The child said to his mother that he did not 
wish to talk to her in the presence of a police “officer and that she . . . knew why 
he was selling marijuana.”120  In this case, the respondent child did not request to 
speak with the third person––his mother––but rather, it was the police officer 
that brought the mother to the scene.
121
  The court held that “these statements . . . 
were an exploitation of the initial illegality,” citing a prior District Court of 
Appeal case as distinguishable in Lundberg v. State.
122
 
This survey does not usually discuss evidentiary issues, as they are 
generic in nature and not necessarily specific to juvenile delinquency cases.  
                                                 
110. Id. 
111. Id. 
112. Id. at 235–36. 
113. D.V., 111 So. 3d at 236–37. 
114. Id. at 237. 
115. Id. 
116. See Michael J. Dale, 2010 Survey of Juvenile Law, 35 NOVA L. REV. 137, 151 
(2010); Dale, 2007–2008 Survey of Juvenile Law, supra note 79, at 384–85. 
117. 100 So. 3d 272 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 2012). 
118. Id. at 274, 279–80. 
119. Id. at 275, 280–81. 
120. Id. at 275. 
121. Id. at 275, 280–81. 
122. M.R., 100 So. 3d at 280–81 (citing Lundberg v. State, 918 So. 2d 444, 445 
(Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2006)). 
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However, on occasion, the issue is germane to juvenile delinquency law.
123
  In 
D.D.B. v. State,
124
 the State filed a delinquency petition alleging that the juvenile 
called “‘911 for the purpose of making a false alarm or complaint or reporting 
false information.’”125  In an adjudicatory hearing, “the State . . . introduce[d] an 
audio recording of [the] two calls purportedly made.”126  The problem was quite 
simple.
127
  The identification of the child’s voice on the recording required 
“authentication, [which] would also require . . . evidence, including [the fact] 
that the recording was of a telephone call received and handled by the 911 
system on the relevant date.”128  Since there was no such evidence under section 
90.901 of the Florida Evidence Code, the court was obligated to reverse.
129
 
The second evidentiary matter, also seemingly basic in nature, arose in 
K.A.A. v. State.
130
  In that case a juvenile was adjudicated delinquent for the 
unlawful possession of gun on school property.
131
  The trial court would not 
allow the respondent “to cross-examine the State’s juvenile witness about 
criminal charges pending against the witness.”132  Citing an earlier case to the 
effect that “‘[t]he right to cross-examine witnesses . . . outweighs the [interest of 
the State] in preserving the confidentiality of juvenile delinquency records,’”133 
the appellate court reversed.
134
  It ought to have been obvious that the 
prosecution witness’s credibility would be an issue.135 
It has been forty-six years since the Supreme Court of the United States 
ruled in In re Gault
136
 that children have the right to counsel in juvenile 
delinquency cases.
137
  In C.W. v. State,
138
 a juvenile appealed from an order 
adjudicating her as delinquent based upon a battery on a law enforcement 
officer.
139
  The issue was the court’s action in taking the case to trial in the 
                                                 
123. See, e.g., D.D.B. v. State, 109 So. 3d 1184, 1185 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 
2013). 
124. 109 So. 3d 1184 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2013). 
125. Id. at 1184. 
126. Id. at 1185. 
127. See id. 
128. Id. 
129. D.D.B., 109 So. 3d at 1185; see also FLA. STAT. § 90.901 (2013). 
130. 109 So. 3d 1175, 1176 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2013). 
131. Id. 
132. Id. 
133. Id. (quoting Tuell v. State, 905 So. 2d 929, 930 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 
2005)). 
134. Id. 
135. See K.A.A., 109 So. 3d at 1176. 
136. 387 U.S. 1 (1967). 
137. Id. at 41, 55. 
138. 93 So. 3d 514 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2012). 
139. Id. at 515. 
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absence of a lawyer for the child.
140
  At the child’s arraignment, the child 
indicated that she hired an attorney.
141
  The court asked if she was sure that she 
would have the attorney represent her, since the attorney had not yet filed any 
pleadings.
142
  On the date of trial, the child indicated that she was not sure where 
her attorney was, and the court said that it was going to trial.
143
  After the trial, 
but before the disposition, an attorney was hired and filed a motion for 
rehearing.
144
  Incredibly, the court denied the motion for rehearing, noting that 
the child ‘“did indeed have a fair trial.’”145  Citing to the Florida Rules of 
Juvenile Procedure which require notification of the right to counsel at each 
stage of the proceeding and—if the child chooses to waive counsel—conducting 
a thorough inquiry to determine if the waiver was freely and intelligently made, 
the appellate court reversed.
146
 
In Florida, determinations of whether an alleged juvenile delinquent is to 
be securely detained are based upon the use of a Risk Assessment Instrument 
(“RAI”).147  In J.L.B. v. Kelly,148 a juvenile petitioned for a writ of habeas 
corpus, challenging the validity of the detention during the course of the juvenile 
delinquency proceeding.
149
  Although he was released from detention while his 
writ was pending—and thus the matter was moot—the court on appeal ruled that 
“improper scoring of [a RAI] . . . is capable of repetition yet evading review,” 
and thus it resolved the issue.
150
  The claim involved impermissible double 
scoring.
151
  The trial court added points to the scoring process on the basis of two 
factors:  “[T]he high risk nature of [a] prior commitment and the circumstances 
of the current burglary offense.”152  The problem was that by doing so, the court 
impermissibly double-scored by acknowledging circumstances that had already 
been taken into account by the RAI, there was nothing in the State statute that 
would allow the court to do so.
153
 
                                                 
140. Id. 
141. Id. 
142. Id. 
143. C.W., 93 So. 3d at 515. 
144. Id. 
145. Id. 
146. Id. at 515–16 (quoting FLA. R. JUV. P. 8.165(a), (b)(2)). 
147. Dale, 2007–2008 Survey of Juvenile Law, supra note 79, at 380–81. 
148. 93 So. 3d 1137 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2012). 
149. Id. at 1138. 
150. Id. (citing T.T. v. Esteves, 828 So. 2d 449, 450 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 
2002)). 
151. Id. at 1139. 
152. Id. at 1138. 
153. J.L.B., 93 So. 3d at 1139 (citing FLA. STAT. § 985.24 (2013)). 
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The State charged a juvenile with felony criminal mischief—valued at 
$1000 or more—for $2600 of damage to an automobile.154  The auto body shop 
owner testified in support of the value of the damage, based on an employee’s 
estimate.
155
  The estimate was made in the regular course of business, but the 
estimate was never admitted into evidence.
156
  When the trial court refused to 
strike the oral testimony, trial counsel objected, and the matter in A.S. v. State
157
 
went up on appeal.
158
  The appellate court reversed on the basis of the Florida 
Rules of Evidence, specifically section 90.803(6), regarding the business records 
exception to hearsay.
159
  Here, the estimate itself would have qualified as a 
business record.
160
  “[H]owever, the testimony explaining the contents of the 
estimate,” where the estimate was not in evidence, did not fall within the 
exception.
161
  As a result, there was no competent proof of the underlying felony 
crime and the court reversed.
162
 
Restitution issues come up regularly at the dispositional stage of 
delinquency cases in Florida; issues also regularly discussed in this survey.
163
  A 
blatantly obvious reversal took place in X.G. v. State,
164
 where the juvenile 
appealed from the revocation of juvenile probation where the court’s basis for 
revocation and probation was the failure to pay restitution.
165
  The problem 
concerned a plea agreement, which stated that “no restitution would be ordered 
on the [underlying] charge.”166  Thus, the disposition order did not list restitution 
as a condition of probation.
167
 
In A.P. v. State,
168
 the issue was whether there was sufficient evidence to 
support a restitution order.
169
  The source of the evidence resulting in an order of 
$220 in restitution was the victim’s testimony, which was based upon the 
                                                 
154. A.S. v. State, 91 So. 3d 270, 271 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2012) (per curiam). 
155. Id. 
156. Id. 
157. 91 So. 3d 270 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2012) (per curiam). 
158. See id. at 271. 
159. Id.; see also FLA. STAT. § 90.803(6)(a) (2013) (amended by Act effective May 
30, 2013, ch. 2013-98, § 1, 2013 Fla. Laws 1, 1–2). 
160. A.S., 91 So. 3d at 271. 
161. Id. 
162. Id. 
163. Dale, 2012 Survey of Juvenile Law, supra note 60, at 346; Michael J. Dale, 
2009 Survey of Juvenile Law, 34 NOVA L. REV. 199, 216 (2009); Dale, 2007–2008 Survey of 
Juvenile Law, supra note 79, at 378. 
164. 106 So. 3d 90 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2013). 
165. Id. at 91. 
166. Id. at 90. 
167. Id. 
168. 114 So. 3d 393 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2013). 
169. Id. at 395. 
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replacement value of the item, and the source of the testimony was unknown.
170
  
Thus, according to the appellate court, the State failed to present competent 
substantial evidence of the item’s fair market value.171 
Among the requirements at the dispositional stage of the delinquency 
proceeding in Florida, is that the court strictly comply with the statutory 
provisions governing proper procedure at a juvenile disposition hearing.
172
  In 
K.P. v. State,
173
 while the court ordered a predisposition psychiatric evaluation of 
the child, the court entered a dispositional order before the psychiatric evaluation 
was available.
174
  That constituted failure to strictly comply with the statutory 
procedures, and the appellate court reversed.
175
  Similarly, at the dispositional 
stage, the trial court is obligated to prepare a written dispositional order that 
complies with its oral pronouncements.
176
  In L.D. v. State,
177
 the trial court 
failed to do so.
178
  It was conceded that the court’s written dispositional order 
was not consistent with its oral pronouncements.
179
  On the basis of the lower 
court’s failure to comply with the statutory obligations, the appellate court 
reversed.
180
 
Similarly, in R.V. v. State,
181
 the appellate court reversed the 
dispositional order of the trial court because there had been no articulation 
regarding why the dispositional alternative of a moderate risk commitment 
program is more appropriate than the Department of Juvenile Justice’s 
recommendation that the child’s rehabilitative needs should result in the least 
restrictive setting.
182
  The appellate court reversed, authorizing the “trial court 
[to] amend [its] disposition[al] order to include the required findings.”183 
Perhaps even harder to understand is the situation which required a 
reversal of a disposition in M.A.L. v. State.
184
  In that case, the trial court 
                                                 
170. Id. 
171. Id. 
172. K.P. v. State, 97 So. 3d 966, 967 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2012) (citing K.D. 
v. State, 911 So. 2d 885, 886 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 2005)); see also FLA. STAT. § 985.43(2) 
(2013). 
173. 97 So. 3d 966 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2012). 
174. Id. at 967. 
175. Id. 
176. L.D. v. State, 107 So. 3d 514, 515 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2013); see also 
FLA. STAT. § 985.43(2). 
177. 107 So. 3d 514 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2013). 
178. Id. at 515. 
179. Id. 
180. Id.; see also FLA. STAT. § 985.43(2). 
181. 107 So. 3d 535 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2013) (per curiam). 
182. Id. at 536. 
183. Id. 
184. 110 So. 3d 493, 495–96, 499 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2013). 
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conducted a dispositional hearing outside of the appellant and her father’s 
presence, in a sidebar.
185
  The juvenile “claim[ed] that [the] sidebar conference 
violated her due process rights to be present and meaningfully heard prior to the 
disposition.”186  Shockingly, the State argued that this was harmless error.187  The 
appellate court reversed, recognizing that the issue of disposition prior to 
determination, in noncompliance with the Florida statute governing how the 
hearing should be held, constituted fundamental error.
188
 
Under Florida law, there is a variety of dispositional alternatives in 
addition to restitution;
189
 such alternatives encompass placement in a various 
residential facilities, including those described as high-risk.
190
  In D.H. v. 
State,
191
 the trial court committed a youth to a high-risk facility for a 
misdemeanor offense in its dispositional order.
192
  Florida law limits the trial 
court’s commitment authority and placement of the juvenile misdemeanant in a 
high-risk facility.
193
  Thus, the most restrictive facility to which the child could 
be sent was a moderate-risk facility; therefore, the appellate court reversed.
194
 
In G.W. v. State,
195
 juveniles in three consolidated appeals challenged 
the constitutionality of a Florida Statute governing sentencing enhancement 
when the crime committed was against a school officer.
196
  The appeal was based 
on equal protection grounds and the appellants claimed that the statute created 
“‘an elite class of untouchables’” because of the additional protection provided 
by the law to school employees.
197
  Applying a rational basis equal protection 
test,
198
 the appellate court affirmed, finding no constitutional infirmity in the 
statute.
199
 
In two major cases decided over the past four years, the Supreme Court 
of the United States dealt with questions of appropriate punishment for 
                                                 
185. Id. at 495. 
186. Id. at 496. 
187. Id. 
188. Id. at 496, 499; see also FLA. STAT. § 985.433(4)(d) (2013). 
189. Compare FLA. STAT. § 985.437, with id. § 985.441. 
190. Id. § 985.441(1)(b); see also id. § 985.03(46). 
191. 114 So. 3d 496 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 2013). 
192. Id. at 497–98. 
193. Id. (quoting FLA. STAT. § 985.441(2)). 
194. Id. at 498. 
195. 106 So. 3d 83 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App.), review denied, 118 So. 3d 220 (Fla. 
2013) (unpublished table decision). 
196. Id. at 84; see also FLA. STAT. § 784.081(2). 
197. G.W., 106 So. 3d at 84. 
198. Id. at 85 (citing Hechtman v. Nations Title Ins. of N.Y., 840 So. 2d 993, 996 
(Fla. 2003)). 
199. Id. at 86; see also FLA. STAT. § 784.081(2). 
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individuals who were juveniles at the time they committed their crimes.
200
  In 
Roper v. Simmons,
201
 the Court held that the death penalty for individuals who 
committed criminal offenses while juveniles was unconstitutional in violation of 
the Eighth Amendment prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment.
202
  In 
Graham v. Florida,
203
 the Court held that life without the possibility of parole 
for a juvenile was also unconstitutional in a felony murder setting where the 
juvenile did not commit the homicide.
204
  Then, in Miller v. Alabama,
205
 the 
Court ruled that state sentencing statutes making life imprisonment without 
parole appropriately mandatory for juvenile non-homicide offenders also violated 
the Eighth Amendment prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment.
206
  In 
three intermediate appellate court opinions decided this past survey year, the 
courts dealt with the application of Graham and Miller to three juveniles tried as 
adults.
207
  The first case is Walling v. State.
208
  There, the defendant, who was 
sixteen at the time of the offense, was convicted of felony murder for 
participating in the planning of the robbery and supplying the gun, although he 
had been “waiting a few blocks away when the fatal shot was fired.”209  He was 
tried as an adult by a six-person jury.
210
  The appellate court held that under 
Roper, Graham, and Miller, the juvenile was not entitled to a twelve-person jury 
because the twelve-person jury is required when death is a possible penalty and 
that death no longer controls the question of a jury’s size when the case involves 
a juvenile.
211
 
In Reynolds v. State,
212
 the defendant had been found guilty by a jury 
and sentenced to life in prison on one count of robbery with a firearm in 2002.
213
 
 The appellate court vacated the sentence of life without parole under Graham.
214
 
                                                 
200. Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2017–18 (2010); Roper v. Simmons, 543 
U.S. 551, 555–56 (2005). 
201. 543 U.S. 551 (2005). 
202. See id. at 578. 
203. 130 S. Ct. 2011 (2010). 
204. Id. at 2034. 
205. 132 S. Ct 2455 (2012). 
206. Id. at 2475. 
207. See Reynolds v. State, 116 So. 3d 558, 559 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 2013); 
Young v. State, 110 So. 3d 931, 931–32 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App.), review denied, 2013 Fla. LEXIS 
2223 (Fla. Oct. 10, 2013); Walling v. State, 105 So. 3d 660, 661–62 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 
2013). 
208. 105 So. 3d 660, 660 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 2013). 
209. Id. at 661–62. 
210. Id. at 662. 
211. Id. 
212. 116 So. 3d 558 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 2013). 
213. Id. at 559. 
214. Id. 
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 The second issue before the court on remand was “‘the concept of aggregate 
sentencing on interdependent offenses, as it relates to [the] trial judge’s desire to 
effect the original sentencing plan.’”215  The appellate court held that there is no 
right to “‘modification, on remand after appeal, of [the] sentences on convictions 
[that were] not challenged on [the original] appeal.’”216  The appellate court 
further acknowledged the lack of legal decisions on point with this issue after the 
Supreme Court of the United States’ opinion in Graham, although it recognized 
general support for the proposition.
217
  Finally, as the court noted that it was not 
unconstitutional for a juvenile to receive a life sentence for a non-homicide 
crime.
218  Rather, it “is unconstitutional . . . for the State not to give [the] 
juvenile offender[] . . . ‘some meaningful opportunity to obtain release.’”219
 
In a third post-Graham decision, Young v. State,
220
 the juvenile was 
sentenced to four consecutive thirty-year sentences and then was resentenced 
pursuant to Graham.
221
  One of the issues the defendant raised on appeal was 
that the trial court violated Graham by “fail[ing] to consider [his] rehabilitation 
and newfound maturity.”222  The juvenile’s claim was that he was entitled to a 
hearing to prove his change in circumstances.
223
  The appellate court rejected this 
argument under Graham.
224
  Under the facts of the case, because the juvenile 
was sentenced to a term of thirty years in prison, after which he would be 
released, he did have a sentence that specifically provided for his eventual 
release.
225
  Therefore, Graham did not apply.
226
  Finally, the appellate court held 
that a resentencing hearing does not require the opportunity to review 
rehabilitation.
227
  On those bases, the court affirmed.
228
 
                                                 
215. Id. at 562 (quoting Fasenmyer v. State, 457 So. 2d 1361, 1366 (Fla. 1984)). 
216. Id. (quoting Fasenmyer, 457 So. 2d at 1366). 
217. Reynolds, 116 So. 3d at 562. 
218. Id. at 563. 
219. Id. (quoting Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2030 (2010)). 
220. 110 So. 3d 931 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App.), review denied, No. 5C13-929, 2013 
WL 5614109 (Fla. 2013). 
221. Id. at 931–32 (citing Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2034). 
222. Id. at 932. 
223. Id. 
224. Id. at 933. 
225. Young, 110 So. 3d at 934. 
226. Id. 
227. Id. 
228. Id. at 936. 
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V. CONCLUSION 
The Supreme Court of Florida decided three important technical matters 
in the delinquency field this past survey year.
229
  In dependency and termination 
of parental rights cases, the intermediate appellate courts decided a large number 
of cases, a number of which involved obvious and basic failures to comply with 
Chapter 39 by the trial courts.
230
  One case in particular, R.L.R. v. State, was 
particularly noteworthy, as it upheld the right of a juvenile to confidentiality with 
his volunteer AAL in a dependency case, over the objections of the GAL 
Program and the DCF.
231
 
                                                 
229. See J.M. II, 101 So. 3d 352, 353 (Fla. 2012) (per curiam); Hopkins II, 105 So. 
3d 470, 471 (Fla. 2012); J.R. v. State, 99 So. 3d 427, 430 (Fla. 2012) (per curiam). 
230. See, e.g., A.J. v. Dep’t of Children & Families, 97 So. 3d 985, 986–87 (Fla. 
4th Dist. Ct. App. 2012) (per curiam). 
231. R.L.R. v. State, 116 So. 3d 570, 574 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 2013). 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
The State of Florida is a leader in many respects.  Florida is number 
one in beaches;
1
 number one in tropical hurricanes
2
 and lightning strikes;
3
 
and at or near the top per capita in mishandling abandoned, abused, and 
neglected children.
4
  Florida actually spends more money on the 
                                                 
* Professor of Law, Nova Southeastern University Law School.  The author thanks 
research assistants Marisa Goldberg Wiggins, Joe H. Baldelomar, and Professor Michael Dale 
for their help in the preparation of this article. 
1. The Best Beach in America, Siesta Beach, DR. BEACH (2010), 
http://www.drbeach.org/top10beaches.htm. 
2. ERIC S. BLAKE ET AL., NAT’L OCEANIC & ATMOSPHERIC ADMIN., THE 
DEADLIEST, COSTLIEST, AND MOST INTENSE UNITED STATES TROPICAL CYCLONES FROM 1851 
TO 2004 (AND OTHER FREQUENTLY REQUESTED HURRICANE FACTS) 15–16 (2005), available at 
http://www.nhc.noaa.gov/pdf/NWS-TPC-4.pdf. 
3. Betsy Crisp, When Lightning Strikes, U. FLA. IFAS EXTENSION, 
http://pasco.ifas.ufl.edu/fcs/Lightning.shtml (last visited Nov. 10, 2013). 
4. See Sofia Santana, Report:  Florida Child Death Rate High, SUN-
SENTINEL, Oct. 21, 2009, at B.8; see also J. KATE STOWELL, THE POLICY GRP. FOR FLA.’S 
FAMILIES & CHILDREN, THE STATE OF FLORIDA’S CHILD: A REPORT FOR THE FLORIDA 
CHILDREN AND YOUTH CABINET 5 (2009), available at http://childrensmovementflorida.org/
issues/children/the_state_of_floridas_child_report.pdf; Nat’l Kids Count, Kids Count Overall 
Rank, KIDS COUNT DATA CTR., http://datacenter.kidscount.org/data/tables/7288-kids-count-
overall-rank?loc=11&loct=2#detailed/2/11/false/36,868/any/14344 (last updated June 2013). 
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incarceration of children than on the education of children.
5
  With tens of 
thousands of children in the dependency system in Florida every year, the 
legal system and child protective services system are stressed.
6
  One glaring 
weakness in the Florida process is that each dependent child is not provided a 
lawyer for representation, except in exceptional circumstances.
7
  Although a 
minority of states fail to provide a dependent child his or her own lawyer, in 
Florida, it is actually much worse.
8
  Take the following example. 
Billy is a fourteen-year-old ninth grade high school student.  Along 
with his ten-year-old brother, Stevie, Billy lives with his mother, Julie, and 
his stepfather, Dave, who have been married for seven years.  Billy’s 
biological father abandoned Billy, his mother, and little brother many years 
ago.  Billy, his mother, and little brother have had a hard life.  Billy’s 
mother, Julie, did not graduate high school and has never held a steady job.  
Until she met and married Dave, Julie regularly relied on government 
benefits to help feed, house, and clothe herself and her children. 
When Julie married Dave, things changed.  Dave is a carpenter 
who—until the recent downturn in the housing market—had steady work, 
made enough money for the family to buy a small house, and provided for 
the children.  With the downturn in the housing market, Dave began losing 
work.  The family struggled to pay the bills despite Dave’s best efforts to 
find work.  The financial pressure finally got to Dave and he began drinking 
more heavily.  Julie took a job at a fast food restaurant to try to help out.  
This resulted in many nights of Dave coming home late, drunk, and picking 
arguments with Julie.  These arguments got progressively worse when Dave 
started physically hitting Julie.  When Billy tried to stop Dave from striking 
Julie, Dave hit Billy too. 
This kind of physical violence continued for several months until 
one day, the high school physical education teacher noticed the bruising and 
                                                 
5. Education vs Prison Costs, CNN MONEY, http://www.money.cnn.com/
infographic/economy/education-vs-prison-costs/ (last visited Nov. 10, 2013). 
6. See FLA. GUARDIAN AD LITEM PROGRAM, FLORIDA GUARDIAN AD LITEM 
PROGRAM 2011 ANNUAL REPORT 1, 5, 7 (2011), available at http://www.guardianadlitem.org/
documents/GALAnnualReport2011.pdf. 
7. See FLA. R. JUV. P. 8.217(a)–(b); In re Interest of D.B. & D.S., 385 So. 2d 
83, 87 (Fla. 1980) (citing Potvin v. Keller, 313 So. 2d 703, 705–06 (Fla. 1975)); Michael J. 
Dale & Louis M. Reidenberg, Providing Attorneys for Children in Dependency and 
Termination of Parental Rights Proceedings in Florida:  The Issue Updated, 35 NOVA L. REV. 
305, 327–28 (2011). 
8. See CHILDREN’S ADVOCACY INST. ET AL., A CHILD’S RIGHT TO COUNSEL: A 
NATIONAL REPORT CARD ON LEGAL REPRESENTATION FOR ABUSED & NEGLECTED CHILDREN 
16, 18–20, 45–46 (3d ed. 2012), available at www.caichildlaw.org/Misc/3rd_Ed_
Childs_Right_to_Counsel.pdf. 
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scarring on Billy’s face, which could not have been from football or 
wrestling practice.  The high school teacher called child protective services 
to report what he saw.  Child protective services, after investigating—and 
over the objection of Billy—removed both Billy and Stevie from the home 
where Julie and Dave lived, and placed both boys in foster care. 
In the time period before the dependency court hearing, Billy, who 
was at best confused by what was happening, was approached by child 
protective service caseworkers.  Billy was told—and received a business card 
stating—that the lawyers representing the child protective services 
government agency were part of the “‘Law Firm for Florida’s Children.’”9  
Further, Billy received a visit from a guardian ad litem who told Billy that 
the Guardian Ad Litem Program (“GAL Program”) would represent Billy’s 
legal interests.  Billy has consistently maintained that he wants to go back 
home to be with his brother, his mother, and Dave, despite what Dave did to 
him and his mother.  Billy believed in his heart that the family, with help, 
could be together again.  Billy relied on the representations made by the 
child protective services’ caseworker and the guardian ad litem that Billy’s 
wish to reunite his family would be represented in court by both.  Billy, 
therefore, had no idea that he might want to hire a lawyer, or that he might 
need to hire a lawyer, or that it might be in his best interest to hire a lawyer.  
Billy thought he was covered. 
 Such, of course, is not the case in Florida specifically, nor in other 
states.
10
  The state government agency involved in child protective services, 
the Department of Children and Families (“DCF”) in Florida, is, in fact, the 
petitioner who brings a dependency petition on behalf of the state, and is not 
authorized to, and does not, act as the lawyer for an alleged dependent 
child.
11
  Further, in Florida, the guardian ad litem is a representative of the 
statewide GAL Program.
12
  The Florida GAL Program is a separate party to 
the dependency proceeding.
13
  Consequently, the GAL Program does not 
provide legal services or representation for an alleged dependent child.
14
  
Needless to say, Billy appeared in court without a lawyer and watched as 
both the DCF and the GAL Program advocated for Billy and Stevie to be 
permanently removed from their home with their mother and Dave.  No 
                                                 
9. See Dale & Reidenberg, supra note 7, at 334. 
10. See, e.g., CHILDREN’S ADVOCACY INST. ET AL., supra note 8, at 41, 45, 52. 
11. See FLA. STAT. §§ 39.01(21), .501(1) (2013); see also Dale & Reidenberg, 
supra note 7, at 327. 
12. FLA. STAT. § 39.820(1); Dale & Reidenberg, supra note 7, at 327, 331. 
13. See Dale & Reidenberg, supra note 7, at 334. 
14. Id. at 327; see also Statewide Guardian Ad Litem Office v. Office of State 
Att’y Twentieth Judicial Circuit, 55 So. 3d 747, 750 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2011). 
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lawyer advocated on behalf of Billy, and Billy was removed from his mother 
and stepfather’s home and separated from his younger brother Stevie. 
The purpose of this article is not to revisit the legal catastrophe that 
is Florida’s child protective services state agency and its GAL Program.15  It 
is clear that Florida’s DCF is systematically ineffective and the Florida GAL 
Program is legally impotent when it comes to providing legal representation 
for children in dependency proceedings.
16
  It has already been proven so!
17
  
Further, this article is not designed to call into question the unselfish 
commitment of so many volunteer guardian ad litems and others who act 
with good intentions to protect abandoned, abused, and neglected children in 
Florida.
18
  Rather, the purpose of this article is very different. 
The design of this article is to suggest that perhaps—using Florida as 
an example—one unexplored avenue to clean up and boost the effectiveness 
of the government agencies involved in the dependency process is to first 
require that these agencies not unfairly or deceptively lure unsuspecting 
children into believing that their legal rights are in any way protected in a 
dependency proceeding by these government agencies.
19
 
Therefore, this article begins with examining whether or not state 
agencies—in particular the child protective services state agencies—can be 
subject to prosecution under state unfair and deceptive trade practice 
statutes.
20
  The first part of this article will outline the fundamental concepts 
that define a cause of action for an unfair or deceptive trade practice.
21
  Next, 
this article will examine whether such state consumer protection laws have 
ever been applied to government entities and activities.
22
  Then, this article 
will analyze if an alleged dependent child could successfully maintain a 
cause of action for an unfair or deceptive trade practice against these child 
protective services government agencies when the state agencies 
                                                 
15. See Dale & Reidenberg, supra note 7, at 334–35. 
16. Michael J. Dale, Providing Counsel to Children in Dependency 
Proceedings in Florida, 25 NOVA L. REV. 769, 773 (2001); Dale & Reidenberg, supra note 7, 
at 334; see also Statewide Guardian Ad Litem Office, 55 So. 3d at 750. 
17. See FLA. GUARDIAN AD LITEM PROGRAM, supra note 6, at 5. 
18. See Dale & Reidenberg, supra note 7, at 327–28.  There are roughly 9600 
volunteer guardian ad litems in Florida who must be applauded for their service.  Volunteer, 
Frequently Asked Questions, FLA. GUARDIAN AD LITEM PROGRAM, http://
www.guardianadlitem.org/vol_faq.asp (last visited Nov. 10, 2013). 
19. See infra Part IV. 
20. See infra Part II. 
21. Id. 
22. See infra Part III. 
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misrepresent their role in the dependency process.
23
  Finally, this article will 
conclude by outlining how the seemingly inapplicable state unfair and 
deceptive trade practice statutes may be used to protect dependent children.
24
 
II. STATE UNFAIR AND DECEPTIVE TRADE PRACTICE STATUTES 
“All fifty states . . . have enacted at least one statute” designed to 
protect consumers from deceptive or unfair trade practices.
25
  In most states, 
the Unfair and Deceptive Acts and Practices (“UDAP”) statutes 
unambiguously provide for a private right of action against a person or entity 
that commits unfair or deceptive trade practices.
26
  These UDAP statutes 
routinely advise that great weight and due deference be given to the Federal 
Trade Commission (“FTC”) and the federal courts’ interpretation of the FTC 
Act as to what comprises an unfair or deceptive practice.
27
  This deference to 
the FTC and the federal courts is designed to aid state courts in establishing 
their own judicial determination of what kind of conduct amounts to an 
unfair or deceptive trade practice.
28
 
The FTC Act, the FTC guidelines and policy statements, and the 
federal courts broadly define and construe what is an unfair or deceptive 
trade practice.
29
  For example, there is federal court precedent backed by 
FTC policy statements that defines a deceptive trade practice as any act or 
practice that has the tendency or capacity to deceive.
30
  The most recent FTC 
policy statement on deceptive trade practices—which has been adopted by 
some federal and state courts—defines a deceptive trade practice as any act 
or “practice that . . . is likely to [deceive] consumers acting reasonably under 
                                                 
23. See infra Part IV. 
24. See infra Part V. 
25. CAROLYN L. CARTER & JONATHAN SHELDON, UNFAIR AND DECEPTIVE 
ACTS AND PRACTICES 1 (8th ed. 2012). 
26. Id. at 722. 
27. Id. at 197; see also 15 U.S.C. § 45(n) (2012) (containing a broad and 
general definition). 
28. CARTER & SHELDON, supra note 25, at 197–98.  Because the FTC Act 
does not provide for a private right of action, it can only be interpreted to evidence “what 
conduct is prohibited by [the] state UDAP statute[s].”  Id. at 197. 
29. 15 U.S.C. § 45(n); Charles of the Ritz Distribs. Corp. v. FTC, 143 F.2d 
676, 680 (2d Cir. 1944); In re Cliffdale Assocs., 103 F.T.C. 110, 164–65 (1984); Letter from 
James C. Miller III, Chairman, Fed. Trade Comm’n, to John D. Dingell, Chairman, Comm. on 
Energy & Commerce, United States House of Representatives (Oct. 14, 1983), available at 
http://www.ftc.gov/bcp/policystmt/ad-decept.htm. 
30. Charles of the Ritz Distribs. Corp., 143 F.2d at 680. 
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the circumstances.”31  Regardless of which standard a federal or state court 
chooses to adopt, neither standard requires proof of intent, negligence, fraud, 
or even actual deception to make out a prima facie case.
32
  In sum, proof of a 
deceptive trade practice focuses on the act or practice, and whether such act 
or practice might mislead or deceive a person.
33
  This is similar to the 
definition and interpretation of what constitutes an unfair trade practice.
34
 
The federal courts, including the Supreme Court of the United 
States, have defined and construed an unfair trade practice to include an act 
or practice that “offends established public policy and . . . is immoral, 
unethical, oppressive, unscrupulous, or . . . injurious to consumers.”35  In 
particular, the Court endorsed such a broad and sweeping definition of an 
unfair trade practice because it noted that “‘[t]here is no [end] to human 
inventiveness’” for those who choose to treat people unfairly.36  Further, just 
like with deceptive trade practices, the federal courts and the FTC do not 
require proof of intent, negligence, fraud, or actual deception for an act or 
practice to be considered unfair.
37
 
The most recent version of the FTC Act and the FTC policy 
statements—adopted in some federal and state courts—revised the definition 
of an unfair trade practice.
38
  In particular, the revised definition of an unfair 
                                                 
31. In re Cliffdale Assocs., 103 F.T.C. at 164–65; see also FTC v. Colgate-
Palmolive Co., 380 U.S. 374, 386–87 (1965) (holding that “misrepresentation of any fact 
which would constitute a material factor in a purchaser’s decision whether to buy” will be 
deemed a deceptive trade practice); Letter from James C. Miller III, supra note 29. 
32. Orkin Exterminating Co. v. FTC, 849 F.2d 1354, 1368 (11th Cir. 1988) 
(concluding that proof of deceptive intent is unnecessary); Grove v. Huffman, 634 N.E.2d 
1184, 1188 (Ill. App. Ct. 1994) (quoting Connor v. Merrill Lynch Realty, Inc., 581 N.E.2d 
196, 202 (Ill. App. Ct. 1991)) (holding that a plaintiff is not required to prove actual 
deception, reliance, or fraud); Brandon v. Winnett, No. 01A01-9411-CH00529, 1995 WL 
444385, at *5 (Tenn. Ct. App. July 28, 1995) (finding a negligent misrepresentation sufficient 
to render the trade practice deceptive).  But see CAROLYN L. CARTER, NAT’L CONSUMER LAW 
CTR., CONSUMER PROTECTION IN THE STATES: A 50-STATE REPORT ON UNFAIR AND DECEPTIVE 
ACTS AND PRACTICES STATUTES 16–17 (2009), available at www.nclc.org/images/pdf/
car_sales/UDAP_Report_Feb09.pdf. 
33. See Orkin Exterminating Co., 849 F.2d at 1368; Brandon, 1995 WL 
444385, at *5; CARTER, supra note 32, at 16–17. 
34. See Spiegel, Inc. v. FTC, 540 F.2d 287, 293 (7th Cir. 1976) (citing FTC v. 
Sperry & Hutchinson Co., 405 U.S. 233, 244–45 n.5 (1972)). 
35. Id. (citing Sperry & Hutchinson Co., 405 U.S. at 244–45 n.5 (1972)). 
36. Sperry & Hutchinson Co., 405 U.S. at 240 (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 63-
1142, at 19 (1914) (Conf. Rep.)). 
37. See Orkin Exterminating Co., 849 F.2d at 1368; Sperry & Hutchinson Co., 
405 U.S. at 244–45 n.5; FTC v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 380 U.S. 374, 386–87 (1965); 
Spiegel, 540 F.2d at 293 (citing Sperry & Hutchinson Co., 405 U.S. at 244–45 n.5). 
38. 15 U.S.C. § 45(n) (2012); FTC v. Neovi, Inc., 604 F.3d 1150, 1155 (9th 
Cir. 2010). 
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trade practice requires that the act or practice “‘causes or is likely to cause 
substantial [consumer injury that cannot be] reasonably avoid[ed] by [the] 
consumer[] . . . and not outweighed by countervailing benefits to [the] 
consumer[].’”39 
Most states adhere to one or both of these FTC and federal court-
generated definitions of what constitutes an unfair or deceptive trade 
practice.
40
  In addition, most states require that such unfair or deceptive trade 
practices arise in trade or commerce.
41
  Trade or commerce is consistently 
defined by UDAP statutes as any profit or non-profit oriented transaction.
42
  
In essence, so long as the act or practice in question can be linked in some 
way to trade or commerce, the act or practice will be covered by a state 
UDAP statute.
43
 
III. APPLICATION OF STATE UNFAIR AND DECEPTIVE TRADE PRACTICE 
STATUTES TO GOVERNMENT ACTIVITIES 
Countering this seemingly uninhibited coverage of UDAP statutes, 
most states exempt some acts or practices and some persons from the reach 
of UDAP statutes.
44
  Common UDAP statutory exemptions include banks, 
savings and loan companies, insurance providers, and utility companies.
45
  
Prohibiting recovery against a state or other government agency is an 
uncommon exemption under UDAP statutes.
46
  However, some states have 
addressed the issue via case law.
47
  For example, in Du Page Aviation Corp. 
                                                 
39. Neovi, 604 F.3d at 1155 (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 45(n)). 
40. See Camacho v. Auto. Club of S. Cal., 42 Cal. Rptr. 3d 488, 494 & n.12 
(Ct. App.), reh’g granted and depublished by B180134, 2006 Cal. App. LEXIS 919 (Ct. App. 
June 1, 2006); State ex rel. Miller v. Cutty’s Des Moines Camping Club, Inc., 694 N.W.2d 
518, 525 (Iowa 2005); State v. Weinschenk, 868 A.2d 200, 206 (Me. 2005); Tucker v. Sierra 
Builders, 180 S.W.3d 109, 116 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2005). 
41. See CARTER & SHELDON, supra note 25, at 11, 197. 
42. See id., at 11–12.  Moreover, some states include non-profit or not-for-
profit activities within the definition of trade and commerce.  E.g., FLA. STAT. § 501.203(8) 
(2013). 
43. See CARTER & SHELDON, supra note 25, at 11. 
44. See id. at 118–20. 
45. CARTER, supra note 32, at 14–15. 
46. CARTER & SHELDON, supra note 25, at 118; see also FLA. STAT. § 501.212; 
N.Y. GEN. BUS. LAW § 349 (McKinney 2013); W. VA. CODE § 46A-6-104 (2013). 
47. Hawaii, Massachusetts, and California have permitted suits against the 
government.  See Notrica v. State Comp. Ins. Fund, 83 Cal. Rptr. 2d 89, 111 (Ct. App. 1999); 
Daly v. Harris, 215 F. Supp. 2d 1098, 1123–25 (D. Haw. 2002); Pierce v. Dew, 626 F. Supp. 
386, 388 (D. Mass. 1986).  Illinois, Montana, Texas, Washington, Connecticut, and North 
Carolina have excluded government entities from liability under each state’s respective UDAP 
statute.  See City of Danbury v. Dana Inv. Corp., 730 A.2d 1128, 1140 (Conn. 1999) 
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v. Du Page Airport Authority,
48
 the Illinois court considered the applicability 
of its UDAP statute to municipal corporations, and found that such 
corporations could not be sued under that statute.
49
  The court reasoned that 
municipal corporations do not fall under the definition of person as required 
by the UDAP statute.
50
  Since the statute specifically mentioned both 
domestic and foreign corporations as possible defendants, the court 
concluded that the failure of the statute to specifically mention municipal 
corporations indicated that the legislature intended to exempt municipal 
corporations from an unfair or deceptive trade practice lawsuit.
51
 
Similarly, in Montana Vending, Inc. v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co. of 
Montana,
52
 the Montana court found that the state’s UDAP statute could not 
be enforced against a government defendant, since the plain meaning of 
person could not be construed to include a government entity.
53
  The court 
went on to note that the government entity in the case––a school district––
was not engaged in a business activity at the time and therefore, could not be 
sued under the state’s UDAP statute.54  This analysis suggests that had the 
school district or other government agency been engaged in trade or 
commerce—as defined by the Montana UDAP statute and the Montana 
courts—a UDAP cause of action would be cognizable.55 
Texas also exempts the government agencies from liability under the 
state’s UDAP statute.56  According to Texas law, “[g]overnmental immunity 
                                                                                                                   
(concluding that municipalities fall under the exemption for “actions . . . permitted under law 
as administered by any regulatory board or officer acting under statutory authority of the 
state”); Du Page Aviation Corp. v. Du Page Airport Auth., 594 N.E.2d 1334, 1341 (Ill. App. 
Ct. 1992); Montana Vending, Inc. v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co. of Mont., 78 P.3d 499, 505–06 
(Mont. 2003); State v. Furio, 148 S.E.2d 275, 277 (N.C. 1966); Rea Constr. Co. v. City of 
Charlotte, 465 S.E.2d 342, 343 (N.C. Ct. App. 1996) (citing Sperry Corp. v. Patterson, 325 
S.E.2d 642, 644 (N.C. Ct. App. 1985)) (finding that neither a state, city, town, nor agency of 
the state may be sued under North Carolina’s UDAP statute); Jefferson Cnty. v. Bernard, 148 
S.W.3d 698, 702 (Tex. App. 2004); Washington Natural Gas Co. v. Public Util. Dist. No. 1 of 
Snohomish Cnty., 459 P.2d 633, 636 (Wash. 1969) (finding that the legislature’s failure to 
include municipal corporations under the section listing entities subject to the statute renders 
municipalities exempt from suit). 
48. 594 N.E.2d 1334 (Ill. App. Ct. 1992). 
49. Id. at 1341. 
50. Id. 
51. Id. 
52. 78 P.3d 499 (Mont. 2003). 
53. Id. at 505–06. 
54. Id. 
55. See id. 
56. TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 311.034 (West 2013); Jefferson Cnty. v. 
Bernard, 148 S.W.3d 698, 700 (Tex. App. 2004). 
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protects governmental units of the [s]tate from” UDAP lawsuits.57  
Therefore, UDAP claims against the government or its agencies will be 
permitted only if there is a clear and unambiguous waiver of immunity.
58
  In 
Jefferson County v. Bernard,
59
 the Texas court was faced with determining 
whether the inclusion of the term governmental entities in the UDAP 
statute’s definition of persons covered in the statute constituted a waiver of 
sovereign immunity.
60
  The court reasoned that the waiver of sovereign 
immunity must be clear and “[a]ny ambiguities in a statute are to be resolved 
in favor of retaining immunity.”61  Therefore, the court held that the 
inclusion of the phrase governmental entities was insufficient to indicate a 
waiver of governmental immunity.
62
  However, it is important to note that 
the Texas UDAP statute is one of the weakest in the country,
63
 and unlike the 
majority of states, Texas chooses to interpret its UDAP statute narrowly.
64
  
Consequently, it is unlikely that other states faced with this issue would 
come to the same conclusion.
65
 
The purpose of UDAP statutes is to provide extensive protection 
from the broadest range of unfair and deceptive practices.
66
  The holding, set 
forth in the Texas case, seems to contradict this purpose by exempting 
governmental entities from the scope of the statutes.
67
  By narrowly 
interpreting terms such as person or governmental entities, these states are 
allowing injured consumers to go without a remedy.
68
  In order to advance 
the true purpose of UDAP statutes, courts should interpret each aspect of the 
statute as liberally as possible in order to ensure coverage to the most 
consumers.
69
  Despite the results in Texas and other states, some other states 
                                                 
57. Bernard, 148 S.W.3d at 700. 
58. Id. 
59. 148 S.W.3d 698 (Tex. Ct. App. 2004). 
60. Id. at 701. 
61. Id. (citing Wichita Falls State Hosp. v. Taylor, 106 S.W.3d 692, 697 (Tex. 
2003)). 
62. Id. 
63. See CARTER, supra note 32, at 11. 
64. See id. 
65. Mack v. Bristol-Myers Squibb Co., 673 So. 2d 100, 109 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. 
App. 1996) (distinguishing the narrow Texas UDAP statute from the broad UDAP statute of 
Florida). 
66. See FTC v. Sperry & Hutchinson Co., 405 U.S. 233, 239–40 (1972). 
67. See Bernard, 148 S.W.3d at 702. 
68. See id. at 701–02. 
69. See Sperry & Hutchinson Co., 405 U.S. at 239–40. 
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have reached the opposite result and permit consumers to bring UDAP 
claims against governmental entities.
70
 
UDAP statutes have been applied against government agencies in a 
few states.
71
  However, the majority of states have not yet had occasion to 
decide this issue.72  Unless there is a specific statutory exemption regarding 
lawsuits against the government, there appears to be no absolute obstacle in 
applying UDAP statutes to government agencies engaging in deceptive 
practices.
73 
Further, if the government engages in an unfair or deceptive trade 
practice in which consumers suffer a loss, such consumers should have a 
method of recovery under the UDAP statutes.
74
  Permitting such lawsuits 
would advance the exact purpose of UDAP statutes; namely, to protect the 
public from unfair and deceptive practices.
75
 
Both Hawaii and Massachusetts permit state agencies to be sued 
under their respective UDAP statues.
76
  Several entities are exempt under the 
Hawaii UDAP statute; however, the statute is silent as to municipalities.
77
  In 
Daly v. Harris,
78
 the Hawaii court concluded that this silence indicated that 
                                                 
70. Daly v. Harris, 215 F. Supp. 2d 1098, 1122–23 (D. Haw. 2002); Pierce v. 
Dew, 626 F. Supp. 386, 387–88 (D. Mass. 1986). 
71. Daly, 215 F. Supp. 2d at 1122–23; Pierce, 626 F. Supp. at 387–88. 
72. See Daly, 215 F. Supp. 2d at 1123; Pierce, 626 F. Supp. at 387. 
73. See CARTER & SHELDON, supra note 25, at 118.  Other articles have 
addressed how statutes have been extended to cover other entities not explicitly noted in the 
statutory provisions.  See also Michael Flynn, Physician Business (Mal)practice, 20 HAMLINE 
L. REV. 333, 345–46 (1996) (finding that the “scarcity of . . . statutory provisions and case 
law”—regarding UDAP statutes’ application to learned professionals—support the notion that 
the statutes could extend to learned professionals); Michael Flynn & Karen Slater, All We Are 
Saying is Give Business a Chance:  The Application of State UDAP Statutes to Business-to-
Business Transactions, 15 LOY. CONSUMER L. REV. 81, 87–89 (2003) (discussing which states 
permit a business to sue another business). 
74. CARTER & SHELDON, supra note 25, at 10–11. 
75. Id. 
76. Daly, 215 F. Supp. 2d at 1123; see also Pierce, 626 F. Supp. at 387–88.  
California has also permitted suits against state agencies in violation of the state UDAP 
statute, though inconsistently.  Compare Trinkle v. Cal. State Lottery, 84 Cal. Rptr. 2d 496, 
499–500 (Ct. App. 1999) (concluding that “[o]nly through an unreasonable, strained 
construction” can the government entity fall under the term person; thus, the cause of action 
failed), and Janis v. Cal. State Lottery Comm’n, 80 Cal. Rptr. 2d 549, 553 (Ct. App. 1998) 
(finding a government entity is not a person subject to suit; thus, the cause of action failed as a 
matter of law), with Notrica v. State Comp. Ins. Fund, 83 Cal. Rptr. 2d 89, 94 (Ct. App. 1999) 
(permitting suit against a government entity, but relying on specific language that authorized 
the fund in question). 
77. See Daly, 215 F. Supp. 2d at 1122–23. 
78. 215 F. Supp. 2d 1098 (D. Haw. 2002). 
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the statute did indeed permit UDAP lawsuits against the government.
79
  
According to Hawaiian “legislative history and judicial interpretation,” a 
strong movement in the direction of increased consumer protection has 
developed.
80
  The court noted that the legislature consequently utilized 
“‘broad’ and ‘sweeping terms’” in the UDAP statute to provide protection to 
as many consumers as possible.
81
  Therefore, when in doubt, the language of 
the statute should be interpreted liberally.
82
  The court further determined 
that the sole limitation set forth in the UDAP statute is the requirement that 
“acts or practices be done ‘in the conduct of any trade or commerce.’”83  
Taking into account such considerations, the court held that so long as the 
government agency in question is engaged in trade or commerce, such 
agency may be sued under Hawaii’s UDAP statute.84 
In making this ruling, the Hawaii court looked to the Massachusetts 
courts, which were also faced with the same issue.
85
  In Pierce v. Dew,
86
 the 
Massachusetts court had to determine whether a governmental entity may be 
held liable under the state UDAP statute.
87
  The Massachusetts UDAP statute 
allows for suits against “‘natural persons, corporations, trusts, partnerships, 
incorporated or unincorporated associations, and any other legal entity.’”88  
As similarly mentioned by the Daly court above, the Massachusetts UDAP 
statute is intended to be a “‘statute of broad impact.’”89  Therefore, when in 
doubt, it is in the court’s best interest to interpret the UDAP statute in the 
most liberal manner.
90
  Consequently, since there was no legislative evidence 
that indicated otherwise, the court found the phrase “‘any other legal entity’” 
to include governmental agencies.
91
 
                                                 
79. Id. at 1123–25. 
80. Id. at 1122. 
81. Id. (quoting Han v. Yang, 931 P.2d 604, 619 (Haw. Ct. App. 1997)). 
82. Id. at 1124 (quoting Cieri v. Leticia Query Realty, Inc., 905 P.2d 29, 43 
(Haw. 1995)). 
83. Daly, 215 F. Supp. 2d at 1122 (quoting Cieri, 905 P.2d at 37). 
84. Id. at 1122–23 (quoting United States Leasing Corp. v. City of Chicopee, 
521 N.E.2d 741, 744 (Mass. 1988)). 
85. Id. at 1123 (citing Cieri, 905 P.2d at 37–38). 
86. 626 F. Supp. 386 (D. Mass. 1986). 
87. Id. at 387. 
88. Id. (quoting MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 93A, § 1(a) (2013)). 
89. Id. at 388 (quoting Slaney v. Westwood Auto, Inc., 322 N.E.2d 768, 772 
(Mass. 1975)); see also Daly, 215 F. Supp. 2d at 1122 (citing Han v. Yang, 931 P.2d 604, 619 
(Haw. Ct. App. 1997)). 
90. Daly, 215 F. Supp. 2d at 1124 (quoting Cieri, 905 P.2d at 43). 
91. Pierce, 626 F. Supp. at 387–88 (citing Keane, Inc. v. Boston Water & 
Sewer Comm’n, No. 50133 (Suffolk Superior Court, Dec. 16, 1981)). 
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In United States Leasing Corp. v. City of Chicopee,
92
 the 
Massachusetts court further developed its stance regarding whether a 
governmental entity may be a proper defendant in a UDAP lawsuit.
93
  The 
court recognized that the legislature had maintained its silence on this issue; 
thus, the court found it necessary to focus its analysis on whether the 
potential government defendant engaged in trade or commerce.
94
  Though 
the defendant in the case had not been participating in any business-like 
endeavors, the analysis set forth by the court suggests that had the defendant 
engaged in such activities, the UDAP statute would have applied and been 
violated.
95
 
Both the Hawaii and Massachusetts courts promote a broad 
interpretation of each state’s UDAP statute’s text.96  Though most courts 
have yet to face the issue of whether a government entity may be a proper 
defendant under state UDAP statutes,
97
 Hawaii and Massachusetts indicate 
that such lawsuits may well fit within the reach of UDAP statues.
98
  Since the 
majority of state UDAP statutes are both expansive in scope and contain 
broad prohibitions against unfair and deceptive acts, state courts should be 
able to permit lawsuits against the government and its entities when such 
parties are engaging in unfair and deceptive acts or practices.
99
 
IV. APPLICATION OF STATE UNFAIR AND DECEPTIVE TRADE PRACTICE 
STATUTES BROUGHT ON BEHALF OF A DEPENDENT CHILD 
There has yet to be a case in this country in which a dependent child 
has maintained a cause of action for an unfair or deceptive trade practice 
against a state agency, when such agency misrepresented to the child its role 
in a dependency proceeding.
100
  Yet, UDAP statutes seem to be broad 
                                                 
92. 521 N.E.2d 741 (Mass. 1988). 
93. Id. at 744. 
94. Id.; Genesco Entm’t, Inc. v. Koch, 593 F. Supp. 743, 750–51 (S.D.N.Y 
1984) (finding courts must focus on whether the practice in question arose out of trade or 
commerce). 
95. United States Leasing Corp. v. City of Chicopee, 521 N.E.2d 741, 744 
(Mass. 1988); see also Bedrosian, L.L.C. v. Costanza, 10 Mass. L. Rptr. 459, 459–60 (Super. 
Ct. 1999) (concluding that municipality may be subject to suit so long as the municipality 
engaged in trade or commerce). 
96. Daly v. Harris, 215 F. Supp. 2d 1098, 1122 (D. Haw. 2002) (quoting Han 
v. Yang, 931 P.2d 604, 619 (Haw. Ct. App. 1997)); Pierce, 626 F. Supp. at 388 (quoting 
Slaney v. Westwood Auto, Inc., 322 N.E.2d 768, 772 (Mass. 1975)). 
97. See, e.g., Pierce, 626 F. Supp. at 387–88. 
98. Daly, 215 F. Supp. 2d at 1122; Pierce, 626 F. Supp. at 387–88. 
99. See CARTER, supra note 32, app. at 24–29. 
100. See id. 
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enough to enable a dependent child to initiate such a claim when the state 
agency deceives or treats a dependent child unfairly.
101
  The key to such a 
claim is to examine the nature of the dependent child’s claim and determine 
if such a claim fits within the UDAP statute prohibitions.
102
 
Florida provides an example of how the courts could permit a UDAP 
claim against government agencies on behalf of dependent children.
103
  The 
Florida UDAP statute, which is typical of most state UDAP statutes, 
prohibits “[u]nfair methods of competition, unconscionable acts or practices, 
and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in the conduct of any trade or 
commerce.”104  Florida specifically requires that the provisions of the statute 
be construed liberally in order to promote the policies set forth in the statute, 
which includes protecting the consuming public.
105
  Therefore, the Florida 
UDAP statute is a broadly written statute.
106
 
In order to determine whether a cause of action could indeed be 
brought against a state agency for misrepresenting its role in a dependency 
proceeding, the facts set forth in the opening anecdote involving Billy’s 
dependency proceeding will be analyzed.  First, the Florida UDAP statute 
defines a consumer as “an individual; child, by and through [the child’s] 
parent or legal guardian; business; firm; . . . corporation; any commercial 
entity, however denominated; or any other group or combination.”107  Billy is 
a child and, therefore, fits within the definition of a consumer.
108
 
Next, the Florida UDAP statute requires that unfair or deceptive 
practices arise in trade or commerce.
109
  The phrase trade or commerce is 
                                                 
101. See id. at 24–29. 
102. See FLA. STAT. §§ 501.203(7), .204 (2013); CARTER, supra note 32, app. 
at 7–10. 
103. See FLA. STAT. § 501.204. 
104. Id. § 501.204(1). 
105. Id. § 501.202. 
106. Hanson Hams, Inc. v. HBH Franchise Co., No. 03-61198-CIV, 2003 WL 
22768687, at *2 (S.D. Fla. Nov. 7, 2003) (citing Day v. Le-Jo Enters., Inc., 521 So. 2d 175, 
178 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1988)) (finding courts have regarded the Florida UDAP statute as 
extremely broad); see also, e.g., Mack v. Bristol-Myers Squibb Co., 673 So. 2d 100, 103 (Fla. 
1st Dist. Ct. App. 1996). 
107. FLA. STAT. § 501.203(7).  At least thirty-four states would grant a private 
right of action to a person or a consumer like Billy.  See id.; see also ALA. CODE §§ 8-19-3(2), 
(5), -10(a) (2013); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 51:1402(1), (8), :1409(A) (2013); MISS. CODE 
ANN. §§ 75-24-3(a), -15(1) (2013); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 358-A:1(I), :10(I) (2013); 73 PA. 
CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 201-2(2), -9.2(a) (West 2013). 
108. See FLA. STAT. § 501.203(7) and see supra hypothetical Part I. 
109. FLA. STAT. § 501.204(1).  Many states require that the unfair or deceptive 
trade practice arise from trade or commerce.  ALA. CODE § 8-19-5; ALASKA STAT. § 
45.50.471(a) (2013); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 42-110b(a) (2013); FLA. STAT. § 501.204(1); HAW. 
REV. STAT. § 480-2(a) (2013); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 48-601 (2013); 815 ILL. COMP. STAT. 
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defined as “the advertising, soliciting, providing, offering, or distributing, 
whether by sale, rental, or otherwise, of any good or service, . . . whether 
tangible or intangible, . . . wherever situated.”110  This is an expansive 
definition of trade or commerce and seems to cover more than what would 
conventionally be considered business activities.
111
  The actions of both the 
child protective services caseworkers and the GAL representatives fit this 
definition.
112
  By providing Billy with a business card, the child protective 
services caseworker engaged in a form of advertisement.
113
  The business 
card is tangible evidence of trade or commerce.
114
  Further, the 
representation that the child protective services government agency is the 
law firm for Florida’s children is tangible evidence that a service is being 
offered to Billy.
115
  In addition, the GAL Program representative declared to 
Billy that the GAL Program represented him in the dependency 
proceeding.
116
  This kind of statement also fits within the definition of trade 
or commerce because the GAL Program is providing legal services.
117
 
The Florida UDAP statute requires that “due consideration and great 
weight shall be given to the interpretations of the [FTC] and the federal 
courts.”118  Therefore, the FTC and the federal court definitions of unfair and 
deceptive trade practices apply to the Florida Statutes.
119
  Under FTC and 
federal court precedent, an act or practice is a deceptive trade practice if the 
act or practice is likely to, or “has the tendency [or] capacity to . . . deceive” 
consumers acting reasonably under the circumstances.
120
  Further, proof of 
                                                                                                                   
505/2 (2013); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 367.170(1) (West 2013); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 
51:1405(A); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 93A, § 2(a) (2013); MICH. COMP. LAWS § 445.903(1) 
(2013); MISS. CODE ANN. § 75-24-5(1); MONT. CODE ANN. § 30-14-103 (2013); NEB. REV. 
STAT. § 59-1602 (2013); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 358-A:2; N.M. STAT. ANN. § 57-12-3 
(2013); N.Y. GEN. BUS. LAW § 349(a) (McKinney 2013); 73 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 201-3; 
R.I. GEN. LAWS § 6-13.1-2 (2012); S.C. CODE ANN. § 39-5-20(b) (2012); TENN. CODE ANN. § 
47-18-104(a) (2013); TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE ANN. § 17.46(a) (West 2013); UTAH CODE 
ANN. § 13-5-2.5(1) (LexisNexis 2013); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 9, § 2453(a) (2013); W. VA. CODE 
§ 46A-6-104 (2013). 
110. FLA. STAT. § 501.203(8). 
111. Id. 
112. See id. and see hypothetical supra Part I. 
113. See Florida Bar v. Matus, 528 So. 2d 895, 895 (Fla. 1988) and see 
hypothetical supra Part I. 
114. FLA. STAT. § 501.203(8); Matus, 528 So. 2d at 895. 
115. FLA. STAT. § 501.203(8) and see hypothetical supra Part I. 
116. See hypothetical supra Part I. 
117. FLA. STAT. § 501.203(8). 
118. Id. § 501.204(2). 
119. See id. 
120. In re Cliffdale Assocs., 103 F.T.C. 110, 153 (1984) (citing Chrysler Corp. 
v. FTC, 561 F.2d 357, 363 (D.C. Cir. 1977)). 
122
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intent, negligence, fraud, or actual deception is not required to establish such 
a prohibited practice.
121
  The FTC and federal court definitions are intended 
to be flexible and do not require a specific rule to be violated in order for 
deception to be found.
122
  The FTC has determined that oral 
misrepresentations and failures to disclose material facts both violate the 
FTC Act.
123
  Therefore, any oral misrepresentation or failure by a party to 
disclose a material fact will be deemed sufficiently deceptive under the 
Florida UDAP statute.
124
  Further, federal courts have held that if a practice 
“offends established public policy, . . . is immoral, unethical, oppressive, 
unscrupulous, or substantially injurious to consumers,” such practice is 
unfair.
125
  Again, proof of intent, negligence, fraud, or actual deception is not 
required for an act to be deemed unfair.
126
 
Viewed from the perspective of Billy, he reasonably believed that 
both the state child protective services caseworker and the GAL Program 
were his legal representatives and would advocate on his behalf.
127
  When the 
child protective services caseworker handed Billy a business card stating that 
his agency was the law firm for Florida children, a reasonably prudent 
person—even if not a child like Billy—would have every reason to believe 
that the caseworker would indeed be his legal representative in court.
128
  The 
caseworker failed to mention that he is in fact the petitioner who brings the 
dependency petition on behalf of the state.
129
  By failing to properly disclose 
the child protective services worker’s true role in the dependency 
proceeding, the caseworker failed to disclose material facts that may have 
impacted Billy’s decision to even think about obtaining his own lawyer.130  
                                                 
121. Orkin Exterminating Co. v. FTC, 849 F.2d 1354, 1368 (11th Cir. 1988); 
Grove v. Huffman, 634 N.E.2d 1184, 1187–88 (Ill. App. Ct. 1994); Brandon v. Winnett, No. 
01A01-9411-CH00529, 1995 WL 444385, at *6 (Tenn. Ct. App. July 28, 1995). 
122. Urling v. Helms Exterminators, Inc., 468 So. 2d 451, 453 (Fla. 1st Dist. 
Ct. App. 1985) (per curiam) (citing Rollins, Inc. v. Heller, 454 So. 2d 580, 584 (Fla. 3d Dist. 
Ct. App. 1984)). 
123. In re Peacock Buick, Inc., 86 F.T.C. 1532, 1556 (1975). 
124. See FLA. STAT. § 501.204(2) (2013). 
125. Spiegel, Inc. v. FTC, 540 F.2d 287, 293 (7th Cir. 1976) (citing FTC v. 
Sperry & Hutchinson, Co., 405 U.S. 233, 244 n.5 (1972)). 
126. See Orkin Exterminating Co., 849 F.2d at 1368. 
127. See hypothetical supra Part I. 
128. See id.; see also Dep’t of Legal Affairs v. Father & Son Moving & 
Storage, Inc., 643 So. 2d 22, 26 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1994) (citing Chrysler Corp. v. FTC, 
561 F.2d 357, 363 (D.C. Cir. 1977)) (stating that “an advertisement is considered deceptive if 
it has the capacity to convey misleading impressions to consumers”). 
129. FLA. STAT. § 39.501(1) and see hypothetical supra Part I. 
130. See FLA. STAT. § 501.204(1); In re Peacock Buick, Inc., 86 F.T.C. 1532, 
1556 (1975) and see hypothetical supra Part I. 
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The caseworker misled Billy, who acted reasonably under the 
circumstances.
131
  Such deceptive actions by the caseworker are prohibited 
under the Florida UDAP statute.
132
 
Further, when the GAL Program representative visited Billy, the 
representative explained that the GAL Program served as Billy’s 
representative in court and would advocate on his behalf.
133
  Billy 
consistently maintained that he wanted to return to his home and be with his 
mother, brother, and stepfather.
134
  Instead, the GAL Program advocated for 
Billy’s separation from his mother, brother, and stepfather, and 
recommended Billy’s removal from his home during the actual 
proceeding.
135
  Again, a reasonably prudent person in Billy’s position would 
have had every reason to believe that the GAL Program would advocate for 
what Billy wanted.
136
  By relying on the oral misrepresentations made by the 
GAL Program representative, Billy acted reasonably when he did not hire a 
lawyer.
137
  Such deceptive actions by the GAL Program are prohibited under 
the Florida UDAP statute.
138
 
Moreover, both the caseworker and the GAL Program representative 
engaged in unfair practices by misrepresenting their respective roles to 
Billy.
139
  Billy is a child faced with a very difficult and emotionally 
demanding situation—Billy is at least scared, worried, confused, and 
vulnerable.
140
  Both the caseworker and the GAL Program representative 
have an ethical, if not moral, responsibility to properly advise Billy, and the 
failure to do so breaches their duties as public officials to carry out the 
legislative policy to protect dependent children.
141
  Instead, both parties 
treated Billy unfairly by denying him legal representation when Billy 
                                                 
131. See hypothetical supra Part I. 
132. FLA. STAT. § 501.204(1) and see hypothetical supra Part I. 
133. See hypothetical supra Part I. 
134. See id. 
135. See id. 
136. See Dep’t of Legal Affairs v. Father & Son Moving & Storage, Inc., 643 
So. 2d 22, 26 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1994) (citing Chrysler Corp. v. FTC, 561 F.2d 357, 363 
(D.C. Cir. 1977)) and see hypothetical supra Part I. 
137. See hypothetical supra Part I. 
138. FLA. STAT. § 501.204(1) (2013). 
139. See id. 
140. See hypothetical supra Part I. 
141. See Spiegel, Inc. v. FTC, 540 F.2d 287, 293 (7th Cir. 1976) (citing FTC v. 
Sperry & Hutchinson Co., 405 U.S. 233, 244–45 n.5 (1972)) (reasoning that under the Florida 
UDAP statute, immoral acts are unfair practices); Urling v. Helms Exterminators, Inc., 468 
So. 2d 451, 453 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1985) (per curiam) (quoting Spiegel, Inc., 540 F.2d at 
293). 
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reasonably believed he was covered.
142
  Billy had no way to know that he 
could even ask for a lawyer, much less that he needed a lawyer, and that the 
GAL Program was prohibited from acting as his lawyer in the dependency 
proceeding; the GAL Program’s actions would fit as an unfair trade practice 
under the Florida UDAP statute.
143
 
Next, Billy must contend with the exemptions section of the Florida 
UDAP statute.
144
  The Florida UDAP statute does not specifically mention 
that the government or government agencies are exempt from lawsuits 
claiming deceptive or unfair trade practices.
145
  However, no Florida court 
has determined if this absence from the exemptions section of the UDAP 
statute permits unfair and deceptive trade practice claims against a 
government agency, like the child protective services state agency or the 
GAL Program.
146
  Yet, the Florida courts have determined this same issue 
with reference to professionals.
147
  In Kelly v. Palmer, Reifler, & Associates, 
P.A.,
148
 a Florida district court was asked to determine whether an attorney 
may be sued under Florida’s UDAP statute.149  Like government agencies, 
neither attorneys specifically, nor learned professionals in general, are 
mentioned under the exemptions section of the statute.
150
  The court reasoned 
that the legislature’s unambiguous failure to mention attorneys in the statute 
exemptions indicates that attorneys are not exempt from a UDAP claim.
151
  
The court noted that neither a Florida District Court of Appeal nor the 
Supreme Court of Florida has decided otherwise.
152
  Therefore, since the 
legislature similarly made no mention of government agencies under the 
exemptions section of the statute, such agencies are not exempted from 
suit.
153
  Therefore, Billy’s claim against both the child protective services 
government agency and the GAL Program is not exempt from enforcement 
under the Florida UDAP statute.
154
 
                                                 
142. FLA. STAT. § 39.4085(20) and see hypothetical supra Part I. 
143. See FLA. STAT. § 501.204(1); Urling, 468 So. 2d at 453 (quoting Spiegel, 
Inc., 540 F.2d at 293 (noting that if an act results in a substantial injury, such act is unfair)); 
Dale & Reidenberg, supra note 7, at 334. 
144. FLA. STAT. § 501.212. 
145. See id. 
146. Kelly v. Palmer, Reifler, & Assocs., P.A., 681 F. Supp. 2d 1356, 1371 
(S.D. Fla. 2010); see also FLA. STAT. § 501.212. 
147. Kelly, 681 F. Supp. 2d at 1371. 
148. 681 F. Supp. 2d 1356 (S.D. Fla. 2010). 
149. Id. at 1371. 
150. FLA. STAT. § 501.212. 
151. Kelly, 681 F. Supp. 2d at 1371. 
152. Id. 
153. See FLA. STAT. § 501.212; Kelly, 681 F. Supp. 2d at 1371. 
154. FLA. STAT. § 501.212; Kelly, 681 F. Supp. 2d at 1371. 
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In sum, there appears to be no impediment to Billy—as a dependent 
child—bringing a lawsuit against the child protective services government 
agency or the GAL Program for unfair and deceptive trade practices. 
V. EFFECT OF APPLYING STATE UNFAIR AND DECEPTIVE TRADE 
PRACTICE STATUTES TO ENSURE PROTECTION OF DEPENDENT CHILDREN 
Perhaps the use of a UDAP statute as a remedy for a dependent 
child’s denial of legal representation seems a bit strange and stretched.  
However, such use of a UDAP statute seems no more strange or stretched 
than the failure to provide dependent children with a lawyer in a dependency 
proceeding.  After all, the purpose of the dependency proceeding is to 
provide government protection to children who have been abused, neglected, 
or abandoned.
155
  Denying such dependent children their own legal 
representation subjects these children to abuse, neglect, and abandonment 
within the dependency process.
156
  The lack of legal representation for 
dependent children—when cloaked with deception and unfairness—cries out 
for a legal remedy.
157
  State UDAP statutes provide just such a remedy.
158
  
Most state UDAP statutes—just like Florida’s—provide as remedies for an 
unfair or deceptive trade practice injunctive relief, economic damages, and 
the prospect of prevailing party attorney’s fees and costs.159  In Billy’s case, 
an injunction mandating that the child protective services state agency and 
the GAL Program refrain from misrepresenting their function and not 
advising Billy that he needs to at least consider, if not obtain, his own lawyer 
to represent him in a dependency proceeding, would ensure that these 
government agencies refrain from deceptive and unfair acts or practices.
160
  
Although economic damages might be difficult to prove, the prospect of 
recovering attorney’s fees and costs would encourage lawyers to take on the 
representation of Billy in a state UDAP claim.
161
 
                                                 
155. FLA. STAT. § 39.001(1)(a). 
156. See Am. Acad. of Pediatrics, Developmental Issues for Young Children in 
Foster Care, 106 PEDIATRICS 1145, 1148 (2000); CHILDREN’S ADVOCACY INST. ET AL., supra 
note 8 at 15–17; Dale & Reidenberg, supra note 7, at 352; Joseph J. Doyle, Jr., Child 
Protection and Child Outcomes:  Measuring the Effects of Foster Care, 97 AM. ECON. REV. 
1583, 1589 (2007). 
157. See CHILDREN’S ADVOCACY INST. ET AL., supra note 8, at 15–17. 
158. CARTER & SHELDON, supra note 25, at 1. 
159. Id. at 2. 
160. See FLA. STAT. § 501.207(b); CARTER & SHELDON, supra note 25, at 1–2. 
161. See CARTER & SHELDON, supra note 25, at 2, 721. 
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VI. CONCLUSION 
By allowing state UDAP claims against government entities, courts 
would accomplish two goals.  First, such a determination would place the 
government on the same legal footing as any other illegitimate business that 
uses unfair or deceptive trade practices to gain an advantage.
162
  Second, in 
the context of dependent children, such a determination would prevent the 
government from further abusing abused, neglected, and abandoned 
children.
163
  Both of these goals fit well within the purpose of the state 
UDAP statutes and the child protection statutes.
164
  Absent legislation 
requiring that every dependent child receive legal representation in a 
dependency proceeding, the least the courts can do is prohibit government 
entities from tricking an abused, neglected, or abandoned child, and treat 
these vulnerable children to a legal process that is not riddled with unfairness 
and deception. 
                                                 
162. See supra Part III. 
163. See supra Parts IV–V. 
164. See FLA. STAT. §§ 39.001(1)(a), 501.204(1); supra Part III. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Human trafficking is one of the most highly organized—and highly 
elusive—crime epidemics, claiming victims internationally.1  However, 
many people do not realize that human trafficking is not just a foreign issue; 
trafficking is occurring within the United States and a majority of victims are 
American citizens.
2
  While there are many forms of human trafficking, each 
case almost always “includes psychological coercion, threats against family, 
. . . and in sex trafficking cases, the threat of being ousted in the victim’s 
community.”3  One reason why this crime epidemic is so elusive is because 
the victims are very difficult to identify.
4
  This is because most victims are 
locked away in a house and rarely allowed outside.
5
  However, not all 
victims constantly seek a way out; some victims feel that working for the 
trafficker is their only choice, or that they owe the trafficker, and the only 
way to pay them back for giving them a place to live is through sex.
6
 
A. A Little Girl’s Story 
Keisha is a [sixteen]-year-old African American female 
originally from Florida.  She was raised by an aunt until she was 
[ten] years old and then placed in the foster care system.  At the 
age of [fourteen], Keisha first ran away from her foster family to 
avoid sexual harassment from one of her foster family’s relatives. 
During that time, she met “Mastur D,” a [twenty-six]-
year-old man who offered to help her get back to her biological 
family.  He said he would be able to pay for some of the expenses 
                                                     
1. FRANCIS T. MIKO, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL30545, TRAFFICKING IN 
PERSONS:  THE U.S. AND INTERNATIONAL RESPONSE 1–2 (2006), available at http://
fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/70330.pdf. 
2. DUREN BANKS & TRACEY KYCKELHAHN, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, 
U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, CHARACTERISTICS OF SUSPECTED HUMAN TRAFFICKING INCIDENTS, 
2008–2010 6 (2011), available at http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/cshti0810.pdf; HUMAN 
SMUGGLING & TRAFFICKING CTR., DOMESTIC HUMAN TRAFFICKING—AN INTERNAL ISSUE 2 
(2008), available at http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/113612.pdf. 
3. Natalia Zea, South Florida Human Trafficking Victim Shares Her Story, 
CBS MIAMI (Aug. 17, 2011, 6:43 PM), http://miami.cbslocal.com/2011/08/17/south-florida-
human-trafficking-victims-shares-her-story/. 
4. POLARIS PROJECT, DOMESTIC SEX TRAFFICKING:  THE CRIMINAL 
OPERATIONS OF THE AMERICAN PIMP 5 (n.d.) [hereinafter POLARIS PROJECT, DOMESTIC SEX 
TRAFFICKING], available at http://www.dcjs.virginia.gov/victims/humantrafficking/vs/
documents/Domestic_Sex_Trafficking_Guide.pdf. 
5. Id. 
6. See id. 
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to get them there, but that she needed to help support them 
financially by engaging in commercial sex with some of his 
friends.  With no money or other options Keisha took him up on 
his offer.  He drove her back to Florida but insisted when they 
arrived that she had not earned enough money to cover their hotel 
and gas costs.  He physically assaulted her and told her she would 
never see anyone else in her family if she did not engage in sex 
with other men of his choosing.  She felt she had no other choice 
and continued to earn money for Mastur D to pay him back . . . .  
Keisha was arrested for solicitation in Florida and after serving 
time in a juvenile detention center, was returned to her foster 
family, and was therefore returned to sexual harassment by her 
foster family’s relative.  Keisha ran away again a year later and 
called Mastur D to help her get back to Florida.  He agreed to help 
again.  She was arrested again.
7
 
Keisha’s story is a perfect example of a young girl who felt her only option 
was to listen to Mastur D and have sex for money.
8
  He used threats and 
psychological coercion to make her believe this was her only option, and 
poisoned her mind with lies for so long that she even returned to him after 
she had been arrested and returned to her foster home.
9
  Now she is not only 
psychologically and physically scarred, but she also has a criminal record 
with prostitution charges that will follow her around for the rest of her life.
10
  
Two prostitution charges is a first-degree misdemeanor, and three charges is 
a third-degree felony in Florida.
11
  This type of record can make it difficult 
for Keisha to find a decent job to support herself or a family.
12
  The way 
Keisha was treated, and the aftermath of the victimization is very common 
with other sex trafficking victims.
13
  This is why Florida Governor Rick 
Scott recently signed a bill that will allow human trafficking victims to 
petition to have their records expunged.
14
 
                                                     
7. Keisha, Domestic Minor Sex Trafficking, POLARIS PROJECT, http://
www.polarisproject.org/what-we-do/client-services/survivor-stories/464-keisha-domestic-
minor-sex-trafficking (last visited Nov. 10, 2013). 
8. Id. 
9. Id. 
10. See id. 
11. FLA. STAT. § 796.07(4)(b)–(c) (2013). 
12. POLARIS PROJECT, Vacating Convictions for Sex Trafficking Victims, in 
2013 ANALYSIS OF STATE HUMAN TRAFFICKING LAWS 51, 51 (2013) [hereinafter POLARIS 
PROJECT, Vacating Convictions for Sex Trafficking Victims], available at http://
www.polarisproject.org/storage/2013_State_Ratings_Analysis_Full_Report.pdf. 
13. HUMAN SMUGGLING & TRAFFICKING CTR., supra note 2, at 13–14. 
14. Act effective Jan. 1, 2014, ch. 2013-98, § 2, 2013 Fla. Laws 1, 2–4 (to be 
codified at FLA. STAT. § 943.0583 (2014)); H.R. 1325, 2013 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Fla. 2013); 
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This Comment is focused on human trafficking victims and how 
Florida’s legislation is growing in the right direction by adding new laws to 
help protect future victims and to assist in the rehabilitation of past victims.
15
  
Part II will discuss the currently enacted Florida Statutes and how Florida 
defines human trafficking.
16
  Part III will analyze human trafficking victims 
and why the victimization continues even after the victim is free.
17
  Part IV 
will address current victim-focused laws Florida has in place.
18
  Part V will 
discuss, in detail, Florida’s new expungement law and how it compares to 
other expungement laws.
19
  Part VI will discuss future laws that Florida can 
enact to further benefit human trafficking victims.
20
 
II. AN OVERVIEW OF FLORIDA’S HUMAN TRAFFICKING LEGISLATION 
The human trafficking epidemic is an international problem, but 
without individual states making an effort to combat local cases of human 
trafficking, the epidemic will only grow.
21
  Human trafficking, and more 
specifically, sex trafficking, is a very organized and secretive crime that is 
most effectively dealt with at a local level.
22
  Local communities and local 
law enforcement must be educated on the signs of human trafficking and the 
best ways to fight it.
23
 
Florida currently defines human trafficking as “transporting, 
soliciting, recruiting, harboring, providing, enticing, maintaining, or 
obtaining another person for the purpose of exploitation of that person.”24  
Exploitation of a person can include labor—farm work, sweatshop work, 
cleaning services, or restaurant work—or sex.25  Sex trafficking expands that 
definition to include “forc[ing], compel[ling], or coerc[ing] another to 
                                                                                                                             
Keyonna Summers, New State Laws to Ease Toll on Human-Trafficking Victims:  They Will 
Move Toward Getting Their Lives Back When Gov. Rick Scott Signs Legislation Today, 
TAMPA BAY TIMES, May 30, 2013, at B1. 
15. See infra Parts II–V. 
16. See infra Part II. 
17. See infra Part III. 
18. See infra Part IV. 
19. See infra Part V. 
20. See infra Part VI. 
21. Adam S. Butkus, Ending Modern-Day Slavery in Florida:  Strengthening 
Florida’s Legislation in Combating Human Trafficking, 37 STETSON L. REV. 297, 301–02, 
311, 315, 324–25 (2007). 
22. Id. at 324–25. 
23. See id. 
24. FLA. STAT. § 787.06(2)(d) (2013). 
25. Id. § 787.06(1)(b). 
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become a prostitute.”26  While these definitions do not include every possible 
type of human trafficking, the Florida Legislature has attempted to 
encompass as much as possible.
27
 
A. Florida:  The Perfect Landscape for Sex Traffickers 
Florida is especially vulnerable to human trafficking crime because 
of the diverse population and number of immigrants.
28
  Florida is ranked 
among the top three states for cases of human trafficking, along with New 
York and California.
29
  This is due to the fact that Florida also has a large 
international airport—Miami International Airport—and many ports for 
boats to unload passengers.
30
  These two factors alone make Florida an ideal 
entry point for human trafficking victims to be brought into the United 
States.
31
  Once in Florida, “[s]ome traffickers keep their victims under lock 
and key.  However, the most frequently used practices are . . . isolati[on] . . . 
from the public and family members, confiscating passports, . . . using or 
threatening . . . violence, . . . [and] telling victims that they will be . . . 
deported for immigration violations if they contact authorities . . . .”32  In 
2004, Florida decided to take the steps needed to combat the human 
trafficking epidemic and enacted legislation to bring awareness to law 
enforcement and the community.
33
 
B. Florida’s First Steps in Combating Human Trafficking 
In 2004, Chapters 787,
34
 796,
35
 and 895,
36
 of the Florida Statutes, 
were amended to address human trafficking crimes.
37
  These laws made it a 
                                                     
26. Id. § 796.04(1). 
27. See id. §§ 787.06(1)(b), (3)(a)–(h), (4), 796.04. 
28. What Is Human Trafficking?, FLORIDA NAT’L ORG. FOR WOMEN (2009), 
http://www.flnow.org/trafficking.html. 
29. Id. 
30. Id. 
31. Id. 
32. FLA. STAT. § 787.06(1)(c). 
33. See id. § 796.04; FLA. STAT. §§ 787.05–.06, 796.035, 895.02 (2004) 
(current versions at FLA. STAT. §§ 787.06, 796.035, 895.02 (2013)). 
 34. FLA. STAT. § 787.05 (2004) (amending FLA. STAT. ch. 787 (2003)) 
(repealed 2012). 
 35. FLA. STAT. § 796.035 (2004) (amending FLA. STAT. ch. 796 (2003)) 
(current version at FLA. STAT. § 796.035 (2013)). 
 36. FLA. STAT. § 895.02 (2004) (amending FLA. STAT. § 895.02 (2003)) 
(current version at FLA. STAT. § 895.02 (2013)). 
37. See statutes cited supra notes 34–36. 
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second-degree felony to engage in labor trafficking or sex trafficking of 
adults,
38
 and a first-degree felony to engage in sex trafficking of minors.
39
  
However, these laws were weak when it came to applicability because they 
did not address how to properly prevent future human trafficking.
40
  It was 
not until 2006 that the laws were amended to provide a more inclusive 
definition of human trafficking, requiring human trafficking training within 
law enforcement, and providing relief for victims.
41
  They were further 
amended in 2012 to become even stronger.
42
 
It is the intent of the Legislature that the perpetrators of 
human trafficking be penalized for their illegal conduct and that 
the victims of trafficking be protected and assisted by this state and 
its agencies.  In furtherance of this policy, it is the intent of the 
Legislature that the state Supreme Court, The Florida Bar, and 
relevant state agencies prepare and implement training programs 
in order that judges, attorneys, law enforcement personnel, 
investigators, and others are able to identify traffickers and 
victims of human trafficking and direct victims to appropriate 
agencies for assistance.  It is the intent of the Legislature that the 
Department of Children and Family Services and other state 
agencies cooperate with other state and federal agencies to ensure 
that victims of human trafficking can access social services and 
benefits to alleviate their plight. 
. . . . 
The Criminal Justice Standards and Training Commission shall 
establish standards for basic and advanced training programs for 
law enforcement officers in the subjects of investigating and 
preventing human trafficking crimes.  After January 1, 2007, every 
basic skills course required for law enforcement officers to obtain 
initial certification must include training on human trafficking 
crime prevention and investigation.
43
 
                                                     
 38. FLA. STAT. § 787.05 (2004) (repealed 2012). 
39. FLA. STAT. § 796.035 (2004) (current version at FLA. STAT. § 796.035 
(2013)). 
40. See FLA. STAT. §§ 787.05 (2004) (repealed 2012), 787.06 (2004) (current 
version at FLA. STAT. § 787.06 (2013)). 
41. Act effective Oct. 1, 2006, ch. 2006-168, §§ 1, 4, 2006 Fla. Laws 1, 1–3, 
6–7 (amending FLA. STAT. §§ 787.06, 895.02(1) (2004)). 
42. Act effective July 1, 2012, ch. 2012-97, § 5, 2012 Fla. Laws 1, 4–7 
(amending FLA. STAT. § 787.06 (2011)). 
43. FLA. STAT. § 787.06(1)(d), (4) (2006) (current version at FLA. STAT. § 
787.06(1)(d), (5) (2013)) (emphasis added). 
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Amending section 787.06 to include a training requirement was a huge step 
for Florida in the battle against human trafficking because spotting the crime 
is one of the toughest parts.
44
  However, the development of the protections 
and remedies afforded to the victims is most important.
45
  Victims need an 
effective support system and the ability to seek an adequate remedy from the 
legal system.
46
  Many victims may return to the sex trafficker because life 
with the sex trafficker is a better life than “foster care or . . . group homes.”47  
If the victim has been with the sex trafficker for a long period of time, he or 
she may have already gone through what is known as a grooming process, in 
which the pimp attempts to gain control over the victim.
48
  These victims 
need a support system and programs in place after they have been rescued in 
order to recover and become accepted members of society.
49
 
C. Florida’s Harsh Punishments for Convicted Traffickers 
Florida has come a long way since the 2004 legislation by adding 
harsher punishments for traffickers.
50
  Currently, all forms of human 
trafficking are first-degree felonies in the State of Florida.
51
  Sex trafficking 
with a minor under fifteen years of age is a life felony, which is punishable 
up to life in prison.
52
  Punishment for a first-degree felony is imprisonment 
                                                     
44. FLA. STAT. § 787.06(1)(d) (2006) (current version at FLA. STAT. § 
787.06(1), (5) (2013)); see also Butkus, supra note 21, at 327. 
45. See Butkus, supra note 21, at 327–28. 
46. Id. at 329–34. 
47. See Lois Lee, Residential Programs for America’s Child Sex Trafficking 
Victims Secure or Non-Secure Facilities?, HUFFINGTON POST (July 9, 2013, 10:47 AM), 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/dr-lois-lee/residential-programs-for-_b_3536472.html. 
48. POLARIS PROJECT, DOMESTIC SEX TRAFFICKING, supra note 4, at 3. 
Pimps manipulate their victims beginning with an initial period of false 
love and feigned affection.  This initial period is critical to attaining long-term 
mind-control. 
. . . . 
 The process of breaking-down a girl from healthy adolescent sexual 
boundaries to commercial sex with strangers is often referred to as grooming or 
seasoning.  It is a systematic process that has been documented and replicated by 
pimps nationwide.  In essence, this process aims to achieve complete control over 
someone’s identity or individuality using a combination of physical, mental, and 
emotional means.  In the trafficking paradigm, this process involves force, fraud, 
and coercion . . . . 
Id. 
49. See Butkus, supra note 21, at 328–30. 
50. See Act effective July 1, 2012, ch. 2012-97, § 5, 2012 Fla. Laws 1, 4–8 
(amending FLA. STAT. § 787.06 (2011) (current version at FLA. STAT. § 787.06 (2013))). 
51. FLA. STAT. § 787.06(3)(a)–(h) (2013). 
52. Id. §§ 775.082(3)(a)2, 787.06(3)(h). 
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for up to thirty years and up to a ten thousand dollar fine.
53
  However, section 
787.06 of the Florida Statutes expressly allows for punishment for up to life 
in prison for the sex trafficking of a minor.
54
  Section 787.06 of the Florida 
Statutes also authorizes the courts to separate each individual instance of 
human trafficking and stack the punishments.
55
  Therefore, each victim a 
trafficker controls would be a separate count of human trafficking, each 
punishable with up to thirty years in prison.
56
 
Section 787.06 of the Florida Statutes also allows for seizure of 
“[a]ny real property or personal property that was used, attempted to be used, 
or intended to be used in violation of any provision of this section.”57  If this 
section was used against traffickers, it could potentially shut down their 
entire operation because they would lose their houses, cars, and any other 
property that was used in conjunction with the human trafficking.
58
  Having 
no house and no car would significantly impair a trafficker’s business.59  
Another option is that Florida could use the seized property to help fund non-
governmental organizations.
60
  This authority comes from the Florida 
Contraband Forfeiture Act, which allows law enforcement to seize property 
used for criminal purposes and use the proceeds for future crime prevention 
efforts.
61
  It would be very beneficial to take the property seized from human 
trafficking crimes and give all the proceeds to human trafficking victim relief 
agencies because these agencies need funding to implement more resources 
for victims.
62
 
D. Florida’s Civil Remedies for Trafficking Victims 
Florida’s legislation does include some civil remedies for victims.63  
These remedies, however, are hardly enough to make a significant, positive 
impact on the victim’s life.64  The victim can only recover up to three times 
                                                     
53. Id. §§ 775.082(3)(b), .083(1)(b). 
54. Id. § 787.06(3)(g). 
55. Id. § 787.06(3)(h). 
56. FLA. STAT. §§ 775.082(3)(b), 787.06(3)(h). 
57. Id. § 787.06(7). 
58. See id. 
59. See POLARIS PROJECT, DOMESTIC SEX TRAFFICKING, supra note 4, at 3, 5; 
What Is Human Trafficking?, supra note 28. 
60. Butkus, supra note 21, at 337. 
61. FLA. STAT. § 932.704(1). 
62. See Butkus, supra note 21, at 329, 336–37. 
63. FLA. STAT. §§ 772.102(1)(a)(15), .104(1)–(2). 
64. See id. § 772.104(2); Buktus, supra note 21, at 328–29. 
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the profit made by the sex trafficker.
65
  The legislation also includes that a 
minimum of two hundred dollars and reasonable attorney’s fees will be 
awarded to the victim.
66
  The burden is on the victim to prove how much was 
made as a result of the sex trafficking,
67
 which can be difficult since the 
victim is most likely not keeping a record of how much he or she has made.
68
  
Unfortunately, section 772.104 of the Florida Statutes denies victims the 
right to seek punitive damages against sex traffickers.
69
  Florida also has a 
statute that allows for victims of sexual exploitation to recover awards under 
victim compensation laws.
70
  However, section 960.065 of the Florida 
Statutes also restricts the award if the victim “who committed the crime upon 
which the claim is based will receive any direct or indirect financial benefit 
from such payment.”71 
Overall, Florida’s legislation addressing human trafficking has 
significantly improved over the last eight years since the 2004 amendments; 
however, there is still room for even greater improvement.
72
  Improvement in 
the area of victim relief is the most important.
73
  Human trafficking is 
occurring every day and is so widespread that it cannot possibly be fixed 
overnight, but the victims that are rescued need to be helped immediately.
74
 
III. THE PROFILE OF A VICTIM 
A. National Victim Statistics 
A victim of human trafficking can be any sex, age, or ethnicity and 
can be as close as a next-door neighbor.
75
  According to the most recent 
report published by the Bureau of Justice Statistics, between January 2008 
and June 2010, there were a reported 527 victims of human trafficking.
76
  Of 
the 527 victims, 257 of them were 17 or younger, 159 of them were 18 to 24, 
                                                     
65. FLA. STAT. § 772.104(2). 
66. Id. 
67. Id. 
68. See POLARIS PROJECT, DOMESTIC SEX TRAFFICKING, supra note 4, at 4. 
69. FLA. STAT. § 772.104(3). 
70. Id. § 960.065(1)(a). 
71. Id. § 960.065(4). 
72. Butkus, supra note 21, at 327.  Compare, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 787.06 
(2013), with FLA. STAT. § 787.06 (2006) (current version at FLA. STAT. § 787.06 (2013)), and 
FLA. STAT. § 787.06 (2004) (current version at FLA. STAT. § 787.06 (2013)). 
73. See Butkus, supra note 21, at 327–29. 
74. See id. at 315, 327–28. 
75. What Is Human Trafficking?, supra note 28; Zea, supra note 3. 
76. BANKS & KYCKELHAHN, supra note 2, at 6. 
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68 of them were 25 to 34, and 27 of them were 35 or older.
77
  This report 
also found that of the 527 victims, 346 of them were United States citizens.
78
  
While this report does not include every single act of human trafficking, the 
trend is clear:  United States citizens are just as likely, if not more likely, to 
become victims of human trafficking within the United States.
79
 
B. Initial Recruiting of a Victim 
Victims can be taken from virtually anywhere; however, the more 
vulnerable ones come from foster homes, halfway houses, homeless shelters, 
and group homes.
80
  These victims usually have no family or place to call 
home, so the grooming process that the sex traffickers use to control the 
victims is much more effective.
81
  Victims can also be picked up at schools, 
playgrounds, bars, and bus stations.
82
  Once they have been taken, they can 
be sent far away from their hometown or locked away in a house, never to be 
seen again.
83
 
Some victims choose to go with the trafficker because they have 
been promised money, food, or love.
84
  Martina Okeke, a Nigerian woman, 
was brought to the United States and was “promised . . . $300 a month, . . . a 
house, and tuition . . . for her . . . children.”85  She admitted that after twelve 
years, she never received a dime.
86
  Martina relied on these promises because 
she was living in poverty with two children as a single mother; coming to the 
United States looked like a step up from her home in Nigeria.
87
  Individuals 
in vulnerable situations are the ideal targets for traffickers because they can 
easily be persuaded by “[p]romises of a better life, fast money, and future 
luxuries.”88  Once the victim is secured—either locked up or cooperative 
                                                     
77. Id. at 6 tbl.5. 
78. Id. 
79. See id. at 6. 
80. See POLARIS PROJECT, DOMESTIC SEX TRAFFICKING, supra note 4, at 3. 
81. See id. 
82. Id. 
83. See Zea, supra note 3. 
84. See David Gonzalez, When American Dream Leads to Servitude, N.Y. 
TIMES, Apr. 24, 2007, at B1. 
85. Id. 
86. Id. 
87. See id. 
88. POLARIS PROJECT, DOMESTIC SEX TRAFFICKING, supra note 4, at 3; see 
also Jessica De Leon, New Laws on Human Trafficking Will Aide Manatee-Sarasota Agencies 
as They Form Task Force, BRADENTON HERALD (June 3, 2013), http://www.bradenton.com/
2013/06/03/4551754/new-laws-on-human-trafficking.html (“‘Two-thirds of the world lives in 
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because of a false sense of security—the victim may be mentally and 
physically abused in order to keep him or her obedient.
89
  This abuse can 
include “beating, rape, starvation, forced drug use, confinement, and 
seclusion.”90  Such treatment instills fear into the victim, causing them to 
want to perform whatever acts the trafficker desires.
91
 
C. A Closer Look at Sex Trafficking Victims 
Sex trafficking victims are generally young—most often under the 
age of twenty-four.
92
  One common reason for this is many of the clients fear 
contracting HIV or other sexually transmitted diseases.
93
  They believe 
having sex with a child—“some as young as seven”—will protect them from 
contracting diseases because the victims are “too young to have been 
infected.”94  Some of the victims in their late teens and early twenties may be 
forced to work in strip clubs or massage parlors—hidden in plain sight.95  
Whatever the age may be, the sex trafficker usually sets a quota, or dollar 
amount, that the victim must make each night in order to avoid severe 
abuse.
96
  This quota could be anywhere from “$500 [to] $1000 each night.”97  
Some of the victims may even resort to theft in order to meet the quota.
98
  
Often times, the victims fear retaliation for not meeting the quota more than 
they fear being arrested by law enforcement.
99
  At the end of the night, all the 
profits the victims have made go directly to the sex trafficker; the victim 
keeps nothing.
100
 
Sex traffickers reap all the benefits from exploiting the victims by 
forcing them to prostitute on the streets, work in brothels, or strip, and then 
                                                                                                                             
extreme poverty . . . . So when they are promised a job in the land of opportunity, which is 
America, they are going to believe it.’”). 
89. See MIKO, supra note 1, at 4. 
90. Id. 
91. See Leif Coorlim, Victims Endure Lives Degraded by Traffickers, CNN, 
http://www.cnn.com/2013/05/06/world/asia/freedom-fighter-victims/index.html (last updated 
May 16, 2013, 3:15 PM). 
92. BANKS & KYCKELHAHN, supra note 2, at 6 tbl.5. 
93. MIKO, supra note 1, at 4. 
94. Id. 
95. See Butkus, supra note 21, at 313 n.108, 314. 
96. POLARIS PROJECT, DOMESTIC SEX TRAFFICKING, supra note 4, at 4. 
97. Id. 
98. Id. 
99. Id. at 4–5. 
100. Id. at 4. 
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give all the money to the trafficker.
101
  It has been estimated that a sex 
trafficker can make up to $632,000 in just twelve months.
102
  This estimation 
is based on the trafficker controlling four girls, with each girl meeting a 
“quota[] of $500 [a] night, [seven] days a week.”103  With this amount of 
untaxed income, traffickers have little incentive to let the victims go once 
they have them.
104
 
D. Victim or Offender? 
One of the hardest parts for victims is the record they are left with—
if they are lucky enough to escape from the trafficker.
105
  Many victims are 
convicted of theft, drug possession, prostitution, loitering, and other crimes 
that make it very difficult to build a life after escaping.
106
  Some people may 
ask why the victim did not tell the police about the trafficker the first time 
they got arrested.  While this seems like a logical solution to someone who is 
not in a victim’s situation, it is not so easy.107  Often times a victim may not 
even think of themselves as a victim, under the impression that they owe the 
trafficker some debt or depend on the trafficker for food and shelter.
108
  
Victims may also feel a sense of loyalty to pimps, known as Stockholm 
Syndrome.
109
  There is also a possibility that the victim distrusts law 
enforcement, due to personal experiences or being convinced by the 
trafficker that law enforcement will only harm them.
110
  It is also very 
                                                     
101. POLARIS PROJECT, DOMESTIC SEX TRAFFICKING, supra note 4, at 4; 
Butkus, supra note 21, at 308, 314. 
102. POLARIS PROJECT, DOMESTIC SEX TRAFFICKING, supra note 4, at 4. 
103. Id. 
104. See id. 
105. Maggie Clark, New Human Trafficking Laws Focus on Victims, PEW 
CHARITABLE TRUSTS (May 31, 2013), http://www.pewstates.org/projects/stateline/headlines/
new-human-trafficking-laws-focus-on-victims-85899480543. 
106. Id. 
107. See POLARIS PROJECT, DOMESTIC SEX TRAFFICKING, supra note 4, at 5. 
108. Id. 
109. Id. 
 Stockholm Syndrome is a . . . psychological phenomenon wherein a 
positive bond between hostage and captor occurs that appears irrational in light of 
the frightening ordeal endured by the victims.  In essence . . . the hostage views the 
perpetrator as giving life by simply not taking it.  Individuals . . . [with] Stockholm 
[S]yndrome display three characteristics, although . . . not always exist[ing] 
together. . . . Hostages have positive feelings for their captors, [v]ictims show fear, 
distrust, and anger toward the authorities, [and p]erpetrators display positive 
feelings toward captives as they begin to see them as human beings. 
Nathalie de Fabrique et al., Understanding Stockholm Syndrome, FBI L. ENFORCEMENT BULL., 
July 2007, at 10, 12. 
110. POLARIS PROJECT, DOMESTIC SEX TRAFFICKING, supra note 4, at 5. 
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probable that victims are scared that once they are out of jail, the trafficker 
may harm them or their family.
111
  Consequently, many victims accumulate a 
record because they were being forced to prostitute, which then makes it 
nearly impossible to find a job, go to school, locate a place to live, or apply 
for credit cards.
112
 
Victims are suffering consequences for the rest of their lives, while 
traffickers may only be in jail for a few years—if they are caught at all.113 
Ten years after Telisia Espinosa had broken free, her life 
on the lam with the boyfriend who had urged her to sell her body 
for cash continued to haunt her. 
From Las Vegas to Cleveland to Florida, Espinosa had 
racked up arrests for prostitution, loitering, solicitation—so many 
charges that, years later, it would take her months to track down all 
the arrest warrants she [did not] even realize she had. 
“You have a person who sells you and exploits you,” said 
Espinosa, a [thirty-seven]-year-old Tampa woman whose record 
has barred her from jobs and even from volunteering with the 
human trafficking victims whose stories match her own.  “They 
may have a slap on the wrist and then you [are] paying for it with 
the rest of your life.”
114
 
Non-governmental organizations are at the home front of post-trafficking 
victim treatment.
115
  These organizations need more funding and support in 
order to maintain their facilities.
116
  Many of these facilities provide law 
enforcement training as well as victim support.
117
  Victims need to have a 
safe place to go and resources to utilize in order to have a future.
118
  Without 
community resources and community awareness, many victims are treated 
like offenders due to their criminal record, which is why victim-focused laws 
are so important for victim recovery.
119
 
                                                     
111. Id. 
112. Clark, supra note 105. 
113. See FLA. STAT. §§ 775.082(3)(d)–(4)(a), 796.07(4)(b)–(c) (2013); POLARIS 
PROJECT, DOMESTIC SEX TRAFFICKING, supra note 4, at 5; Clark, supra note 105. 
114. Summers, supra note 14. 
115. See Butkus, supra note 21, at 329. 
116. See id. at 329, 331. 
117. See id. at 329–30. 
118. See id. at 320. 
119. See id.; Clark, supra note 105. 
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IV. SAFE HARBOR ACT:  FLORIDA’S FIRST BIG VICTIM-FOCUSED LAW 
Florida has taken steps towards enacting laws for the benefit of 
victims.
120
  The Safe Harbor Act became effective January 1, 2013, and it is 
focused on protecting child victims of sex trafficking.
121
  This law requires 
that children be placed in a safe house and assessed through physical and 
mental examinations.
122
  In addition, section 409.1678 of the Florida Statutes 
requires that the children be provided with “food, clothing, medical care,” 
and other resources.
123
  The goal of the Safe Harbor Act is directed towards 
the rehabilitation and reintegration of children into society.
124
 
When an officer has established probable cause to believe a minor is 
being sexually exploited, the officer has the authority to take that child into 
custody “to be placed in a short-term safe house.”125  The safe house is 
required to have staff awake twenty-four hours a day to ensure the safety of 
the children being housed.
126
  The Safe Harbor Act states that appropriations, 
gifts, and government funding will be provided to the safe homes to help 
facilitate the rehabilitation process.
127
  The ultimate goal is to either reunite 
the minor with his or her family or find a long-term living arrangement 
where the child can be cared for and ultimately lead a normal, healthy life.
128
 
A. A Major Flaw in the Safe Harbor Act 
While the Safe Harbor Act is very beneficial to minor victims, it 
completely ignores victims over the age of eighteen.
129
  While a majority of 
sex trafficking victims appear to be minors, there are still a substantial 
number of sex trafficking victims who are eighteen or over.
130
  Victims need 
                                                     
120. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 409.1678 (2013). 
121. Act effective Jan. 1, 2013, ch. 2012-105, §§ 1–2, 10, 2013 Fla. Laws 1, 1–
2, 12 (amending FLA. STAT. § 39.001 (2012)); POLARIS PROJECT, Safe Harbor–Protecting 
Sexually Exploited Minors, in 2013 ANALYSIS OF STATE HUMAN TRAFFICKING LAWS 33, 33 
(2013), available at http://www.polarisproject.org/storage/2013_State_Ratings_Analysis_
Full_Report.pdf. 
122. FLA. STAT. § 39.524(1). 
123. Id. § 409.1678(1)(e). 
124. See id. § 409.1678(2)(b); Lydia Butler, Modern-Day Slavery Eclipsing the 
Sunshine State Compels Safe Harbor Legislation in Florida, 7 INTERCULTURAL HUM. RTS. L. 
REV. 191, 236–37 (2012). 
125. Butler, supra note 124, at 237. 
126. FLA. STAT. § 409.1678(1)(b). 
127. Butler, supra note 124, at 237; see also FLA. STAT. § 409.1678(2)(e). 
128. See Butler, supra note 124, at 236–37. 
129. See FLA. STAT. § 39.524(1). 
130. See BANKS & KYCKELHAHN, supra note 2, at 6 tbl.5. 
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to be able to find a safe place to stay while they go through the rehabilitation 
process.
131
  Group homes and halfway homes are potential safe houses for 
adult victims; however, those places are, often times, targets for sex 
traffickers to recruit more victims.
132
  The likelihood of being pulled back 
into sex trafficking is much higher if victims do not have a place to stay and 
be protected.
133
  The best possible solution is to amend the Safe Harbor Act 
to be non-discriminatory.
134
  Victims of all ages need physical and mental 
medical attention, food, shelter, and legal assistance to effectively seek legal 
remedies.
135
 
There has been some debate recently over whether to implement 
secure safe houses or open safe houses.
136
  The difference between the two is 
that the former essentially is locking up the victims until they are physically 
and psychologically ready to be given freedom, and the latter does not lock 
the doors to keep the children in.
137
  However, locking a child up can be just 
as traumatizing as being with a trafficker.
138
  Often times, the advocates that 
wish to have secure facilities are inexperienced and would rather force their 
treatment on the children.
139
  Secured homes act more like a punishment for 
the victim rather than an effective treatment.
140
  Also, they will most likely 
cost more, which would pull funding away from victim treatment and put it 
towards security to keep them in.
141
  The Safe Harbor Act is a step in the 
right direction to help victims after-the-fact;
142
 however, there are still many 
holes in this legislation that need to be filled. 
                                                     
131. Butler, supra note 124, at 238. 
132. POLARIS PROJECT, DOMESTIC SEX TRAFFICKING, supra note 4, at 3. 
133. See Butler, supra note 124, at 236–37. 
134. See id. at 238–39. 
135. See id. at 236, 238–39. 
136. See Lee, supra note 47. 
137. See id. 
138. Id. 
139. Id. 
140. See id. 
141. See Lee, supra note 47. 
142. See FLA. STAT. §§ 39.524(1), 409.1678(1)(b) (2013) (addressing the issue 
of minor sex trafficking victims, while leaving out individuals who are no longer minors but 
may have been minors while being trafficked). 
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V. FLORIDA’S EXPUNGEMENT LAW:  ANOTHER STEP IN THE RIGHT 
DIRECTION 
Florida is now one of eight states to pass a law that allows victims of 
human trafficking to petition to have their records expunged.
143
  Chapter 
2013-98 of the Florida Laws will give victims the opportunity to petition to 
have a conviction for any offense expunged off their record if the conviction 
occurred while they were victims of human trafficking.
144
  However, there 
are a few exceptions to the offenses that victims can have expunged.
145
  The 
exceptions include, “[a]rson, [s]exual battery, [r]obbery, [k]idnapping, 
[a]ggravated child abuse, . . . [a]ggravated assault with a deadly weapon, 
[m]urder, [m]anslaughter, . . . [using a] bomb, [a]rmed burglary, [a]ggravated 
battery, [and] [a]ggravated stalking.”146  These crimes are considered violent 
felonies, which may be why the Florida Legislature does not want to give 
individuals the ability to have them expunged.
147
 
Furthermore, a victim who is petitioning to have his or her 
convictions expunged must no longer be under the control of the trafficker.
148
  
If the victim cannot be completely free, due to possible harm, the victim may 
show that he or she attempted to escape by seeking services for victims of 
human trafficking.
149
 
(4) A petition under this section must be initiated by the 
petitioner with due diligence after the victim has ceased to be a 
victim of human trafficking or has sought services for victims of 
human trafficking, subject to reasonable concerns for the safety of 
the victim, family members of the victim, or other victims of 
human trafficking that may be jeopardized by the bringing of such 
petition or for other reasons consistent with the purpose of this 
section.
150
 
 If the victim has official documentation of his or her status as a 
victim of human trafficking, then the Session Law only requires a 
                                                     
143. Act effective Jan. 1, 2014, ch. 2013-98, § 2, 2013 Fla. Laws 1, 2–4 (to be 
codified at FLA. STAT. § 943.0583 (2014)); Clark, supra note 105. 
144. Ch. 2013-98, § 2, 2013 Fla. Laws at 3. 
145. Id.; see also FLA. STAT. § 775.084(1)(b)1. 
146. FLA. STAT. § 775.084(1)(b)1.a.–e., g.–i., l.–o.; see also Ch. 2013-98, § 2, 
2013 Fla. Laws at 3. 
147. See FLA. STAT. § 775.084. 
148. Ch. 2013-98, § 2, 2013 Fla. Laws at 3. 
149. Id. 
150. Id. 
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preponderance of the evidence to grant expunction.
151
  However, if there is 
no official documentation, the victim must show clear and convincing 
evidence in order to get his or her record expunged.
152
 
(b) “Official documentation” means any documentation 
issued by a federal, state, or local agency tending to show a 
person’s status as a victim of human trafficking. 
(c) “Victim of human trafficking” means a person subjected 
to coercion, as defined in [section] 787.06, for the purpose of 
being used in human trafficking, a child under [eighteen] years of 
age subjected to human trafficking, or an individual subjected to 
human trafficking as defined by federal law.
153
 
 Expungement of a conviction “is deemed to have been vacated due 
to a substantive defect in the underlying criminal proceedings.”154  This 
essentially means it will be as if the conviction never occurred.
155
  Once the 
court has granted the expunction, the victim will be able to “lawfully deny or 
fail to acknowledge the arrests covered by the expunged record.”156  The 
victim will not be liable for any criminal penalties as a result of failing to 
disclose the arrests to potential employers, credit card companies, 
apartments, or other institutions that may request information about criminal 
history.
157
  However, there are some limitations on when the victim can 
withhold the information: 
The [victim] . . . may lawfully deny or fail to acknowledge the 
arrests covered by the expunged record, except when the subject of 
the record: 
1. Is a candidate for employment with a criminal 
justice agency; 
2. Is a defendant in a criminal prosecution; 
3. Concurrently or subsequently petitions for relief 
under this section . . . ; 
                                                     
151. Id. 
152. Id. 
153. Ch. 2013-98, § 2, 2013 Fla. Laws at 2. 
154. Id. § 2, at 3. 
155. See id. 
156. Id. § 2, at 4. 
157. See id. 
144
Nova Law Review, Vol. 38, Iss. 1 [2013], Art. 1
http://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol38/iss1/1
138 NOVA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 38 
4. Is a candidate for admission to The Florida Bar; 
5. Is seeking to be employed or licensed by or to 
contract with the Department of Children and 
Family Services . . . .
158
 
 Even with these very limited exceptions to the expungement law, 
this addition to Florida’s victim-focused statutes will give victims the chance 
to start a new life without being held back by an unfortunate past.
159
 
A. Similar Legislation in Other States 
Florida modeled its expungement law after New York’s 
expungement law passed in 2010.
160
  However, New York’s statute only 
seems to allow expungement of loitering and prostitution.
161
 
The judgment is a conviction where the arresting charge was under 
section 240.37 (loitering for the purpose of engaging in a 
prostitution offense, provided that the defendant was not alleged to 
be loitering for the purpose of patronizing a prostitute or 
promoting prostitution) or 230.00 (prostitution) of the penal law, 
and the defendant’s participation in the offense was a result of 
having been a victim of sex trafficking . . . .
162
 
Yet, it seems that New York courts will expunge other crimes that are related 
to human trafficking if the victim is able to argue that the additional crimes 
were committed under the same coercion as prostitution and loitering.
163
  The 
discretion to do this comes from the word may in section 440.10(1),
164
 which 
has been interpreted to give the New York Court the ability to expunge other 
crimes relating to sex trafficking.
165
  Both Florida and New York laws 
                                                     
158. Ch. 2013-98, § 4, 2013 Fla. Laws at 6 (amending FLA. STAT. § 
943.0815(4)(a) (2013)). 
159. Id. §§ 2, 4, 6, 2013 Fla. Laws at 2, 5, 8; Clark, supra note 105. 
160. Clark, supra note 105.  Compare Ch. 2013-98, § 2, 2013 Fla. Laws at 2–4, 
with N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 440.10(1)(i) (McKinney Supp. 2013). 
161. N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 440.10(1)(i). 
162. Id. 
163. Memorandum from Melissa Broudo, Staff Atty., & Sienna Baskin, Co-
Dir. of the Sex Workers Project at the Urban Justice Ctr., on Vacating Criminal Convictions 
for Trafficked Persons, to Advocates & Legislators 3–4 (Apr. 2012), available at http://
sexworkersproject.org/downloads/2012/20120422-memo-vacating-convictions.pdf. 
164. N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 440.10(1). 
165. See Memorandum from Melissa Broudo & Sienna Baskin, supra note 163, 
at 3–4. 
145
: Nova Law Review 38, #1
Published by NSUWorks, 2013
2013] BATTLE AGAINST HUMAN TRAFFICKING 139 
require that the victim no longer work for the trafficker, but they also both 
leave open the possibility that safety may be an issue for the victim trying to 
escape.
166
 
New York’s law also includes a provision that allows a 
“presumption that the [victim’s] participation in the offense was a result of 
having been a victim of sex trafficking,” if he or she has official 
documentation showing his or her “status as a victim of sex trafficking.”167  
Florida’s statute has the same provision, making it easy on the victim once 
he or she has been established as a legal “‘[v]ictim of human trafficking,’” to 
successfully get his or her record expunged.
168
  Once a victim has the 
presumption in his or her favor, the burden will shift to the other side to 
prove that the victim’s participation in the crime was not a result of sex 
trafficking.
169
  Only six other states have currently enacted expungement 
legislation, including Nevada, Illinois, Vermont, Maryland, Hawaii, and New 
Jersey.
170
  A few “other states are . . . considering expungement laws, 
including California, . . . Pennsylvania, Texas, . . . and Virginia.”171 
Unfortunately, Florida’s expungement statute does not spell out what 
evidence should be used to prove one’s status as a victim.172  Since the law 
                                                                                                                             
Moreover, the defendant has provided a very compelling narrative of the 
circumstances surrounding all of her arrests, demonstrating that they were the 
product of years of brutal physical, psychological, and sexual violence by her 
husband, which resulted in having been trafficked by him.  While the defendant has 
moved to vacate all six convictions based on the provisions of the new amendment, 
and even though only two are prostitution offenses technically covered by the 
[statute], this issue need not be addressed in the instant case because the People 
have consented to the defendant’s motion in its entirety.  Based upon the unique 
circumstances presented here, this court concurs with the People’s position that all 
of the defendant’s convictions are entitled to the relief requested.  Thus, under the 
provisions of the new amendment, this court “must vacate the judgment . . . .” 
People v. G.M., 922 N.Y.S.2d 761, 765–66 (Crim. Ct. 2011) (quoting N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW 
§ 440.10(6)). 
166. Compare Act effective Jan. 1, 2014, ch. 2013-98, § 2, 2013 Fla. Laws 1, 3 
(to be codified at FLA. STAT. § 943.0583 (2014)), with N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 
440.10(1)(i)(i). 
167. N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 440.10(1)(i)(ii). 
168. Compare ch. 2013-98, § 2, 2013 Fla. Laws at 2–3, with N.Y. CRIM. PROC. 
LAW § 440.10(1)(i)(ii). 
169. See ch. 2013-98, § 2, 2013 Fla. Laws at 3; N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 
440.10(1)(i)(ii); POLARIS PROJECT, Vacating Convictions for Sex Trafficking Victims, supra 
note 12, at 53. 
170. Clark, supra note 105. 
171. Carrie N. Baker, The Influence of International Human Trafficking on 
United States Prostitution Laws:  The Case of Expungement Laws, 62 SYRACUSE L. REV. 171, 
180 (2012). 
172. Ch. 2013-98, § 2, 2013 Fla. Laws at 2–4.  Contra 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. 
5/116-2.1(b) (2013). 
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has just been enacted, becoming effective January of 2014, it is too early to 
determine exactly what the Florida courts will accept as sufficient evidence 
to prove victim status or exactly who may provide official documentation 
when determining if a victim’s record should be expunged.173  Illinois law 
states that “evidence such as court records, law enforcement certifications, or 
a ‘sworn statement from a trained professional staff of a victims services 
organization, an attorney, a member of the clergy, or a medical . . . 
professional’” can be used as evidence to help establish status as a victim and 
ultimately determine if the victim’s record should be expunged.174  A report 
from one of these individuals would need to include a determination as to 
whether the individual is truly a victim of human trafficking, which may also 
be accompanied by expert testimony in court as to how the individual 
reached his or her conclusion.
175
  Expungement laws are extremely beneficial 
to victims because they provide a chance at starting a new life.
176
  Hopefully, 
other states will follow the growing trend of victim-focused laws and realize 
that the battle against human trafficking requires state involvement.
177
 
VI. FLORIDA’S OPTIONS FOR FUTURE VICTIM-FOCUSED LAWS 
A. Affirmative Defense Laws 
Even though Florida has made huge improvements to its human 
trafficking legislation by adding victim-focused laws, there is still room for 
improvement.
178
  One law that a few states have implemented a variation of, 
is the affirmative defense law.
179
  This law basically allows victims to use 
human trafficking as a defense for the crime they are being charged with.
180
  
                                                     
173. See ch. 2013-98, § 8, 2013 Fla. Laws at 9. 
174. Baker, supra note 171, at 180; see also 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/116-
2.1(b). 
175. See Baker, supra note 171, at 180. 
176. Id. at 180–81. 
177. See id. at 179–81. 
178. Compare FLA. STAT. §§ 39.524, 787.02–.025, 796.035, 796.04, 
895.02(1)(a)(29) (2013), with FLA. STAT. § 787.06 (2004) (current version at FLA. STAT. § 
787.06 (2013)), and FLA. STAT. § 796.035 (2004) (current version at FLA. STAT. § 796.035 
(2013)). 
179. Baker, supra note 171, at 180–81. 
180. POLARIS PROJECT, HUMAN TRAFFICKING LEGISLATIVE ISSUE BRIEF:  
VICTIM ASSISTANCE 1 (n.d.), [hereinafter POLARIS PROJECT, HUMAN TRAFFICKING 
LEGISLATURE ISSUE BRIEF], available at http://www.national-consortium.org/2013Annual/
Presentations/Human-Trafficking-Victim-Assistance.pdf. 
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Generally, with sex trafficking, this would include prostitution and loitering; 
however, it can be used for other related crimes.
181
 
Implementing an affirmative defense law would allow victims to 
come forward with their situation early because they would be able to use it 
as a defense and hopefully seek help at that juncture in time.
182 
 This type of 
statute would also allow victims to avoid acquiring a cumbersome criminal 
record, thus, alleviating future expungement proceedings.
183
  If the victim 
can affirmatively show that he or she has been coerced into performing the 
illegal acts, the affirmative defense law allows for the charges to be dropped, 
treating the defendant “as [a] victim[] rather than [a] criminal[].”184 
Georgia’s version of the affirmative defense law states that “[a] 
person shall not be guilty of a sexual crime if the conduct upon which the 
alleged criminal liability is based was committed under coercion or 
deception while the accused was being trafficked for sexual servitude.”185  
Implementing a statute such as this in Florida would give victims another 
legal resource in their fight against human trafficking.
186
 
B. Punitive Damages 
Allowing victims to recover punitive damages will not only benefit 
victims by giving them more financial resources, but also will help weaken 
trafficking organizations.
187
  Human trafficking is a business built on making 
money; therefore, taking away the traffickers’ resources will potentially 
place them out of business.
188
 
Illinois is leading the way with one of the strongest victim-focused 
“laws by allowing victims to [collect] punitive damages [from] sex 
traffickers, [individuals] who pay for prostitutes, and [individuals] who 
knowingly benefit from . . . sex [trafficking].”189  A 2008 report by the 
Chicago Alliance Against Sexual Exploitation found that—of the men 
interviewed—sixty-eight percent would think twice before buying a 
                                                     
181. POLARIS PROJECT, HUMAN TRAFFICKING LEGISLATIVE ISSUE BRIEF, supra 
note 180: Clark, supra note 105. 
182. See POLARIS PROJECT, HUMAN TRAFFICKING LEGISLATIVE ISSUE BRIEF, 
supra note 180; Baker, supra note 171, at 181. 
183. E.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 16-3-6 (2013); see also Baker, supra note 171, at 
181. 
184. Baker, supra note 171, at 181. 
185. GA. CODE. ANN. § 16-3-6(b). 
186. See id. 
187. Meribah Knight, Campaign Against Sex Trafficking Is Gaining, N.Y. 
TIMES, Aug. 14, 2011, at A.21A. 
188. See id. 
189. Knight, supra note 187; see also 740 ILL. COMP. STAT. 128/5 (2013). 
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prostitute if it involved fines of one thousand dollars or more.
190
  The Illinois 
law goes a step further, giving traffickers almost no legal recourse to defend 
themselves.
191
  The traffickers are not allowed “to use victims’ consent to sex 
acts, prior criminal conduct, or their marital, sexual or familial relations as 
defenses.”192  The Illinois Legislature has taken a stand against human 
trafficking by implementing such a powerful and harsh law that negatively 
affects human traffickers, which should prove to be an effective deterrent, 
and may make traffickers think twice before committing or continuing their 
crime.
193
 
Florida does not currently allow victims to collect punitive damages 
from human traffickers; however, Florida law does allow victims to recover 
in a civil lawsuit, and collect up to three times the amount gained from the 
trafficking.
194
  This method may not be the best way to allow victims to 
recover from years of victimization because it could leave the victim with 
just a small amount of award money.
195
  Generally, compensatory damages 
are awarded to make the victim whole again—which looks at what the victim 
had before the crime—but many victims had little to nothing before being 
trafficked.
196
  Additionally, the amount the trafficker gained is something 
that may be hard to prove.
197
  Since many victims do not keep any of the 
profits made, it may be nearly impossible to determine how much was made, 
and will most likely come out to less than was actually made.
198
 
While Florida does not seem to be close to passing a law allowing 
for punitive damages any time soon, the Florida Congress should seriously 
consider making it an option.
199
  It would be a great legal tool for victims to 
utilize in order to recover for the time they were victimized, and to 
potentially cripple human trafficking enterprises.
200
 
                                                     
190. Knight, supra note 187. 
191. See 740 ILL. COMP. STAT. 128/25; Knight, supra note 187. 
192. Knight, supra note 187. 
193. See 740 ILL. COMP. STAT. 128/5, /25. 
194. FLA. STAT. § 772.104(2)–(3) (2013). 
195. Butkus, supra note 21, at 333. 
196. Id. 
197. See POLARIS PROJECT, DOMESTIC SEX TRAFFICKING, supra note 4, at 4. 
198. See id. 
199. See Butkus, supra note 21, at 324–25. 
200. See Knight, supra note 187. 
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VII. CONCLUSION 
Human trafficking is an international epidemic that affects our 
neighbors, co-workers, friends, family, and children.
201
  Florida is one of the 
top three states for human sex trafficking because of its diverse population 
and easy access for international travelers.
202
  Subsequently, the Florida 
Legislature has been aggressive since 2004, creating and amending human 
trafficking laws to instill harsher punishments for traffickers and to provide 
assistance and relief to victims.
203
  Victims of human trafficking suffer even 
after they escape from the grips of their traffickers because they are left with 
criminal records that make it hard to move on with their lives.
204
  Florida’s 
Safe Harbor Act provides relief for minors, but discriminates against older 
victims who need the care and services just as much as minors.
205
  That is 
why the expungement law that Florida has enacted is a huge step towards 
providing victims of all ages with a second chance.
206
  New York’s 
expungement law has been used effectively and there is no reason to believe 
that victims in Florida will not obtain similar positive results.
207
 
Keisha, the little girl whose story was discussed earlier, has 
successfully escaped life as a sex trafficking victim.
208
 
Keisha reached out to a Polaris Project social worker and told her 
parts of her story.  Polaris Project immediately stepped in to 
provide emotional support and additional social services.  The 
social worker helped Keisha talk to her case manager at the 
detention center about what happened and helped Keisha’s 
probation officer understand other options for support instead of a 
detention center and returning to her foster family.  Keisha now 
has an order of protection against Mastur D and was able to leave 
the detention center and go to an out-of-state residential program 
for young girls who were victims of sex trafficking.  Keisha is 
doing well in her program and is almost finished with her GED.
209
 
                                                     
201. See Butkus, supra note 21, at 301–02. 
202. What Is Human Trafficking?, supra note 28. 
203. Butkus, supra note 21, at 32526. 
204. Clark, supra note 105. 
205. Butler, supra note 124, at 23637. 
206. See Act effective Jan. 1, 2014, ch. 2013-98, § 2, 2013 Fla. Laws 1, 2–4 (to 
be codified at FLA. STAT. § 943.0583 (2014)); Clark, supra note 105. 
207. See People v. G.M., 922 N.Y.S.2d 761, 764–66 (Crim. Ct. 2011). 
208. Keisha, Domestic Minor Sex Trafficking, supra note 7. 
209. Id. 
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Keisha’s story is an example of how one victim can successfully use 
her resources and reach out to the community for help.
210
  With Florida’s 
new expungement law in place, Keisha can petition to have her record 
expunged, which she accumulated over years of being trafficked by Mastur 
D.
211
  Florida is moving in the right direction by implementing more victim-
focused laws.
212
  While these laws may not help prevent new trafficking 
crimes, they will certainly help the current and future victims, which is the 
first step in a long battle against human trafficking.
213
 
                                                     
210. Id. 
211. Ch. 2013-98, § 2, 2013 Fla. Laws at 2–4; Keisha, Domestic Minor Sex 
Trafficking, supra note 7. 
212. See FLA. STAT. § 409.1678 (2013); Butler, supra note 124, at 235; Clark, 
supra note 105. 
213. See FLA. STAT. § 409.1678; Clark, supra note 105. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
When you hear the term sex offender, what kind of a person comes 
to mind?  Let me guess:  An eighteen-year-old high school senior with great 
grades and a talent for cheerleading, basketball, and chorus.
1
  Not what you 
had in mind?  Well, in February of this year, Kaitlyn Hunt, an eighteen-year-
old Florida high school student with the attributes listed above, was expelled 
from her high school and was charged with “two counts of lewd and 
lascivious battery of a child [twelve] to [sixteen] years of age.”2 
Kaitlyn and her younger girlfriend met at Sebastian River High 
School in Sebastian, Florida.
3
  Kaitlyn was an eighteen-year-old senior, and 
her girlfriend was a fourteen-year-old freshman at the high school.
4
  There 
was a three year and seven month age difference between the two partners, 
which—as you will soon learn—will be a crucial piece of information in 
determining Kaitlyn’s future sentence.5 
The couple played on the school basketball team and socialized with 
the same circle of friends.
6
  While dating, they engaged in sexual acts 
multiple times before the younger girlfriend’s parents discovered their 
                                                                    
1. Stacey Barchenger, Support Grows for Student Expelled over Same-Sex 
‘Love’, USA TODAY (May 21, 2013, 4:57 PM), http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/
2013/05/21/student-expelled-same-sex-relationship/2345157/. 
2. Stephanie Slifer, Kaitlyn Hunt Update:  Fla. Teen Charged over Same-Sex 
Underage Relationship Speaks Out, CBS NEWS (May 23, 2013, 11:26 AM), 
http://www.cbsnews.com/8301-504083_162-57585885-504083/kaitlyn-hunt-update-fla-teen-
charged-over-same-sex-underage-relationship-speaks-out/. 
3. Jason Parsley, When Did High School Senior Kaitlyn Hunt Meet Her 
Freshman Girlfriend?, SFGN (June 1, 2013), http://www.southfloridagaynews.com/when-did-
high-school-senior-kaitlyn-hunt-meet-her-freshman-girlfriend/122918; Slifer, supra note 2. 
4. Parsley, supra note 3. 
5. Id.; see discussion infra Parts II.B., VI.B.2. 
6. Slifer, supra note 2. 
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relationship.
7
  Once they learned their daughter was dating a girl about three-
and-a-half years older than her, they promptly contacted the police to report 
Kaitlyn.
8
  After rejecting a plea deal that would have sentenced her to two 
years house arrest and one year of probation, Kaitlyn now faces up to fifteen 
years in prison, and may be required to register as a sex offender.
9
 
There is no question as to the importance of statutory rape laws.
10
  
Young teenagers are at risk of being taken advantage of by older individuals 
and they absolutely deserve the legal protection that statutory rape laws 
provide.
11
  Offenders of said laws are usually given lengthy prison 
sentences
12
 and are required to register as sex offenders upon their release.
13
  
However, despite the importance of statutory rape laws it is worth 
questioning whether some of the acts punishable by statutory rape laws—
sexual activity between two otherwise consenting teenagers—are acts that 
should result in such crippling consequences.
14
 
This Comment will analyze whether Florida’s statutory rape laws are 
too harsh on teenage offenders, and whether or not its Romeo and Juliet 
law—a law used to negate the sex offender registration requirement for 
teenage offenders—does enough to protect teenagers from the life-changing 
consequences of being found guilty of statutory rape. 
II. A BRIEF HISTORICAL OVERVIEW OF STATUTORY RAPE LAW 
A. Statutory Rape Laws:  Beginnings 
Statutory rape laws criminalize sexual activity with persons who are 
not yet old enough to legally give consent for sex.
15
  Such laws have been 
enforced in English law for over seven hundred years.
16
  England’s first 
                                                                    
7. Carlos Harrison, Florida Student, 18, Gets Online Support After Her 
Arrest for Sex With Girlfriend, 14, N.Y. TIMES, May 22, 2013, at A20. 
8. Id. 
9. Barchenger, supra note 1; Parsley, supra note 3. 
10. See Steve James, Comment, Romeo and Juliet Were Sex Offenders:  An 
Analysis of the Age of Consent and a Call for Reform, 78 UMKC L. REV. 241, 245–46 (2009). 
11. Id.; see also FLA. STAT. §§ 775.21, 794.05, 800.04, 943.04354 (2013). 
12. See FLA. STAT. §§ 775.21, 794.05, 800.04; see also id. § 775.082. 
13. Id. § 775.21(6). 
14. See Barchenger, supra note 1; see, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 800.04(5)(c)–(d). 
15. Emily J. Stine, Comment, When Yes Means No, Legally:  An Eighth 
Amendment Challenge to Classifying Consenting Teenagers as Sex Offenders, 60 DEPAUL L. 
REV. 1169, 1183 (2011) (describing the intent of Romeo and Juliet laws and why they were 
enacted by some states). 
16. Michelle Oberman, Turning Girls into Women:  Re-Evaluating Modern 
Statutory Rape Law, 85 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 15, 24 (1994) (providing a brief historical 
overview of statutory rape laws). 
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statutory rape law—put into effect in 1275—prohibited children under the 
age of twelve from consenting to sex.
17
  At this time, women were 
considered to be chattel.
18
  Their family would marry them off to another 
family’s son for a bride price.19  Chastity was of significant monetary value 
and a woman’s parents would receive a greater bride price if their daughter 
was chaste at the time she was sold.
20
  For this reason, statutory rape was 
originally considered to be a property crime.
21
  These laws were later 
adopted into American law and they continue to be the foundation of modern 
day statutory rape laws in America.
22
  Statutory rape is considered a strict 
liability offense, eliminating consent as a viable defense.
23
  At the beginning 
of the twentieth century, however, states began to raise the age of consent to 
as high as twenty-one in order to prevent young women from engaging in 
non-marital intercourse.
24
 
B. Age Discrepancy Considerations in Statutory Rape Law 
Originally, the age of the perpetrator had no impact on the severity 
of a punishment for statutory rape because the offender’s age was not 
considered to be an element of the crime.
25
  This led to a failure in 
differentiating between sexual acts amongst peers and sexual exploitation of 
young females by older men.
26
  This is different today; some states take into 
consideration the difference in age between the alleged victim and the 
alleged perpetrator when determining the punishment for statutory rape.
27
 
                                                                    
17. Id.; Anthony M. Amelio, Note, Florida’s Statutory Rape Law:  A Shield 
or a Weapon?—A Minor’s Right of Privacy Under Florida Statutes § 794.05, 26 STETSON L. 
REV. 407, 410 (1996) (providing a historical overview of statutory rape laws). 
18. Rita Eidson, Comment, The Constitutionality of Statutory Rape Laws, 27 
UCLA L. REV. 757, 767 (1980) (explaining the method in which women were once bought 
and sold in marriage). 
19. Id. 
20. See id. 
21. Id. 
22. James, supra note 10, at 245 (providing historical context for statutory 
rape laws). 
23. Amelio, supra note 17, at 410 (explaining how statutory rape laws were 
adopted into the U.S. legal system). 
24. Eidson, supra note 18, at 762–63 (describing how statutory rape laws 
were written at the turn of the twentieth century). 
25. Amelio, supra note 17, at 410 (providing a historical overview of statutory 
rape laws). 
26. Id. at 410–11. 
27. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 794.05 (2013). 
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C. Statutory Rape Laws Today 
There have obviously been significant changes in how women have 
been treated since 1275,
28
 but statutory rape laws are still being enforced 
today.
29
  Instead of protecting women as if they were just a piece of 
property,
30
 statutory rape laws now serve to “‘protect young people from 
coerced sexuality activity; enforce morality; prevent teen pregnancy; and 
reduce welfare dependence.’”31  Florida has two statutory rape laws:  
Sections 794.05
32
 and 800.04 of the Florida Statutes.
33
  Section 794.05 
prohibits a person twenty-four years of age or older from engaging in sexual 
activity with a person between the ages of sixteen and seventeen.
34
  Section 
800.04 prohibits any sexual activity whatsoever with a person between the 
ages of twelve and sixteen.
35
 
Some states have also chosen to put Romeo and Juliet laws into 
effect.
36
  These laws are meant to lessen the punishment of teenage offenders 
under section 800.04 of the Florida Statutes so that they are not punished in 
the exact same manner as adult offenders.
37
  When teenage offenders apply 
for protection under Romeo and Juliet laws, their prison sentences can be 
reduced and their sex offender registration requirement can be dismissed as 
well.
38
 
D. Gender Discrimination in Statutory Rape Law 
Originally, only men could be found guilty of statutory rape.
39
  
Women were viewed as property in need of legal protection.
40
  Despite our 
ever-evolving societal views, however, some statutory rape laws still 
discriminate based on the minor’s gender.41 
                                                                    
28. See Oberman, supra note 16, at 24. 
29. See FLA. STAT. §§ 794.05, 800.04. 
30. James, supra note 10, at 245. 
31. Id. at 246 (explaining the intent behind statutory rape laws). 
32. FLA. STAT. § 794.05. 
33. Id. § 800.04. 
34. Id. § 794.05(1). 
35. Id. § 800.04(4)(a). 
36. Stine, supra note 15, at 1184. 
37. See FLA. STAT. § 943.04354. 
38. See State v. Limon, 122 P.3d 22, 24 (Kan. 2005). 
39. Eidson, supra note 18, at 760–61 (describing the rationale for statutory 
rape laws). 
40. Oberman, supra note 16, at 25 (providing a brief history of statutory rape 
laws). 
41. James, supra note 10, at 252 (explaining that age of consent laws can 
lawfully discriminate based on a person’s gender). 
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In 1981, the Supreme Court of the United States in Michael M. v. 
Superior Court of Sonoma County
42
 questioned the constitutionality of such 
gender-based laws.
43
  In this case, the defendant, a seventeen-year-old male, 
challenged California’s rape law, arguing that the law was unconstitutional 
because it discriminated on the basis of gender.
44
  The Court disagreed and 
upheld the constitutionality of California’s statutory rape law despite the fact 
that the law only allowed men to be held criminally liable.
45
  The Court 
reasoned that a statute will be upheld “where the gender classification is not 
invidious, but rather realistically reflects the fact that the sexes are not 
similarly situated in certain circumstances.”46 
Justice Brennan, in his dissent, admitted that “[c]ommon sense . . . 
suggests . . . gender-neutral statutory rape law[s] [would be] a greater 
deterrent of sexual activity” among minors because the laws would apply to 
more individuals.
47
  Currently, many states have chosen to use a common 
sense approach and now include gender-neutral language in their statutory 
rape laws to allow for the protection, as well as the punishment, of both 
males and females.
48
 
III. SEXUAL BEHAVIOR IN ADOLESCENTS 
Among U.S. high school students, 46% have had sexual intercourse 
at some point.
49
  Additionally, “[m]ore than 400,000 teen[age women] aged 
[fifteen to nineteen] . . . gave birth in 2009.”50  Moreover, the likelihood of a 
teenager having sex in his or her freshman year of high school is 31.6%, 
while the likelihood of a teenager having sex in his or her senior year of high 
school is a whopping 62.3%.
51
 
                                                                    
42. 450 U.S. 464 (1981). 
43. Id. at 466. 
44. Id. at 466–67. 
45. Id. at 467. 
46. Id. at 469. 
47. Michael M., 450 U.S. at 493–94 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
48. See id.; Frances Olsen, Statutory Rape:  A Feminist Critique of Rights 
Analysis, 63 TEX. L. REV. 387, 404 (1984). 
49. 59 CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, DEP’T OF HEALTH & 
HUMAN SERVS., NO. SS–5, MORBIDITY AND MORTALITY WEEKLY REPORT: YOUTH RISK 
BEHAVIOR SURVEILLANCE—UNITED STATES, 2009 20 (2010), available at http://
www.cdc.gov/mmwr/pdf/ss/ss5905.pdf. 
50. Sexual Risk Behavior:  HIV, STD, & Teen Pregnancy Prevention, CDC, 
http://www.cdc.gov/HealthyYouth/sexualbehaviors/ (last updated Aug. 26, 2013). 
51. CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN 
SERVS., supra note 49, at 20. 
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Florida high school statistics show similar trends.
52
  According to the 
Florida Department of Health, which polled 6212 high school students in 
seventy-eight different Florida high schools in 2011, 48.2% of Florida high 
school students had sexual intercourse.
53
  In fact, 7.6% of high school 
students had sexual intercourse for the first time before they reached the age 
of thirteen.
54
  Of the students polled, 43.4% had also participated in oral sex, 
which—as you will soon learn—is also prohibited under Florida’s statutory 
rape laws.
55
 
These statistics are not all that surprising when you consider how 
much sexual content teenagers are being exposed to.
56
  These teenagers are 
more vulnerable to such content than adults because the exposure occurs 
during a period in which sexual attitudes and behaviors are being 
developed.
57
  Statistics show that teenagers who frequently watch 
television—which are many, since the average high school student has 2.9 
televisions in his or her house—“see 143 incidents of sexual behavior on 
network television . . . each week.”58  Shockingly, “80% of all movies shown 
on network or cable television [includes] sexual content.”59  There is no 
doubt that such television content has had an impact on how teenagers view 
and understand sex, as 80% of teenagers reported that they or their peers 
have learned about sex from watching television or movies.
60
 
                                                                    
52. Compare id., with FLA. DEP’T OF HEALTH, SEXUAL BEHAVIORS AMONG 
FLORIDA PUBLIC HIGH SCHOOL STUDENTS:  RESULTS FROM THE 2011 FLORIDA YOUTH RISK 
BEHAVIOR SURVEY 1 (n.d.), available at http://www.floridahealth.gov/reports-and-data/
survey-data/youth-risk-surveys/youth-risk-behavior-survey/reports/2011/_documents/sex-
behavior.pdf#search=%22sexual%20behaviors%20among%20high%20school%20students%2
2. 
53. FLA. DEP’T OF HEALTH, supra note 52. 
54. Id. 
55. Id.; see also FLA. STAT. § 800.04(1)(a) (2013). 
56. See Enid Gruber & Joel W. Grube, Adolescent Sexuality and the Media:  
A Review of Current Knowledge and Implications, 172 W.J. MED. 210, 211 (2000), available 
at http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC1070813/pdf/wjm17200210.pdf (providing 
statistics about sexuality in the media). 
57. Id. 
58. Id. 
59. Id. 
60. Id. 
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IV. FLORIDA STATUTES § 800.04—LEWD AND LASCIVIOUS BATTERY ON 
A CHILD TWELVE TO SIXTEEN YEARS OF AGE 
A. Definitions in Florida Statutes § 800.04 
1. Sexual Activity 
“‘Sexual activity’ means the oral, anal, or vaginal penetration by, or 
union with, the sexual organ of another or the anal or vaginal penetration of 
another by any other object; however, sexual activity does not include an act 
done for a bona fide medical purpose.”61 
In Burnett v. State,
62
 the First District Court of Appeal held that the 
defendant was not guilty of lewd and lascivious battery towards a minor 
when he engaged in inappropriate activities involving pornographic films 
with minors and did not participate in any physical sexual acts.
63
 
In this case, there was evidence that the defendant had watched adult 
pornography with at least two minors.
64
  The defendant was charged and 
found guilty of two counts of lewd and lascivious conduct, which he 
appealed.
65
  The defendant moved for a judgment of acquittal arguing that 
there was no evidence that he actually participated in any kind of physical 
sexual act with the minors.
66
  The appellate court agreed, holding that 
because there was no evidence of the defendant committing a lewd and 
lascivious act on the minors, he could not be found guilty under section 
800.04(4) of the Florida Statutes.
67
 
2. Consent 
“‘Consent’ means intelligent, knowing, and voluntary consent, and 
does not include submission by coercion.”68  Supporters of statutory rape 
laws argue that sexual activity between two people, regardless of how close 
in age both parties may be, cannot be considered consensual if one party is 
below the age of consent.
69
  Opponents of statutory rape laws, however, 
argue that these laws—many times—punish teenagers who are engaging in 
what would otherwise be considered—if not for their young age—wholly 
                                                                    
61. FLA. STAT. § 800.04(1)(a) (2013). 
62. 737 So. 2d 1106 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1998) (per curiam). 
63. Id. at 1107. 
64. Id. 
65. Id. 
66. Id. 
67. Burnett, 737 So. 2d at 1107; see also FLA. STAT. § 800.04(4) (2013). 
68. FLA. STAT. § 800.04(1)(b). 
69. Stine, supra note 15, at 1183. 
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consensual sex.
70
  Proponents of statutory rape laws have argued that acts 
that would legally be classified as consensual sex are—in reality—not 
wholly consensual when dealing with teenage girls, due to manipulation by 
older adults.
71
 
Michelle Oberman—in her law review article titled Turning Girls 
into Women:  Re-Evaluating Modern Statutory Rape Law—discusses 
Antioch College and the college’s attempt to create a system that would 
assure consensual sex.
72
  In this system, one partner would ask the other for 
verbal consent for each separate act of intimacy.
73
  This method was 
criticized for “tak[ing] all the fun out of sex,” which in Oberman’s opinion, 
“provides ample evidence of the entrenchment of the hazy spectrum that 
separates consensual sex from rape.”74  Consent is clearly a major element in 
sexual relationships, yet it is overlooked in statutory rape cases due to the 
language of these laws, which strictly prohibits minors from being able to 
give such consent.
75
 
3. Coercion 
“‘Coercion’ means the use of exploitation, bribes, threats of force, or 
intimidation to gain cooperation or compliance.”76  In her article, Oberman 
explains that despite the intent of statutory rape laws, which is to protect 
teenage girls who are at risk of being coerced into having sex, the teenage 
girls’ vulnerabilities are overlooked.77  Instead, statutory rape laws require 
courts to focus simply on the age differences between the parties.
78
 
4. Victim 
“‘Victim’ means a person upon whom an offense described in this 
section was committed or attempted or a person who has reported a violation 
of this section to a law enforcement officer.”79  The common perception of a 
                                                                    
70. Id. at 1183–84. 
71. Oberman, supra note 16, at 70 (pointing out the short-sightedness of 
statutory rape laws when dealing with teenage girls who can be easily manipulated). 
72. Id. at 71 (explaining the increasing difficulty of differentiating between 
permissible and impermissible sexual encounters). 
73. Id. 
74. Id. 
75. Id. at 42; see also, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 800.04(2) (2013). 
76. FLA. STAT. § 800.04(1)(c). 
77. Oberman, supra note 16, at 42 (arguing that the vulnerability of teenage 
women is overlooked in statutory rape laws). 
78. Id. 
79. FLA. STAT. § 800.04(1)(d). 
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victim—which usually involves an individual being hurt or injured—may not 
always apply in statutory rape cases; a minor in a sexual relationship—
regardless of how honest and consensual such a relationship may be—is 
considered a victim.
80
 
B. The Text of Florida Statutes § 800.04 
Section 800.04 states, “[n]either the victim’s lack of chastity nor the 
victim’s consent is a defense to the crimes proscribed by this section.”81  The 
statute also says, “[t]he perpetrator’s ignorance of the victim’s age, the 
victim’s misrepresentation of his or her age, or the perpetrator’s bona fide 
belief of the victim’s age cannot be raised as a defense in a prosecution under 
this section.”82  Lewd or lascivious battery—the charge that Kaitlyn is 
currently being charged with—occurs when: 
A person . . . [e]ngages in sexual activity with a person [twelve] 
years of age or older but less than [sixteen] years of age; or . . . 
[e]ncourages, forces, or entices any person less than [sixteen] years 
of age to engage in sadomasochistic abuse, sexual bestiality, 
prostitution, or any other act involving sexual activity commits 
lewd or lascivious battery, a felony of the second degree . . . .
83
 
Therefore, a person under the age of sixteen in Florida is unable to consent to 
sexual activity, regardless of the age of the defendant.
84
 
C. The Effectiveness of Florida Statutes § 800.04 
Section 800.04 continues to be upheld because the State of Florida 
has determined that these laws are necessary to protect its youth, which is 
considered a compelling state interest.
85
  It is important to note, however, 
that these laws have not been known to be effective in preventing consenting 
teenagers from having sex with one another.
86
  The ineffectiveness of these 
laws at deterring teenagers from having sex puts the future of many high 
school students in doubt, as many of them will be required to register as sex 
                                                                    
80. See Oberman, supra note 16, at 25. 
81. FLA. STAT. § 800.04(2). 
82. Id. § 800.04(3). 
83. Id. § 800.04(4). 
84. See id. 
85. Amelio, supra note 17, at 422 (pointing out Florida’s compelling interest 
in protecting its youth). 
86. See Stine, supra note 15, at 1212–13 (explaining that very few teenagers 
who are sexually active are actually prosecuted). 
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offenders for the rest of their lives.
87
  The consequences of carrying such a 
label can be absolutely devastating.
88
 
V. CONSEQUENCES OF HAVING TO REGISTER AS A SEX OFFENDER 
The public strongly supports sex offender registration and 
notification laws because of the popular belief that having knowledge of 
where sex offenders live in a person’s community will help protect them or 
their children from future sex crimes.
89
  This view is not without merit, as 
some sex offenders may repeat past unlawful sexual acts, which would pose 
a serious risk to people in the community.
90
 
The Florida Sexual Predators Act—which aims to protect the 
community from sexual predators—enforces a number of requirements and 
prohibitions on registered sex offenders.
91
  The statute reasons that because 
of “[t]he high level of threat that a sexual predator presents to the public 
safety, and the long-term effects suffered by victims of sex offenses,” there is 
a significant state interest to monitor the release of sexual predators into the 
community, monitor the supervision of these sexual predators released into 
the community, enforce registration and notification laws, restrict certain 
employment opportunities for sex offenders, and create strict residency 
requirements.
92
  The legislature—despite their good intentions—even admits 
that “the cost of sexual offender victimization to society at large, while 
incalculable, [is] clearly exorbitant.”93 
Although there is surely a need to prevent these wrongful acts, the 
majority of research shows that the sex offender registration and notification 
laws have proven to be largely ineffective.
94
  Critics of such policies argue 
that “sex offender laws do not work, that is, they do not reduce sex offenses; 
. . . the stigmatizing and ostracizing effects of registration, notification, and 
residency restriction[s] may encourage the violent behavior they are aimed to 
deter.”95  This argument is sound, as these policies have been known to have 
                                                                    
87. Id. at 1214–15. 
88. Id. at 1215. 
89. Jill Levenson & Richard Tewksbury, Collateral Damage:  Family 
Members of Registered Sex Offenders, 34 AM. J. CRIM. JUST. 54, 55 (2009). 
90. Doe v. City of Albuquerque, 667 F.3d 1111, 1134 (10th Cir. 2012). 
91. FLA. STAT. § 775.21(3)(b) (2013). 
92. Id. 
93. Id. § 775.21(3)(a). 
94. Levenson & Tewksbury, supra note 89, at 55. 
95. Joseph J. Fischel, Transcendent Homosexuals and Dangerous Sex 
Offenders:  Sexual Harm and Freedom in the Judicial Imaginary, 17 DUKE J. GENDER L. & 
POL’Y 277, 286 (2010) (explaining the ineffectiveness of statutory rape laws in regards to 
reducing sex offenses). 
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a significantly negative impact on the lives of both sexual offenders and their 
families.
96
 
A. Employment Opportunities 
As a result of the registration and notification laws required by the 
Florida Sexual Predators Act, up to half of all sex offenders experience a 
decrease in employment opportunities.
97
  This is troubling because studies 
have shown the “lack of stable employment” to be a central factor in sexual 
offenders repeating their past criminal behavior.
98
  Not only does the Florida 
Sexual Predators Act restrict sex offenders from working near places where 
children frequently visit, but these sex offenders “are also excluded from 
working in [such] fields . . . as law, real estate, medicine, nursing, physical 
therapy, and education.”99 
If that were not bad enough, when sex offenders are finally able to 
find jobs that they are not restricted from obtaining, employers are still 
reluctant to hire these individuals because of their criminal past.
100
  In fact, in 
“[a] survey of employers in five major” U.S. cities, two-thirds of the 
employers answered that they would never hire a sex offender.
101
  Sadly, the 
lack of employment opportunities has led many registered sex offenders to 
live a life of crime to support themselves and their families.
102
  This pattern 
just serves to reinforce the already unfavorable perception of sex 
offenders.
103
 
B. Residential Restrictions 
Most states require that sex offenders live a certain distance away 
from “schools, daycare centers, parks, [and school] bus stops.”104  The intent 
of these restrictions is to decrease the possibility that a sex offender could 
commit future sex crimes by diminishing his or her opportunities to commit 
such crimes again.
105
  To put into perspective the extreme inconvenience 
                                                                    
96. Levenson & Tewksbury, supra note 89, at 57. 
97. Id. at 55; see FLA. STAT. § 775.21(6), (7). 
98. James L. Johnson, Sex Offenders on Federal Community Supervision:  
Factors That Influence Revocation, 70 FED. PROBATION 18, 19 (2006). 
99. Id.; see also FLA. STAT. § 775.21(3)(b)(5). 
100. Johnson, supra note 98, at 19. 
101. Id. 
102. See id. at 20. 
103. See id. at 19–20. 
104. Levenson & Tewksbury, supra note 89, at 56. 
105. Stine, supra note 15, at 1183 (discussing the rationale behind residency 
restrictions). 
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these restrictions could cause a sex offender and his or her family, consider 
this:  In the city of Orlando, a whopping 95% of residential homes fall within 
1000 feet of a school, daycare center, school bus stop, or park, leaving only 
5% of the city available for them to live in.
106
 
Some states have even been known to enforce larger safety zones 
than are required by law.
107
  In Miami Beach, for example, sex offenders are 
prohibited from residing in homes within 2500 feet away from a school if the 
victim was under the age of sixteen.
108
  These strict policies prevent sex 
offenders from living stable lives, which have proven to be 
counterproductive in trying to reduce instances of recidivism.
109
 
Even when sex offenders are able to finally find a home to settle 
down in, in 20 to 40% of cases, the sex offender is forced to move out of his 
or her home at the request of his or her landlord or neighbors after they 
receive notification of their sex offender label.
110
  Not surprisingly, these 
residency restrictions have left a large number of registered “sex offenders 
homeless throughout the state [of Florida].”111 
C. Impact on the Family 
As stated earlier, classifying somebody as a sex offender not only 
has an adverse impact on the offender’s life, but on the lives of his or her 
loved ones as well.
112
  While residency restrictions are intended to keep sex 
offenders away from certain areas, they also indirectly prevent the spouses 
and children living with sex offenders—individuals who may not have been 
charged with sex crimes—from living in close proximity to these areas as 
well.
113
  As a result, the children of sex offenders are forced to live farther 
away from schools, which can be quite an inconvenience for the family.
114
 
As far as their social life is concerned, a survey of the family 
members of registered sex offenders revealed that 86% experienced stress in 
                                                                    
106. Levenson & Tewksbury, supra note 89, at 56. 
107. Kari White, Note, Where Will They Go? Sex Offender Residency 
Restrictions as Modern-Day Banishment, 59 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 161, 170 (2008) 
(explaining that some states go above and beyond what statutory rape laws require in regards 
to residency restrictions for sex offenders). 
108. Id. 
109. Stine, supra note 15, at 1183 (arguing that strict residency restrictions 
prevent sex offenders from living stable lives, which could be the cause of some offenders 
repeating past criminal behavior). 
110. Levenson & Tewksbury, supra note 89, at 55–56. 
111. White, supra note 107, at 170 (explaining the serious consequences of 
being labeled a sex offender). 
112. Levenson & Tewksbury, supra note 89, at 57. 
113. Id. 
114. Id. 
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their lives, 77% felt isolated, and 49% had fear for their own safety.
115
  Half 
of the family members polled had lost friends as a result of their family 
member becoming a sex offender, and many who were polled admitted that 
being in a family with a registered sex offender kept them from participating 
in community events.
116
 
Unfortunately, the children of sex offenders suffer tremendous 
emotional strain from their parents’ label.117  More than half of the family 
members polled said that the children of sex offenders were treated badly by 
their classmates.
118
  Children of sex offenders are reported to feel increased 
“anger (80%), depression (77%), anxiety (73%), [loneliness] (65%), and fear 
[for their safety] (63%).”119  Perhaps the most disturbing fact of all is that 
“one in eight . . . children of [sex offenders] were reported to [experience] 
suicidal tendencies.”120  The statistics are clear:  Sexual registration 
requirements will have an extremely negative effect not only on the actual 
offender, but extend to the offender’s family as well.121 
D. The Lasting Effects of Registering as a Sex Offender 
In 2009, a Michigan appellate court held that forcing a “teenager 
[who was] convicted of [having] consensual [intercourse] with his below-
the-age-of-consent girlfriend” to register as a sex offender was considered 
cruel and unusual punishment.
122
  “Sex offender registration [could be 
considered a] modern day scarlet letter,” and as a result, the decision to 
classify a person as a sex offender should not be taken lightly.
123
  For this 
reason, some states—including Florida—have chosen to put Romeo and 
Juliet laws into place to protect consenting teenagers from having to register 
as sex offenders.
124
  These laws, however, are far from perfect. 
                                                                    
115. Id. at 57. 
116. Id. 
117. Levenson & Tewksbury, supra note 89, at 63–64. 
118. Id. at 63. 
119. Id. at 63–64. 
120. Id. at 64. 
121. Id. at 63–64. 
122. Stine, supra note 15, at 1188 (providing past constitutional challenges to 
sex offender laws). 
123. Catherine L. Carpenter, The Constitutionality of Strict Liability in Sex 
Offender Registration Laws, 86 B.U. L. REV. 295, 324 (2006) (describing the serious 
consequences of having to register as a sex offender). 
124. Id.; Stine, supra note 15, at 1184; see also FLA. STAT. § 943.04354 (2013). 
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VI. FLORIDA STATUTES § 943.04354THE ROMEO AND JULIET LAW 
A. Text of Florida’s Romeo and Juliet Law 
(1) For purposes of this section, a person shall be considered for 
removal of the requirement to register as a sexual offender or 
sexual predator only if the person: 
(a) Was or will be convicted or adjudicated delinquent of a 
violation of . . . [section] 800.04 . . . ; 
(b) Is required to register as a sexual offender or sexual predator 
solely on the basis of this violation; and 
(c) Is not more than [four] years older than the victim of this 
violation who was [fourteen] years of age or older but not more 
than [seventeen] years of age at the time the person committed this 
violation. 
(2) If a person meets the criteria in subsection (1) and the violation 
of . . . [section] 800.04 . . . was committed on or after July 1, 2007, 
the person may move the court that will sentence or dispose of this 
violation to remove the requirement that the person register as a 
sexual offender or sexual predator.  The person must allege in the 
motion that . . . [the] removal of the registration requirement will 
not conflict with federal law.  The state attorney must be given 
notice of the motion at least [twenty-one] days before the date of 
sentencing or disposition of this violation and may present 
evidence in opposition to the requested relief or may otherwise 
demonstrate why the motion should be denied.  At sentencing or 
disposition of this violation, the court shall rule on this motion and, 
if the court determines the person meets the criteria in subsection 
(1) and the removal of the registration requirement will not conflict 
with federal law, it may grant the motion and order the removal of 
the registration requirement.  If the court denies the motion, the 
person is not authorized under this section to petition for removal 
of the registration requirement.
125
 
 
B. Legal Authority Regarding Florida’s Romeo and Juliet Law 
Over the past decade, some states have implemented Romeo and 
Juliet laws, which absolve certain teenagers from having to register as sex 
                                                                    
125. FLA. STAT. § 943.04354(1)–(2). 
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offenders.
126
  These provisions were created to “impose lighter penalties 
when both parties are underage, while maintaining strict penalties for sex 
between an adult and a minor,” because some states believe that “sex 
between two young people is . . . less punishable than sex between a young 
person and an adult.”127 
An offender under section 800.04 of the Florida Statutes is 
automatically labeled a sex offender unless the offender satisfies three 
elements.
128
  First, the offender must be no “more than [four] years older 
than the victim.”129  Second, the offender must have been “required to 
register as a sex[] offender” solely for that offense.130  Third, the offender 
must have not been charged with multiple sex crimes.
131
 
If the offender were to satisfy all three of these elements, the 
offender would have the potential to take advantage of the Romeo and Juliet 
exception to remove the registration requirement.
132
  The following cases 
provide authority as to when and how the Romeo and Juliet law could be 
applied. 
1. Defendants Charged with Multiple Sex Crimes 
In Courson v. State,
133
 the Second District Court of Appeal held that 
the defendant—who was charged on two separate occasions under section 
800.04(4) of the Florida Statutes—did not qualify for the Romeo and Juliet 
exception because the law requires that an applicant not be charged with 
multiple sex crimes.
134
 
The defendant was found guilty of two separate charges of “lewd 
and lascivious battery of a victim over [twelve] but [fewer than sixteen] 
years of age.”135  “He was [then] sentenced to three years [in prison], 
followed by five years of probation, and [was labeled] a sex[] offender.”136  
The defendant tried to apply the Romeo and Juliet law to remove the 
requirement that he register as a sex offender, but his motion was denied by 
                                                                    
126. Stine, supra note 15, at 1184 (providing a brief history of Romeo and 
Juliet laws). 
127. Sabrina A. Perelman, Note, A Step in the Right Direction:  How Kansas v. 
Limon Indicates a Brighter Future for Gay Rights Under Lawrence v. Texas, 7 GEO. J. 
GENDER & L. 217, 240 (2006) (explaining the rationale behind Romeo and Juliet laws). 
128. FLA. STAT. §§ 800.04, 943.04354(1). 
129. Id. § 943.04354(1)(c). 
130. Id. § 943.04354(1)(b). 
131. Id. § 943.04354(1)(a). 
132. Id. § 943.04354(2). 
133. 24 So. 3d 1249 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 2009). 
134. Id. at 125051; see also FLA. STAT. §§ 800.04(4), 943.04354(1)(a). 
135. Courson, 24 So. 3d at 1250. 
136. Id. 
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the trial court.
137
  The trial court agreed with the State, and the defendant 
appealed.
138
 
On appeal, the defendant argued that although the Romeo and Juliet 
law requires that the defendant not be convicted of more than one section 
800.04 crime, denying him usage of the Romeo and Juliet law would be to 
disregard the legislature’s true intent, which was to keep young lovers in 
consensual relationships from being branded as sex offenders for the rest of 
their lives.
139
  The State, on the other hand, argued that the plain language of 
the statute denied the defendant the right to take advantage of the Romeo and 
Juliet law.
140
 
The appellate court agreed that “[i]f the language is clear and 
unambiguous, there is no need to engage in statutory construction, and the 
statute should be given its plain and obvious meaning.”141  Therefore, 
because the statute clearly states that offenders with multiple sex crime 
convictions are not able to remove their sex offender registration 
requirement, the defendant was unable to take advantage of the Romeo and 
Juliet exception.
142
 
The appellate court’s holding was consistent with the express terms 
of the statute but contrary to the original legislative intent.
143
  Regardless, the 
court would not hold otherwise because to modify the statute’s express terms 
would be an abuse of the court’s power.144  In other words, its hands were 
tied. 
2. The Law’s Strict Age Limit 
In State v. Welch,
145
 the Second District Court of Appeal held that 
because the defendant was slightly more than four years older than his minor 
girlfriend when she became pregnant with his child, the defendant did not 
meet the elements required to use the Romeo and Juliet Statute to remove his 
sex offender registration requirement.
146
 
                                                                    
137. Id.; see also FLA. STAT. § 943.04354(1)–(2). 
138. Courson, 24 So. 3d at 1250. 
139. Id.; see also FLA. STAT. §§ 800.04, 943.04354(1)(a). 
140. Courson, 24 So. 3d at 1250. 
141. Id. at 1251 (citing Jackson Cnty. Hosp. Corp. v. Aldrich, 835 So. 2d 318, 
329 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 2002), review granted sub nom. Bay Anesthesia, Inc. v. Aldrich, 
847 So. 2d 975 (2003)). 
142. Id. at 1251; FLA. STAT. § 943.04354(1)(a). 
143. Courson, 24 So. 3d at 1251. 
144. Id. 
145. 94 So. 3d 631 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App.), reh’g denied, No. 2D11-2911, 
2012 Fla. App. LEXIS 15191 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2012). 
146. Id. at 634. 
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At the time the victim became pregnant with the defendant’s child, 
the victim was fourteen years old, and the defendant was eighteen years 
old.
147
  They were in a relationship with one another, and the defendant was 
aware of the victim’s younger age.148  The defendant, who was four years, 
two months, and twenty days older than his girlfriend, was charged with the 
“second-degree felony of lewd or lascivious battery on a female under 
sixteen years of age.”149  The defendant was adjudicated guilty, placed on 
probation for ten years, and labeled a sex offender.
150
 
After his probation, the defendant attempted to take advantage of the 
Romeo and Juliet law to remove this requirement to register as a sexual 
offender.
151
  The State opposed, arguing that although the sexual conduct 
between the victim and the defendant was consensual, the defendant did not 
meet the element of the statute that requires the defendant be no more than 
four years older than the victim at the time of the violation.
152
  Despite this 
argument, the trial court ruled in favor of the defendant, and reasoned that 
the ages at the time of the offense—eighteen and fourteen—could be 
considered a four-year difference.
153
  The trial court stated that its decision 
was ‘“equitable under the circumstances”’ because, in the last ten years, the 
defendant had completed his sex offender treatment, he had married another 
woman, and had been having unsupervised contact with the children from his 
marriage.
154
 
The State later appealed this ruling, and the case was brought to the 
appellate court.
155
  The higher court then reversed the lower court’s ruling, 
holding that the language, “‘“not more than [four] years older than the 
victim,”’”156 is clear, and that construction of its interpretation was not 
necessary.
157
  Therefore, the court had no choice but to hold that he did not 
meet the requirements of the Romeo and Juliet law because the defendant 
was more than four years older than the victim.
158
 
                                                                    
147. Id. at 633. 
148. Id. 
149. Id. 
150. Welch, 94 So. 3d at 633. 
151. Id. 
152. Id. 
153. Id. 
154. Id. 
155. Welch, 94 So. 3d at 633. 
156. Id. at 634 (quoting State v. Marcel, 67 So. 3d 1223, 1225 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. 
App. 2011)); FLA. STAT. § 943.04354 (2013). 
157. Welch, 94 So. 3d at 634 (quoting Marcel, 67 So. 3d at 1225). 
158. Id. 
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Erasing all doubt as to what the phrase not more than four years 
meant, the court in State v. Marcel
159
 held that “[i]f a defendant [was] one 
day [older than] the four-year . . . limit, . . . he [would be] ineligible to” use 
the Romeo and Juliet law to pardon his sex offender registration 
requirement.
160
  The defendant was charged with one count of lewd or 
lascivious battery of a person over the age of twelve but under the age of 
sixteen because he “was four years, three months, and eight days older than 
the victim.”161  The defendant was initially labeled a sex offender, but once 
the Romeo and Juliet law was enacted, the trial court granted relief to the 
defendant.
162
 
The State appealed, arguing that the defendant had not met the 
criteria required for the Romeo and Juliet law because he was more than four 
years older than the victim.
163
  The defendant disagreed and argued that 
completed years of life, not months and days, should be used when 
determining whether an offender is “not . . . more than four years older than 
[a] victim.”164  This interpretation, known as the birthday rule, would not 
consider a defendant to “be more than four years older than [a] victim until . . 
. [he] was five years older.”165 
The appellate court rejected this argument and explained that the 
Romeo and Juliet law requires an analysis of time and the birthday rule was 
only meant to calculate age.
166
  The court also reasoned that because the 
Romeo and Juliet law uses the word more—“commonly understood to mean 
greater”—the law’s language was clear as to whether or not the defendant 
was more than four years older than the victim.
167
  The court went even 
further, stating, “[i]f a defendant is one day past the four-year eligibility limit 
prescribed by section 943.04354 of the Florida Statutes, he is ineligible to 
petition for relief.”168  Therefore, because of the strict interpretation of the 
Romeo and Juliet law, the defendant was unable to petition for removal of 
his sex offender registration requirement.
169
 
                                                                    
159. 67 So. 3d 1223 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 2011). 
160. Id. at 1225; see also FLA. STAT. § 943.04354(1)(c). 
161. Marcel, 67 So. 3d at 1224; see also FLA. STAT. § 800.04(4)(a). 
162. Marcel, 67 So. 3d at 1224. 
163. Id.; see also FLA. STAT. § 943.04354(1)(c). 
164. Marcel, 67 So. 3d at 1224. 
165. Id. 
166. Id. 
167. Id. at 1225; see also FLA. STAT. § 943.04354(1)(c). 
168. Marcel, 67 So. 3d at 1225; see also FLA. STAT. § 943.04354(1)(c). 
169. Marcel, 67 So. 3d at 1225. 
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3. Sexual Orientation Discrimination in Romeo and Juliet Laws 
Unfortunately, not only are some statutory rape laws gender-biased, 
some are biased regarding sexual orientation as well.
170
  As shown in State v. 
Limon,
171
 the penalties in statutory rape cases can be much harsher for same-
sex couples than for heterosexual couples.
172
  In this case, the defendant had 
just turned eighteen years old when he participated in consensual oral sex 
with a fourteen-year-old.
173
  The defendant was less than four years older 
than the victim, so the defendant was young enough to take advantage of 
Kansas’ Romeo and Juliet law.174  Unfortunately for the defendant, however, 
Kansas’ Romeo and Juliet law did not provide protection for individuals in 
homosexual relationships.
175
  Therefore, because the defendant’s partner was 
of the same sex, he was unable to use the Romeo and Juliet law exception 
and was sentenced to seventeen years in prison.
176
 
The defendant appealed and the Kansas Supreme Court reversed the 
lower court’s decision.177  The court held that the discrimination of a same-
sex relationship in its Romeo and Juliet statute violated the Equal Protection 
Clause and, therefore, was unconstitutional.
178
  As a result, the defendant’s 
sentence was reduced from seventeen years in prison to one year in prison.
179
 
However, Kansas is not the only state that has discriminatory 
language against same-sex couples in its statutory rape laws.
180
  Currently, 
Texas prohibits homosexuals from taking advantage of its Romeo and Juliet 
statute.
181
  There has recently been a legislative push to include same-sex 
couples in this law, but as of today, homosexual teenagers in Texas cannot 
                                                                    
170. James, supra note 10, at 253 (providing an instance of discrimination in a 
Romeo and Juliet law). 
171. 122 P.3d 22 (Kan. 2005). 
172. James, supra note 10, at 253; Kate Sutherland, From Jailbird to Jailbait:  
Age of Consent Laws and the Construction of Teenage Sexualities, 9 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN 
& L. 313, 327 (2003) (discussing the discrimination of same-sex couples in Romeo and Juliet 
laws). 
173. Limon, 122 P.3d at 24. 
174. Id. 
175. Id. 
176. Sutherland, supra note 172, at 327. 
177. Limon, 122 P.3d at 41. 
178. Id. at 40; James, supra note 10, at 253. 
179. See James, supra note 10, at 253; Sutherland, supra note 172, at 327. 
180. See Jim Vertuno, Bills Would Add Gays to Texas’ ‘Romeo and Juliet’ 
Law, STAR-TELEGRAM (Apr. 8, 2013), http://www.star-telegram.com/2013/04/08/4759215/
bills-would-add-gays-to-texas.html. 
181. Id. 
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use the Romeo and Juliet law to remove their sex offender registration 
requirement.
182
 
VII. OPINION 
A. Why Florida’s Statutory Rape Law Is Too Harsh on Otherwise 
Consenting Teenagers 
The purpose of this Comment is not to condone teenage sex; it is to 
bring to light that the consequences of section 800.04(4) of the Florida 
Statutes regarding consenting teenagers—which can be as severe as serving 
fifteen years in prison—are unintended consequences.183  Instead of 
providing real, effective ways to communicate to teenagers why abstaining 
from sexual activity at such a young age is a viable option, the statute seeks 
to imprison teenagers who have already engaged in sexual activity.
184
  This 
law does not deter consenting teenagers from engaging in sex, but merely 
punishes those who have already done so.
185
 
The Model Penal Code (“MPC”), a statutory text written by the 
American Law Institute, argues that teens close in age should not be held 
criminally liable for partaking in oral or vaginal sex.
186
  The American Law 
Institute reasons that because of the greater likelihood that teenagers would 
be otherwise consenting participants in sexual activity, criminal law should 
not target such activity.
187
  Additionally, the MPC states that criminal 
liability against only the older party of an otherwise consenting teenage 
relationship is unfair.
188
  Some states agree with this reasoning and have 
completely decriminalized sex amongst consenting teenagers altogether.
189
  
With a growing number of states implementing Romeo and Juliet laws, it is 
clear that states do not find such severe punishments against consenting 
                                                                    
182. Id. 
183. FLA. STAT. §§ 775.082(3)(c), 800.04(4) (2013). 
184. Id. § 800.04(4), (5)(b)(d), (6)(b)(c); see also id. § 775.082; Stine, supra 
note 15, at 1212–15. 
185. See FLA. STAT. § 800.04(4), (5)(b)(d), (6)(b)(c); Stine, supra note 15, at 
1212–15. 
186. MODEL PENAL CODE § 213.3 (Proposed Official Draft 1962); Siji A. 
Moore, Note, Out of the Fire and into the Frying Pan:  Georgia Legislature’s Attempt to 
Regulate Teen Sex Through the Criminal Justice System, 52 HOW. L.J. 197, 224 (2008) 
(providing an argument posed by the MPC). 
187. MODEL PENAL CODE § 213.3 (Proposed Official Draft 1962); Moore, 
supra note 186, at 224. 
188. MODEL PENAL CODE § 213.3 (Proposed Official Draft 1962); Moore, 
supra note 186, at 224. 
189. Olsen, supra note 48, at 404 (discussing recent revisions of statutory rape 
laws). 
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teenagers to be just.
190
  Even these Romeo and Juliet exceptions, however, do 
not do enough to protect teenagers from the severe consequences of statutory 
rape laws.
191
 
B. Why Florida’s Romeo and Juliet Law Does Not Do Enough to 
Protect Otherwise Consenting Teenagers 
In the Welch case, Justice Morris, in his concurring opinion, 
discussed the injustice of the appellate court’s holding that the defendant—
who was four years and two months older than his girlfriend—would be 
unable to use the Romeo and Juliet exception to remove the requirement to 
register as a sex offender: 
This case profoundly illustrates the manifest injustice 
which can result when a statute has rigid criteria that prevents a 
trial judge from exercising reasonable discretion.  Judge Stargel, 
the trial judge in this case, attempted to exercise such discretion in 
the application of this statute.  The facts of this case cry out for the 
result he reached.  Regrettably, the requirements of the law do not 
permit us to support his decision. 
Is there a societal interest in prohibiting an eighteen-year-
old boyfriend and fourteen-year-old girlfriend from having 
consensual sexual relations?  The answer to that question is 
obvious; of course there is.  Mr. Welch should be punished for this 
behavior, and he was.  However, is it really the will of the people 
to label the eighteen-year-old in this situation a sex offender for 
life?  Is Mr. Welch who we really think of when we contemplate 
the definition of what a sex offender is or should be?  I doubt most 
people would include him in this category.
192
 
Although these Romeo and Juliet laws help protect most consenting 
teenagers, some teenagers continue to fall victim to the laws’ strict 
construction.
193
  These high school seniors, because they are more than four 
years older than their partners, end up receiving the same exact punishment 
as much older adult sex offenders.
194
 
                                                                    
190. Stine, supra note 15, at 1184; see also FLA. STAT. § 943.04354. 
191. See State v. Welch, 94 So. 3d 631, 634–35 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App.) 
(Morris, J., concurring), reh’g denied, No. 2D11-2911, 2012 Fla. App. LEXIS 15191 (Fla. 2d 
Dist. Ct. App. 2012). 
192. Id. 
193. See, e.g., id. 
194. See, e.g., id. 
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We need to use a common sense approach here:  There is no 
substantive difference between a relationship in which an offender is 3 years 
and 364 days older than his or her partner and a relationship where an 
offender is four years and one day older than his or her partner.  Even if there 
were a substantive difference, it surely should not amount to enough of a 
difference that one party be labeled a sex offender, while the other party is 
not.  According to Florida’s statutory rape laws, however, this distinction is 
justifiable.
195
 
VIII. THE SOLUTION 
Kaitlyn is not a sexual predator who sought to take advantage of a 
younger girl.
196
  Kaitlyn is just a girl who had a crush on her friend.
197
  There 
is no doubt that when looking from the outside in, there seems to be a 
difference in maturity between an eighteen-year-old and a fourteen-year-
old.
198
  But who is to say that all teenagers act their own age?  When Kaitlyn 
was asked whether she thought it was wrong of her to be in a sexual 
relationship with her girlfriend because of their age difference, she responded 
“‘that she did not think about it because (redacted) acted older.’”199  Instead 
of sentencing teenagers like Kaitlyn to fifteen years in prison—a punishment 
that has not been shown to prevent consenting teens from beginning sexual 
relationships
200—we should lower the sentences for consenting teenagers and 
provide services to help both the offender and the victim understand the 
consequences and risks that come with entering into a sexual relationship.
201
 
If our true intent is to prevent teenagers from having sex at such an 
early age, there needs to be a more beneficial outcome than locking teenagers 
in prison for fifteen years and robbing many of them of promising futures.  It 
would not be surprising in the least if neither Kaitlyn nor her girlfriend knew 
that they were even breaking the law.
202
  This lack of effectiveness in 
deterring underage sex is the statute’s biggest flaw.203 
While Kaitlyn may still be able to apply the Romeo and Juliet statute 
to remove her sex offender registration requirement, she still faces up to 
                                                                    
195. See FLA. STAT. § 943.04354. 
196. See Barchenger, supra note 1. 
197. See id. 
198. See id. 
199. Id. 
200. Stine, supra note 15, at 1212–13 (explaining the ineffectiveness of rape 
laws in regards to consenting teenagers); see also FLA. STAT. §§ 775.082, 800.04. 
201. See, e.g., Stine, supra note 15, at 1211–12, 1214–16, 1224–25. 
202. See Barchenger, supra note 1. 
203. See FLA. STAT. § 943.04354; Stine, supra note 15, at 1212–14. 
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fifteen years in prison.
204
  Not all teenagers charged with statutory rape will 
be as lucky—if you can call it that—as they may be slightly too old to use 
the Romeo and Juliet exception.
205
  Instead of using such a strict numbering 
system to determine whether a teenager should be labeled a sex offender, a 
totality of the circumstances approach should be implemented to determine 
so. 
Whether the teenagers were in the same high school, whether they 
shared the same friends, whether the older partner truly had good 
intentions—this is information that is important and should actually be 
weighed in the legal process.  The current Romeo and Juliet laws do not take 
these essential factors into account, and for that reason, the true intention of 
the Romeo and Juliet exception is not being realized.
206
 
IX. CONCLUSION 
Since Kaitlyn was charged with lewd and lascivious battery of a 
minor, her case has received national media attention.
207
  Society can clearly 
see the wrong in Kaitlyn facing such a harsh punishment.
208
  And though she 
will likely escape her sex offender registration requirement,
209
 the teenagers 
who fall beyond the Romeo and Juliet law’s four-year limit will be provided 
no such legal protection.
210
  Until Florida makes a change, these unlucky 
teenagers will continue to be treated the same as the sexual predators that 
society and the legislature intended to label as sex offenders.
211
 
Labeling a teenager a sex offender is not a decision that should be 
dependent solely on something as insignificant as a birthday.  To the person 
who argues that a line needs to be drawn somewhere, I say, draw it 
somewhere else. 
                                                                    
204. Barchenger, supra note 1; Slifer, supra note 2. 
205. See, e.g., State v. Welch, 94 So. 3d 631, 634 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App.), 
reh’g denied, No. 2D11-2911, 2012 Fla. App. LEXIS 15191 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2012). 
206. See, e.g., id. at 634–35 (Morris, J., concurring). 
207. Slifer, supra note 2. 
208. Barchenger, supra note 1. 
209. Slifer, supra note 2. 
210. State v. Marcel, 67 So. 3d 1223, 1225 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 2011). 
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